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Abstract: 
 
This thesis examines domestic authorities’ use of non-criminal justice responses1 to 
counter organized crime. Examples of responses used to counter outlaw motorcycle2 gangs in 
Canada, Germany, and Iceland are provided. These responses are significantly different from 
most international efforts focusing on criminal norms and cooperation in criminal matters.   
                                                
1 For the purpose of this work, the term ‘non-criminal justice responses’ will be used in accordance with the 
following definition:  
non-criminal justice responses are neither intended to bring about criminal punishment, nor to carry out any criminal 
punishment.  However, failing to comply with these responses or conditions laid out by them, might bring about 
criminal liability, without such criminal sanctions being the purpose of these responses as such.  Therefor, non-
criminal justice response might have one or more institution of the criminal justice system as part of the process, 
(such as police, prosecution, etc.) or be entirely initiated, executed and controlled by such institutions.  However, the 
actions taken are neither based on the criminal law nor legislations intended to bring about or execute criminal 
sanctions. 
An example would be the check stops in Canada, where the police sets up check stops based on the traffic law and 
apparently to collect intelligence about individuals suspected of being involved in organized crime.  Therefore, these 
efforts are neither based on the criminal law, nor intended to bring about prosecution for any particular offence 
under the criminal law.   
Another example would be the civil law orders in Australia, where known members of declared outlaw motorcycle 
can be issued a control order, restricting their ability to associate, take on particular occupation or stay in particular 
location.  Non compliance with these control orders bring criminal sanctions, without though the criminal sanctions 
being the main purpose of the orders, but rather to reinforce the preventive control orders. 
Consequently, the term ‘non-criminal justice responses’ excludes both ‘criminal law responses’ and ‘criminal justice 
responses’.  This study has found there to be a confusion in the use of the terms ‘criminal law responses’ and 
criminal justice response, for the sake of clarity, this work will rely on the following use of these terms: 
‘Criminal Law Responses’ are only those responses that are based directly on the Criminal Law. 
‘Criminal justice responses’, include criminal law responses, but additionally, include all the responses utilized by 
the criminal justice system for the purpose of enforcing the criminal law.  These could be actions taken by 
authorities, such as detention and arrest for investigative purposes, search and seizure, etc. (potentially based on 
parts of the criminal procedural law, law about the judiciary, policing acts, etc.)  Additionally, responses intended to 
execute sanctions, by bringing about and manage the punishment that has been decided (potentially based on laws 
and regulations governing payment of fines, incarceration, disposal of criminally forfeited assets, etc.)   These 
responses are generally based on legislations intended for the purpose of upholding the criminal law, to bring about 
punitive actions of the criminal law, and for the management of any punitive actions. 
2 Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCG) is a form of organized crime, known for utilizing intimidation and violence to 
further the gang’s interests. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs originate from the motorcycle culture of Northern America 
after the Second World War, but have increasingly become involved in ever more sophisticated forms of organized 
crime, including drug trafficking, prostitution and extortion.  Outlaw motorcycle gangs are distinctive from many 
other forms of organized crime in that member generally do not hide their involvement with the gang, in fact 
members generally wear insignia on their clothing that indicates their involvement with the gang. 
See for example: Quinn, James F, ‘angels, bandidos, outlaws, and pagans: the evolution of organized crime among 
the big four 1% motorcycle clubs’ (2001) 22 Deviant Behavior, 379;  Barker, Tom, ‘American Based Biker Gangs: 
International Organized Crime’ (2011) 36 American Journal of Criminal Justice, 207;  Gomez del Prado, Grégory, 
‘Outlaw motorcycle gangs’ attempted intimidation of Quebec’s police forces’ (2011) 12 Deviant Behavior, 66;  
Librett, M, ‘Wild pigs and outlaws: The kindred worlds of policing and outlaw bikers’ (2008) 4 Crime, Media, 
Culture, 257. 
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As harmonization of legislation, policies and practices in this field become an 
international focus, I examine the role currently played by the European Union in promoting 
these non-criminal justice 'alternative' enforcement strategies for the purpose of furthering the 
development of international and domestic efforts to counter organized crime. 
This study concludes that the European Union is, in fact, promoting this approach 
through International Soft Law. The thesis then examines whether there are the same concerns 
pertaining to matters such as due process and democratic principles as previously raised with 
international efforts to suppress organized crime within the field of Transnational Criminal Law.  
 
 
————  
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Introduction 
 
Transnational crime has been described as one of the major issues for policy making, 
crime control and policing for the 21st century.3  The rise in ‘transnational crime’4 has been 
considered to be the consequence of globalization, or at least facilitated by an increased 
frequency and ease of: travel, trade, movement of capital and communications.  Subsequently, 
the problem that transnational crime presents has been said to be one that can no longer be dealt 
with by domestic authorities in each country individually, because how law enforcement and 
judicial authority are still fundamentally linked to sovereignty and limited by nation state 
borders.5  With transnational crime being less and less limited by borders of nation states, an 
international effort is needed to counter the problem — i.e. to prevent those involved in these 
kind of crime from being able to operate out of safe havens and further their operations by 
selective use of favourable jurisdictions.  In the foreword of the Palermo Convention6 Kofi 
Annan Secretary-General of the UN clearly states his view of ‘transnational organized crime’7 as 
a global threat that has to be met with a global response.8 
                                                
3 Louise I. Shelley, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center’s website, front page.  
<www.policy-traccc.gmu.edu/ > Accessed 8 January 2011. 
4 ‘Transnational crime’ is a Criminological term that has been defined by Mueller, as: “. . . certain criminal 
phenomena transcending international borders, transgressing the laws of several states or having an impact on 
another country.”  Mueller, Gerhard O W, ‘Transnational crime: Definitions and Concepts’ in P Williams and D 
Vlassis (eds), Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses (Frank Cass 2001), 13.  As cited 
in Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at p 954.   
The term has been claimed to be an umbrella term for variety of criminal behaviour, including organized crime.  
See: Fijnaut, ‘Transnational Crime and the role of the United Nations’, 8 European Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice (2000) 119, at 120.  As cited in Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European 
Journal of International Law, 953, at p 954. 
5 Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘Palermo on the Pacific Rim’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, August 2009), p 
262, 293 and 298 - 299.  Smith, Jennifer M, ‘An International Hit Job’ (2009) 97 The Georgetown Law Journal, 
1111, at p 1112 - 1116.  Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag 
2010) p 22.  United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations November 15, 
2000), p 2. United Nations News Centre, ‘Countries ignorant about threats posed by transnational crime – UN 
agency chief’ (UN News Centre, April 23, 2007) 
6 The Palermo Convention is what the ‘United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime’ is 
frequently called both by practitioners and academics, as the convention was signed in Palermo Italy.  United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations November 15, 2000). 
7 ‘Transnational organized crime’ is a term that has been used about organized crime that are transnational or have 
been considered to have transnational aspect.  There seems however not to be any agreed up on definition.  The kind 
and degree of the transnational aspect needed for organized crime to be considered ‘transnational organized crime’ 
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The call for global response has been answered, with a number of initiatives for 
countering organized crime at both the transnational and the international level, including the 
creation of international legal instruments to suppress the criminal activity.  The most significant 
of these international legal instruments are the UN ‘Palermo Convention’ in 2000, and two 
international legal instruments introduced by the European Union: ‘Joint action of 21 December 
1998’ and ‘The Organized Crime Framework Decision’ from 2008.9 
 
The international efforts for countering transnational and organized crime by use of 
‘International Law’ have been the focus of a healthy academic discussion.  ‘Transnational 
Criminal Law’ has been claimed to be a complementary legal term for the criminological term 
‘transnational crime’10 and a “doctrinal match” in the field of law.11  Claiming Transnational 
Criminal Law to be the venue for discussing ‘transnational crime’ within the field of law.  
Consequently, the field of ‘Transnational Criminal Law’ has become an important venue of 
academic discussion about international efforts for countering transnational and organized 
crime.12 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
is unclear.  ‘Transnational organized crime’ is by definition to be considered to fall under the criminological term 
‘transnational crime’, See definition of ‘transnational crime’ in fn 4. 
8 Annan, Kofi A, Foreword of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime p iii – iv.  
<http://www.unodc.org/> Accessed 8 January 2011. 
9 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations November 15, 2000);  The 
Organized Crime Framework Decision [2008] OJ L300/42;  Joint Action of 5 December 1997 adopted by the 
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, establishing a mechanism for evaluating the 
application and implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against organized crime 
[1997] OJ L344/7. 
10 This work will use Boister’s simplified definition for the term ‘transnational crime’: “. . .. transnational crime 
describes conduct that has actual or potential trans-boundary effects of national and international concern.“  Boister, 
N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at 954.  Boister cites: 
Mueller, Gerhard O W, ‘Transnational crime: Definitions and Concepts’ in P Williams and D Vlassis (eds), 
Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses (Frank Cass 2001), 13;  Fijnaut, C, 
‘Transnational crime and the role of the United Nations in its Containment through international cooperation: A 
challenge for the 21st century’ [2000] Eur J Crime Crim L & Crim Just, 119. 
11 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at p 953 – 954. 
12 See for example: Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘Palermo on the Pacific Rim’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime August 2009);  Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag 
2010). 
   3
Preliminary study suggests there to be an important difference between national and 
international efforts for countering organized crime, a difference that seems to have gone largely 
unnoticed by the academic discussion about international efforts for countering organized crime.   
Academic discussion within the field of Transnational Criminal Law focuses on formal 
‘criminal justice responses’13 to organized crime.  For example, Neil Boister, who relabelled part 
of the ‘International Criminal Law’14 as ‘Transnational Criminal Law’ in 2003, defined the term 
as “. . . the indirect suppression by international law through domestic penal law of criminal 
activities that have actual or potential trans-boundary effects.”15  This definition raises concerns 
for being too narrow and exclusive, by excluding the influence of international ‘soft law’16 and 
responses based in other fields of law such as administrative and civil law, which I will examine.  
It is evident that domestic authorities utilize not only criminal law and criminal justice responses 
in their efforts to counter organized crime, but also a variety of non-criminal justice responses, 
perhaps in particular when dealing with ‘outlaw motorcycle gangs’.  
This apparent difference between domestic and international efforts raises important 
questions as to whether there is a disconnect between practitioners tasked with countering 
organized crime, national and supranational policymakers in the field, and the academic 
discussion about organized crime. This raises three questions: Is there an increase in the 
utilization of non-criminal justice responses at the domestic level?  If so, have these enforcement 
strategies failed to reach the attention of policymakers at the international level. We might 
question why academic discussion has not examined this apparent difference in approach 
between the domestic and the international efforts. Finally, I question whether lack of 
                                                
13 See fn 1 for definition of criminal justice responses vs. non-criminal justice responses. 
14 ‘International Criminal Law’ “. . . is the primary international legal regime that addresses the atrocities of war and 
other forms of inter-social conflict in the hope of providing accountability, which in turn is expected to lead to the 
prevention of conflict and to the enhancement of peace prospects.”  Bassiouni, M Cherif, Introduction to 
International Criminal Law, 2nd Revised Edition (Brill 2012), at p cxxi.  See also: Bassiouni, M Cherif, ‘The 
sources and content of international criminal law: a theoretical framework’ in M Cherif Bassiouni (ed), International 
Criminal Law, Volume I: Sources, Subjects, and Contents (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers / Brill Academic 2008), 3;  
Currie, Robert J, International and transnational criminal law (Irwin Law 2010), at p 17 – 19. 
15 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953 at p 955.  
Importantly however he limits the “indirect suppression by international law” with ‘Suppression Conventions’ – 
suggesting a formal convention has to be in place between the states involved. 
16 See on hard and soft International Law: Dixon, Martin, Textbook on International Law (5 edn, Oxford University 
Press 2013).   
See on International Soft Law: Guzman, Andrew T, and Timothy L Meyer, ‘“International Soft Law” by Andrew T. 
Guzman, et al.’ (2010) 2 Journal of Legal Analysis, 171;  Ho, Daniel E, ‘Compliance and International Soft Law: 
Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?’ (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic Law, 647. 
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knowledge, about domestic use of non-criminal justice responses, might have hindered the 
development of efforts to incorporate these responses into an international more formalized set 
of recommended responses to organized crime — and if such recommendations may raise fewer 
concerns than the system of Transnational Criminal Law and the less formal transnationalization 
of non-criminal justice responses, suspected to exist.  The answer is not straightforward.  While 
the system of Transnational Criminal Law has been seen to focus on harmonization of domestic 
criminal norms and academic knowledge about non-criminal justice responses seems to be 
limited, and largely absent from discussion about international efforts for countering organized 
crime – pluralist legal thinking suggests there to be important practical and theoretical 
difficulties with transnationalization of domestic approaches and norms.  Importantly, legal 
pluralism shows there to be important practical and theoretical difficulties with the creation of 
universal norms.17  Furthermore, pluralism emphasizes the importance of interdisciplinary 
understanding of law in its appropriate context within and outside the legal discipline.18 
 
The study starts by reviewing academic literature on organized crime responses within 
the field of Transnational Criminal Law, continues by reviewing literature on pluralism in global 
governance as an alternative to the emphasize on harmonization within the field of Transnational 
Criminal Law, and ends with reviewing academic literature on non-criminal justice responses to 
organized crime.  Following the literature component, this study examines how non-criminal 
justice responses are being utilized by domestic authorities to counter organized crime.  For 
practical purposes, the examination will be limited to responses utilized for countering outlaw 
motorcycle gangs in three countries: Canada, Germany and Iceland, as this study is limited in 
space and time.  Second, the study examines if non-criminal justice responses are being 
promoted under International Law.  Finally, I examine if concerns should be raised with 
compatibility of the transnationalization of non-criminal justice responses with fundamental 
principles of law, Human Rights and good governance.  The examination will rely on the 
concerns Boister raised with the system of Transnational Criminal Law, while adding one 
                                                
17 Walker, Neil, ‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies, at p 533 - 541;  Krisch, 
Nico, ‘The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law’ [2009] Law Society and Economy Working Papers, at p 7 - 9 
and 40 - 45. 
18 Zumbansen, Peer, ‘Comparative, global and transnational constitutionalism: The emergence of a transnational 
legal-pluralist order’ (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism, 16, at p 51. 
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concern found to be of importance from the discussion about the international efforts of the 
European Union in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
Some concluding remarks will be offered, attempting to bring the findings into context 
and showing their importance for the discussion about transnationalization of crime control and 
criminal norms. 
 
_________________________   
   6
Methods 
 
This thesis starts with a threefold literature review.  The first part provides an overview of 
the literature on international efforts for countering organized crime in the field of Transnational 
Criminal Law, then continues by providing an account of how pluralist legal thinking as an 
alternative to the focus by the international community via Transnational Criminal Law on 
harmonization of norms, affects legal studies.  Finally an overview is provided of the literature 
on non-criminal justice responses utilized domestically for the countering of organized crime.  
The understanding acquired will serve as a basis for studying the presumed difference between 
domestic and international efforts for the countering of organized crime.  Furthermore, the 
overview of existing literature is expected to provide knowledge of the concerns raised with both 
approaches, capable of providing the basis for assessing if the promotion of non-criminal justice 
responses under International Law would be likely to raise lesser concerns than the current 
promotion of criminal justice responses raises. 
 
The first phase of the research, the research into the utilization of non-criminal justice 
responses for countering organized crime by domestic authorities in Canada, Germany and 
Iceland, was limited to the kind of organized crime generally referred to as outlaw motorcycle 
gangs.19   
The selection of outlaw motorcycle gangs for studying the utilization of non-criminal 
justice responses for the countering of organized crime was initially dictated by the author’s 
existing knowledge of non-criminal justice responses being utilized to counter outlaw 
motorcycle gangs perceived by authorities to be part of the local organized crime problem.  
Furthermore, information about outlaw motorcycle gangs is more readily available than with 
most other kinds of organized crime.  Members do not hesitate to identify themselves with the 
gangs and express themselves as gang members, as well as adhering to a culture with highly 
visible insignia and running club houses under the gangs insignia. 
In order to research the enforcement of outlaw motorcycle gangs, data collection was 
based in part on the snowball method.  The author contacted personal contacts acquired as a 
                                                
19 See definition of outlaw motorcycle gangs in fn 2. 
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police officer, all of which were at the time working as practitioners in law enforcement.  These 
contacts then introduced the author to other law enforcement practitioners that would be able to 
inform the author further about the subject of the research.  The process would then repeat itself. 
All the law enforcement practitioners were tasked with countering organized crime in 
some form, they were therefore able to inform of measures and approaches used by law 
enforcement authorities to counter organized crime in one or more of the countries covered by 
this research.   
The contacts were asked to inform the author of any responses they knew to be utilized 
for countering organized crime (specifically outlaw motorcycle gangs), regardless of their legal 
basis or whether the responses were utilized in their own jurisdiction or not.  The contacts were 
informed that the author was particularly interested in non-criminal justice responses.  The 
contacts were asked to provide citable sources, but these practitioners frequently did not have 
their information from publicly available sources and access might be restricted to their own 
sources. 
The contacts were assured that they would not be cited on the information they gave.  
Furthermore, the contacts were assured that the measures they brought to the authors attention 
would not be discussed in this work, unless on the basis of some citable information that would 
provide the evidence for the use of these measures.  Also, all the contacts were guaranteed 
anonymity. 
This method provided a valuable knowledge about variety of non-criminal justice 
responses that were being utilized to counter outlaw motorcycle gangs.  Media search, without 
the guidance provided by the contacts, would presumably have generated some information but 
the evidence on the use of other less publicly visible responses would have remained hidden. 
Logically, it is easier to find evidence for something the existence of which is known, 
than to look for everything that might be expected to exist, knowledge of a specific approach or 
kind of measures makes it easier to recognize evidence of it when one comes across such 
evidence.  Consequently, knowledge of use of specific responses in one country would make a 
search for such responses in another country easier, e.g. because of better knowledge of how 
such responses looks like when implemented. Iceland was a natural country to focus on first due 
to the author’s existing knowledge of organized crime responses there.  Germany brings the 
focus on one of the leading member states of the European Union, the Union arguably being the 
   8
main actor in transnationalization of criminal norms, also, Germany is known to have tried to 
ban criminal organizations.  Finally, the study is conducted in Canada, where responses for 
countering organized crime seem to be under influence from both developments in Europe and 
the United States of America. 
 
Based on the information from the contacts five different searches were made for 
publicly available information for the use of the non-criminal justice responses now known to be 
used to counter organized crime by domestic authorities. 
First, a focused media search was conducted for publicly available information showing 
the use of responses in line with those described by the contacts as being utilized by domestic 
authorities.  This search was not limited to the countries being studied, but was limited by the 
language knowledge of the author.  This search was intended to inform of variety of responses 
being utilized to counter organized crime. 
Second, a more focused search was conducted, now limited to the three countries being 
studied, Canada, Germany and Iceland.  This search was guided by the knowledge of existing 
non-criminal justice responses to organized crime, acquired from the contacts and the previous 
media search.  The author then assessed if each response should be considered to be a non-
criminal justice response.  For the purpose of this assessment, ‘non-criminal justice responses’ 
were considered neither to be intended to bring about criminal punishment, nor to carry out any 
criminal punishment.  However, failing to comply with these responses or conditions laid out by 
them, might bring about criminal liability, without such criminal sanctions being the purpose of 
these responses as such.  Therefor, non-criminal justice response might have one or more 
institution of the criminal justice system as part of the process, (such as police, prosecution, etc.) 
or be entirely initiated, executed and controlled by such institutions.  However, the responses as 
such are neither based on the criminal law nor legislations intended to bring about or execute 
criminal sanctions.20 
Finally, a search was made for case law dealing with the non-criminal justice responses 
found to be utilized in the three countries included in this study. 
 
                                                
20 See my definition of non-criminal justice responses vs. criminal justice responses in fn 1. 
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A second research was then conducted, on the basis of the acquired knowledge of non-
criminal justice responses being utilized by domestic authorities for countering organized crime 
– this time for evidence of non-criminal justice responses being promoted at the international 
level.  The purpose is to see if the utilization of non-criminal justice responses by domestic 
authorities is influencing the approach taken by international efforts for countering organized 
crime. 
The research was conducted by utilizing the document search engines of the European 
Union and the United Nations, these two being the main international bodies involved in the 
suppression of organized crime at the international level according to the Transnational Criminal 
Law literature review.  The search engines were utilized to search for evidence of any promotion 
of non-criminal justice response for the purpose of countering organized crime, such as outlaw 
motorcycle gangs.  The knowledge of non-criminal justices being utilized by domestic 
authorities for countering organized crime, gained in the first part of the research, was used to 
guide the search for any international promotion. 
 
Finally, the study developed a test to examine if the promotion of non-criminal justice 
responses would be likely to meet less criticism for incompatibility with fundamental principles 
of law and good governance than the system of Transnational Criminal Law currently does.  The 
test is intended to indicate if the domestic approach of utilizing non-criminal justice responses 
for countering organized crime should be influencing international efforts for the same purpose.  
The test is developed from the main concerns raised for incompatibility of the system of 
Transnational Criminal Law with fundamental principles of law and good governance, in 
addition to the concern raised with lack of sound knowledge as a basis for policymaking. 
 
Known limitations of this Method 
 
Known weaknesses of the method have primarily to do with the initial research for non-
criminal justice responses being utilized by domestic authorities.  These concerns include that the 
contacts are unlikely to have revealed all measures they knew to be used by authorities to counter 
organized crime.  Adding to the potential incompleteness of the research, due to confidentiality 
requirements, no measures are being discussed in this work, for which the author did not find 
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publicly available information.  Consequently, the sample of non-criminal justice responses 
presented here should not be seen as a complete sample of such responses used by authorities in 
the countries covered in this research. 
Ideally this kind of research would benefit from being conducted in cooperation with 
multinational or international institutions that are involved in crime control, capable of 
facilitating the information sharing.  Attempt was made to secure cooperation with both the 
European Police Institute and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.  Unfortunately, 
neither institution was able to provide full accessed to their data.  Although, both institutions 
deserve thanks for the information shared and support shown. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime shared its publication called "Digest of 
Organized Crime Cases" that is a compilation of cases dealing with organized crime.21  
However, examination showed the publication to be limited to criminal justice responses, 
excluding non-criminal justice responses, such as for example civil and administrative measures. 
 
Of the three languages of the three countries studied in this work the author only has 
sufficient knowledge for academic work in two.  Therefore assistance had to be received in 
working with material in German, in which the author has only limited competence.  Also, 
information received had frequent references to measures used in other countries than those 
being studied, often in variety of languages.  The author’s ability to read all the Scandinavian 
languages except Finish was therefore an asset, but inability to read languages such as French, 
Italian and Dutch proved to be a weakness.  Therefore, this methodology might be more 
comprehensible for a group of researchers that together have proficiency in wider variety of 
languages. 
  
                                                
21 ‘Digest of organized crime cases’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 16 October 2012). 
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/ebook_E.pdf> Accessed 17 October 2012.  See also about the 
project at: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) official website: 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/digest-of-organized-crime-cases.html> accessed 17 October 
2012. 
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Literature review 
 
Transnational crime have been described by academics as a major global issue.  In the 
words of Louise I. Shelley, a well known scholar in this field: 
“Transnational crime will be a defining issue of the 21st century for 
policymakers - as defining as the Cold War was for the 20th century and 
colonialism was for the 19th. Terrorists and transnational crime groups will 
proliferate because these crime groups are major beneficiaries of 
globalization. They take advantage of increased travel, trade, rapid money 
movements, telecommunications and computer links, and are well positioned 
for growth.”22 
Organized crime is considered to be a part of this Transnational Crime issue.  
Increasingly transnational organized crime is considered to be a problem that can no longer be 
dealt with by domestic authorities in each country individually, but that an international effort is 
needed to counter the problem—i.e. via ‘harmonization’ of the way that individual countries deal 
with the enforcement issues as well as with increased cooperation and joint efforts.23  In the 
foreword of the Palermo Convention, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the UN, clearly states 
that transnational organized crime24 is a global threat that has to be met with a global response.25 
 
                                                
22 Louise I. Shelley, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center’s website, front page <www.policy-
traccc.gmu.edu/ > Accessed 8 January 2011. 
23 Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘Palermo on the Pacific Rim’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime August 2009), 
p 262, 293 and 298 - 299.  Smith, Jennifer M, ‘An International Hit Job’ (2009) 97 The Georgetown Law Journal, 
1111, at p 1112 - 1116.  Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag 
2010) p 22.  United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations November 15, 
2000), p. 2. United Nations News Centre, ‘Countries ignorant about threats posed by transnational crime – UN 
agency chief’ (UN News Centre, April 23, 2007) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.> accessed 2 April 
2014 
24 ‘Transnational organized crime’ is a term that has been used about organized crime that are transnational or have 
been considered to have transnational aspect.  There seems however not to be any agreed up on definition.  The kind 
and degree of the transnational aspect needed for organized crime to be considered ‘transnational organized crime’ 
is unclear.  ‘Transnational organized crime’ is by definition to be considered to fall under the criminological term 
‘transnational crime’, see definition in footnote 4. 
25 Kofi A. Annan, Foreword of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime p iii – iv  
<http://www.unodc.org/> Accessed 8 January 2011. 
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The European Union responded at a regional level in 1998 with the Joint Action, making 
it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organization within its member states.  Again in 
2008, it adopted the Framework Decision on the fight against organized crime.26  The United 
Nations responded on the international level with the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, better known as the Palermo Convention in 2000.27 
The Palermo Convention has established organized crime as a crime under International 
Criminal Law. 
 
Public discussion tends to identify International Criminal Law with crime such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression, i.e. the crime that now 
fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.  Neil Boister has however 
emphasized that the so-called treaty crime are much greater in number than the crimes under 
International Criminal Law sticto sensu. 28  Treaty crime being crime that have been established 
by international treaties where states agree to criminalize specific conduct.29 
 
Transnational Criminal Law – a field within International Criminal 
Law 
 
Boister and others claim it to be necessary to distinguish between International Law that 
deals with International Crime stricto sensu and the part of International Criminal Law that deals 
with crime that have become familiar to public discussion as Transnational Crime.30 
Boister notes that Transnational Crime is a criminological rather than juridical term, 
created “in order to identify certain criminal phenomena transcending international borders, 
transgressing the law of several states or having an impact on another country”31.  However, he 
                                                
26 The Organized Crime Framework Decision [2008] OJ L300/42;  Joint Action of 5 December 1997 adopted by the 
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, establishing a mechanism for evaluating the 
application and implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against organized crime 
[1997] OJ L344/7 
27 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations November 15, 2000) 
28 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953 at 956. 
29 Currie, Robert John, International and transnational criminal law (Irwin Law 2010), at p 15 - 16. 
30 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953.  Currie, Robert 
John, International and transnational criminal law (Irwin Law 2010), at p 12 - 21. 
31 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953 at p 955. 
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sees it as problematic that this term is unknown to international lawyers, who would use terms 
such as ‘crime of international concern’ and ‘common crimes against internationally protected 
interests’.32  Boister therefore suggests a legal term for the system of international law that 
suppresses ‘transnational crimes’. 
Boister claims to build on Philip Jessup’s use of the phrase “transnational law” as 
describing “all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers”.33  Boister 
states that he wants a more restricted use of the term Transnational Criminal Law than had 
previously been used.  He claims the term traditionally to have been used to describe all criminal 
law that were not entirely confined to its nation state, in line with Jessup’s definition of 
“transnational law”.34  Boister defined Transnational Criminal Law as “the indirect suppression 
by international law through domestic penal law of criminal activities that have actual or 
potential trans-boundary effects.“35  Focusing on the network of treaties between states that 
suppress “socially, economically and morally undesirable inter- and intra-state conduct” through 
domestic penal law.36 
Boister does not discuss why he restricts his definition of Transnational Criminal Law to 
treaties suppressing activity through domestic penal law.  By so doing he seems to omit other 
kinds of domestic legislations than penal law that may be used to suppress “socially, 
economically and morally undesirable inter- and intra-state conduct”37.  It seems contradictory 
for Boister to create a term to facilitate interdisciplinary discussion with other disciplines, but at 
the same time to limit the discussion to a specific field within the legal discipline itself.  The 
limitation of the term to domestic penal law seems, partially at least, to defeat the purpose of 
facilitating interdisciplinary discussions. 
                                                
32 Ibid 
33 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953 at p 954.  
Citing Philip Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1956), at p 2. 
34 Boister cites for this use of Transnational Criminal Law: A. Eser and O. Lagodny (eds), Principles and Procedures 
for a New Transnational Criminal Law (1992), at v; Clark, ‘Countering Transnational and International Crime: 
Defining the Agenda’, in P. J. Cullen and W. C. Gilmore (eds), Crimes Sans Frontieres: International and European 
Approaches: Hume Papers on Public Policy Vol. 6, nos 1 and 2 (1998) 20. Boister cites Philip Jessup for his 
definition of ‘Transnational Law’: See P. Jessup, Transnational Law (1956), at 2. See generally,: O. Schachter, 
‘Phillip Jessup’s Life and Ideas’, 80 AJIL (1986) 878, at 893–894. 
35 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953 at p 955. 
36 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at p 955 - 956. 
37 Ibid p 956. 
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Both Boister and Robert J. Currie refer to the treaties that form Transnational Criminal 
Law as ‘suppression conventions’.38  Consequently, both of them seem to limit Transnational 
Criminal Law to suppression through formal treaties under international law, as opposed to soft 
law.39  By so doing they exclude varieties of soft law such as non-binding agreements, 
recommendations, or agreed up on road maps that might be highly influential on the state parties.  
Boister explains that the offences established by these suppression conventions, together with 
what he calls International Criminal Law stricto sensu, were considered to fall within the broad 
system of International Criminal Law.  The difference being that offences established by the 
suppression conventions only brought with them domestic criminal liability for individuals, and 
in fact only after the relevant member state ratified the convention by enacting such liability into 
domestic law.  While International Criminal Law stricto sensu “. . . provide for individual penal 
responsibility for violations of international law before an international penal tribunal.”40 
 
Currie explains that by establishing suppression conventions the states agree to two 
objectives.  First, the objective to cooperate with each other to prevent offenders from finding 
safe havens from prosecution in the other contracting states, and second to reinforce law 
enforcement powers of the contracting states to suppress the activity made criminal under the 
convention by way of joint effort.41  Currie furthermore states these conventions place three main 
types of obligations on the contracting states to achieve these objectives.42  First, state parties 
must criminalize the kind of conducts that falls under the convention.  Second, they must take 
jurisdiction over offences and offenders under the convention both territorially and 
extraterritorially, including amending domestic law accordingly.  And last, state parties must 
accept the legal principle of aut dedere aut judicare, meaning that they have to either prosecute 
offenders under the convention or extradite them to state parties willing to do so.  The Palermo 
convention is a case in point.  The convention obligates state parties to criminalize specific 
                                                
38 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953 at p 955.  
Currie, Robert John, International and transnational criminal law (Irwin Law 2010), p 19.   
39 See further on hard and International Soft Law: Dixon, Martin, Textbook on International Law (5 edn, Oxford 
University Press 2013) p 47 - 48. 
40 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953 at p 955. 
41 Currie, Robert John, International and transnational criminal law (Irwin Law 2010), at p 19. 
42 Ibid 
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conduct under articles 5, 6, 8 and 23, take jurisdiction under article 15 and at last the principle of 
aut dedere aut judicare is to be found under article 16. 
Boister discusses the following three main reasons for the need to bring increased focus 
on this system of International Law that he calls Transnational Criminal Law.   
His first reason is that Transnational Crime is a rapidly growing phenomenon43 and that 
as a response to this growth the number of suppression conventions have grown rapidly to over 
200 such treaties44, making Transnational Criminal Law “probably the most significant existing 
mechanism for the globalization of substantive criminal norms.”45  However, he argues there to 
be “far greater scope for legal ambiguity and abuse of rights in Transnational Criminal Law than 
in International Criminal Law stricto sensu.”46  This reason has only grown to become more 
relevant and pressing today than when Boister wrote his article more than ten years ago.  There 
has been substantive development in the supranationalization of criminal law within the 
European Union after Boister made this claim.  For example after the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 the 
European Union has now the ability to introduce European criminal law and although greatly 
limited, one of the subject matter where it has legislative competence is organized crime.47  
Additionally the Lisbon Treaty provides that the union can now establish a European Public 
Prosecutor's Office who’s power’s can be extended ” . . . to include serious crime having a cross-
border dimension . . .”48 
Secondly, Boister claims studies of Transnational Criminal Law have been neglected, 
contributing to the lack of doctrinal basis for this field of law, “. . . where sovereignty is still a 
dominant value but somewhat contradictorily, interstate cooperation is often extensive although 
                                                
43 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953 at p 956.  
Citing: Fijnaut, ‘Transnational Crime and the role of the United Nations’, 8 European Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice (2000) 119, at p 122. 
44 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at p 956.  
Citing: Bassiouni, M. Cherif, ’The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Framework’, 
in Bassiouni ed, International Criminal Law 2 ed (1999) at p 32-33 and 62-69, for the full list of treaties. 
45 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953 at p 956. 
46 Ibid 
47 Herlin-Karnel, Ester, ‘What Principles Drive (or Should Drive) European Criminal Law’ (2010) 11 German Law 
Journal, 1115, at p 1116 – 1117;  Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union[2012] OJ C326/1, part 3, title 5, chapter 4. 
48 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union[2012] OJ C326/1, part 3, title 5, chapter 4, art 86. 
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beyond the reach of the public eye.”49  This is supported by Francesco Calderoni’s and Andreas 
Schloenhardt’s claims that scientific studies are lacking in the field of organized crime.50  They 
also claim legislation in the field to have been driven by particular incidents and politics rather 
than scientific knowledge.51 
Thirdly, Boister claims relabeling is necessary, as scholars had originally mislabelled 
crime under the suppression conventions as crime against internationally protected interests.  The 
relabeling would draw a clear distinction between crime that are international crime, considered 
to be “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”52, and 
those that might be seen to be of less universal values and interests.  This re-labeling being 
necessary to “. . . draw attention to the deficiencies of this increasingly important system.”53   
 
Boister is concerned that the system of Transnational Criminal Law creates risk of 
ambiguity and risk of abuse of rights, his apprehension is based on the following six main 
concerns: 
• Transnational Criminalization 
• Legitimacy in the Development of the System 
• Doctrinal Weaknesses in the System 
• Human Rights Considerations 
• Legitimacy in the Control of the System 
• Enforcement of the System 
With regards to transnational criminalization, Boister finds it dangerous to form 
transnational morality without holistic policy and coherency with fundamental principles.54  He 
finds it necessary to ask questions about what constitutes the threat intended to counter and if the 
appropriate response at the international level is to promote penal response.  He also finds the 
                                                
49 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at p 956 and 
958 - 959. 
50 Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘Palermo on the Pacific Rim’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime August 2009), 
at p 294.  Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag 2010), at p 25. 
51 Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘Fighting Organized Crime in the Asia Pacific Region: New Weapons, Lost War’ (2012) 2 
Asian Journal of International Law, 137, at p 164.  Calderoni, Francesco, ‘Organized crime legislation in the 
European Union’ (Springer Verlag 2010), at p 170. 
52 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (United Nations, July 17, 1998), Art 5. 
53 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at p 956. 
54 Ibid, at p 957. 
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creation of the system at the transnational level, by democracy of states, to suffer from 
democratic deficiency where the citizens have little to do with its adoption or application.55  He 
is concerned of doctrinal weaknesses in the system by lack of coherency of general principles, 
procedures, penalties and the scope of criminal liability.56  Additionally, he points out that the 
system does not ensure compatibility with Human Rights.57  Furthermore, Boister is concerned 
of legitimacy in the control of the system, especially undue influence of powerful states, that he 
claims to have promoted the system due to their own sensitivity and vulnerability to many of the 
activities the system is intended to suppress.58  Finally, Boister is concerned about the weak and 
infrequently used provisions for enforcement of Transnational Criminal Law, which he claims is 
an informal gradient system of inducement, the development of which was driven by few 
powerful states for their own purposes.59 
 
Calderoni seems to share Boister’s concern for the influence of the international legal 
instruments on domestic law, but rather because of lack of quality and best knowledge basis of 
the instruments than concerns about legitimacy.60  Calderoni claims that the legal instruments 
introduced for the joint efforts of countering organized crime do not reflect best scientific 
knowledge in the field.  Consequently, Calderoni is concerned that member states of the Union 
will be forced to amend legislations, of higher quality and stronger base in scientific knowledge, 
to approximate to the legal instruments of the European Union. 
 
To summarize, common policy for countering Transnational Crime is being created at the 
international level, influencing and perhaps up to a point steering domestic response of the 
member states.61  At the same time there has been an ongoing discussion about legitimacy 
problems in global governance, revolving inter alia around the democratic deficiency of the 
European Union, where this supranational body, created by a multinational treaty, is creating 
                                                
55 Ibid, at p 957 - 958. 
56 Ibid, at p 958. 
57 Ibid, at p 959. 
58 Ibid, at p 959 - 960. 
59 Ibid, at p 960. 
60 Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag 2010), at p 25. 
61 Baker, Estella, and Christopher Harding, ‘From past imperfect to future perfect? A longitudinal study of the Third 
Pillar’ (2009) 34 European Law Review.  Baker, E, ‘Governing through crime -- the case of the European Union’ 
(2010) 7 European Journal of Criminology, 187, at p 188 - 191. 
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norms that either have direct effect at the domestic level or obliges member states to change their 
domestic law so as to conform to European Union Law.62  
 
Boister and some likeminded scholars claim the system of Transnational Criminal Law to 
be a powerful system of International Law but that the system is haunted by a variety of 
problems.  The scholars claim that these problems are caused by three main issues; academic 
knowledge is lacking in the field, consequently the system and the responses promoted by it are 
not based on best academic knowledge in the field, lack of academic knowledge in the field 
being an issue in its own right, and last but not least complexity of the social problems intended 
to counter - portrayed e.g. by the absent of consensus on how to define these problems - 
organized crime being a case in point. 
 
International efforts to suppress organized crime through domestic 
penal law – the system of Transnational Criminal Law. 
 
As noted by Boister, the system of Transnational Criminal Law is made up of 
suppression conventions that developed in response to the most pressing issues of the time.  
Taking as an example how a number of hijacking conventions were adopted in the late 1960’s 
and early 1970’s as a response to hijacking becoming a global problem.63  By the end of the last 
century, Transnational Organized Crime was claimed to be on the rise and Kofi Annan, then the 
Secretary-General of the UN, stated in the year 2000 that transnational organized crime had 
become a global threat that had to be met with a global response.64  The call for international 
response against organized crime continues.  As a response to this, policy is being formed on a 
supranational basis, including but not limited to conventions, affecting domestic policy and 
legislations.65 
                                                
62 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘The Constitution of Europe’ (CUP, New York 1999), at p 264 - 270. 
63 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at p 957. 
64 Kofi A. Annan, Foreword of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, at p iii – iv  
<http://www.unodc.org/> > Accessed 8 January 2011. 
65 For call for transnational response to organized crime see for example: United Nations, United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, ‘The globalization of crime’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2010), at p V and 36;  
Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘Palermo on the Pacific Rim’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime August 2009), at 
p 298 – 299;  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ‘"Crime must have no home," says 
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‘Harmonization’ towards criminal justice response 
 
The European Union responded to the call for a transnational integrated response to 
organized crime at a regional level in 1998 with its Joint Action, making it a criminal offence to 
participate in a criminal organization in its member states, requiring its member states to amend 
their domestic law accordingly.66  The Joint Action also introduced a definition for a criminal 
organization.67  The definition has meet criticism from the scholarly community, e.g. for being 
vague and lacking the minimum clarity required in criminal law.68 
 
The UN responded on the international level in 2000 with the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, better known as the Palermo Convention.69  The main 
goal for the Palermo Convention was to facilitate transnational cooperation in the subject field of 
organized crime.  Nevertheless, the convention also introduced its own definition of an organized 
criminal group that has become a global standard.70  That definition was, however, a political 
settlement between contradicting views of the signatory states of what constitutes organized 
crime, for the scope of the convention.71  Because the scope of the convention was to facilitate 
transnational cooperation, the definition was not intended to tell the signatory states what they 
                                                                                                                                                       
UNODC Chief ahead of Vienna Conference on transnational organized crime’, (UNODC press release 11 October 
2012) <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/allpress.html?ref=fp> accessed 7 March 2013 
Regarding policy being formed at supranational level see for example: The Stockholm Program [2010] OJ C115/1 
, at chapter 4, particularly subchapter 4.4.  European Unions, Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 
‘Draft Council Conclusions on the creation and implementation of a EU policy cycle for organised and serious 
international crime’ (The European Union, October 25, 2010) 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st15/st15358.en10.pdf> accessed on 27 November 2012. 
66 The Organized Crime Framework Decision [2008] OJ L300/42;  Joint Action of 5 December 1997 adopted by the 
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, establishing a mechanism for evaluating the 
application and implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against organized crime 
[1997] OJ L344/7.  
67 Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag 2010), at p 27 - 28.  
For the definition, see: ‘Joint Action of 21 Desember 1998’ (eur-lex.europe.eu December 29, 1998), art. 1. 
68 Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag 2010), 189, at p  28. 
69 UN General Assembly, ‘United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime’ (United Nations 
November 15, 2000). 
70 Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag 2010), at p 32. 
71 Ibid.  Orlova, Alexandra V, and JW Moore, ‘"Umbrellas" or “building blocks”? Defining international terrorism 
and transnational organized crime in international law ’ (2005) 27 Houston Journal of International Law 
(Magazine/Journal), 267, at p 285 - 287. 
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should regard to be organized crime and therefore was not drafted for such purpose.72  The 
convention, again like the European Union’s Joint Action, provides for two model offences that 
either or both must be established as criminal offences.73  One has been called the conspiracy 
model, criminalizing conspiracy between two or more persons to commit a crime involving an 
organized criminal group, the other has been called the participation model, criminalizing 
participation in such group.  The model offences have meet criticism from the academic 
community primarily for being overly broad and under inclusive.74  Neither of the model 
offences make any kind of transnational element a requirement in the description of the offence. 
Even if, article 3 of the Palermo Convention, titled Scope of the application clearly states that the 
scope of the Convention is where an offence is “transnational in nature”.75  Consequently, the 
influence of the Convention can be seen to exceed its scope by introducing model offences at the 
domestic level that are not limited to offences that are “transnational in nature”.  In fact, the 
organized crime offence in the Icelandic criminal code, art 175 a, was enacted to fulfill Iceland’s 
obligations under the Palermo Convention.76  The offence does not mention transnational 
elements as a requirement and the travaux préparatoires does not mention any legislative intent 
to limit the offence to activities that have transnational element.77 
 
The European Union acted again in 2008 by adopting the Framework Decision.  The 
2008 Framework Decision had minor differences from the Palermo convention and it’s 
                                                
72 Ibid 
73 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations November 15, 2000), art. 5.  
Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘Transnational Organized Crime and International Criminal Law’ in M Cherif Bassiouni 
(ed), International Criminal Law, Volume I: Sources, Subjects, and Contents, vol. 1 (3rd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers / Brill Academic 2008), 939, at p 953.  Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the 
European Union (Springer Verlag 2010), at p 33 - 34. 
74 Orlova, Alexandra V, and JW Moore, ‘"Umbrellas" or “building blocks”? Defining international terrorism and 
transnational organized crime in international law ’ (2005) 27 Houston Journal of International Law 
(Magazine/Journal), 267, at p 281 - 285.  Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union 
(Springer Verlag 2010), at p 32 - 35.    
75 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations November 15, 2000), art. 3 
para 1 
76 ‘Excerpts from the General Penal Code, No. 19/1940, Articles 69 a-69 g, 100 a, 175 a and 264’.  As changed by 
Act No. 149/2009.  Accessed 8 May 2012. <http://eng.innanrikisraduneyti.is/laws-and-regulations/english/penal-
code-and-punishment/nr/27244> 
77 Ibid;  Frumvarp til laga nr. 149/2009 (Bill of law no. 149/2009) from 8 October 2009 <http://www.althingi.is/dba-
bin/ferill.pl?ltg=138&mnr=16> accessed 7 May 2012; Lög um breyting á almennum hegningarlögum (Law 
amending the General Penal Code) no 19 from 30 December 2009 
<http://www.althingi.is/altext/stjt/2009.149.html> accessed 7 May 2012 
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predecessor, the Joint Action from 1998.78  The participatory model offence is changed so as not 
to include any more the reference to “other activities” than criminal, now only applying to 
criminal activities and listed non-criminal behaviours.79  The non-criminal activities being listed 
as “provision of information or material means, the recruitment of new members and all forms of 
financing of its activities.80 
The decision also requires the member states to introduce a minimum sanction of two to 
five years for the offence of participation in a criminal organization.81  Finally the decision 
requires, that committing an offence within the framework of a criminal organization may count 
as an aggravating circumstance in the member states, a requirement not either to be found in the 
other two international legal instruments. 
 
These three international legal instruments all attempt to suppress organized crime by 
requiring their member states to criminalize specific activities under their domestic law.82  
Therefore they all meet the standards set by Boister for being part of Transnational Criminal Law 
– “. . . the indirect suppression by international law through domestic penal law of criminal 
activities that have actual or potential trans-boundary effects.”83  Whether the European Union 
legal instruments qualify as suppression conventions can however be contested. 
However, the transnational efforts for harmonization of domestic legislations are not 
limited to ‘criminal law responses’84 but are concerned more generally with ‘criminal justice 
                                                
78 Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag 2010), at p 41. 
79 Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag 2010), at p 38.   
80 ‘Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008’ (Official Journal of the European Union 
December 30, 2008), art. 2 para. a.  
81 Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag 2010), at p 38 - 39.  
‘Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008’ (Official Journal of the European Union 
December 30, 2008), art. 3 para 1. 
82 UN General Assembly, ‘United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime’ (United Nations 
2000), art 5.  The Organized Crime Framework Decision [2008] OJ L300/42 art. 2.  Joint Action of 5 December 
1997 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, establishing a mechanism 
for evaluating the application and implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against 
organized crime [1997] OJ L344/7, art. 2. 
83 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at p 955. 
84 For the purpose of this work, ‘criminal law responses’ and criminal justice responses’ will be used in accordance 
with the following definition: ‘Criminal law responses’ are only those responses that are based directly on the 
criminal law.  ‘Criminal justice responses’, include criminal law responses, but additionally, include all the 
responses utilized by the criminal justice system for the purpose of enforcing the criminal law.  These could be 
actions taken by authorities, such as detention and arrest for investigative purposes, search and seizure, etc. 
(potentially based on parts of the criminal procedural law, law about the judiciary, policing acts, etc.)  Additionally, 
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responses’85.  This work will differentiate between these two terms, ‘criminal law responses’ is 
considered to be responses that are based directly on the criminal law, while the ‘criminal justice 
responses’ additionally include responses for bringing about or enforce the criminal law although 
having a different legal basis.  The international legal instruments require participating states – in 
addition to them introducing ‘criminal law responses’ – to introduce domestic legislations for 
furthering transnational cooperation in criminal matters; for facilitating detection, investigation 
and adjudication across borders, as well as to facilitate execution of sanctions.86  
An important difference between the three above discussed legal instruments is that the 
Palermo convention promotes ‘criminal justice responses’ in general, while the two European 
Union instruments only promote ‘criminal law responses.87  In fact, the cooperative provisions of 
the Palermo convention were said to have been the main concern for the negotiation of the 
convention, the model offences and definition of organize crime having been a secondary 
concern.88  However, this difference should not be overstated, as the European Union goes even 
further in promoting ‘criminal justice responses’ other than ‘criminal law responses’, only the 
Union does so in a variety of different international legal instruments.89 
International efforts continue to promote criminal justice responses for countering 
organized crime.90  Within the European Union, policy is being formed and introduced both on 
                                                                                                                                                       
responses intended to execute sanctions, by bringing about and manage the punishment that has been decided 
(potentially based on laws and regulations governing payment of fines, incarceration, disposal of criminally forfeited 
assets, etc.)   These responses are generally based on legislations intended for the purpose of upholding the criminal 
law, to bring about punitive actions of the criminal law, and for the management of any punitive actions. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Orlova, Alexandra V, and JW Moore, ‘"Umbrellas" or “building blocks”? Defining international terrorism and 
transnational organized crime in international law’ (2005) 27 Houston Journal of International Law, 267 at p 285. 
87 UN General Assembly, ‘United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime’ (United Nations 
2000), art 11 – 31;  The Organized Crime Framework Decision [2008] OJ L300/42.  Joint Action of 5 December 
1997 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, establishing a mechanism 
for evaluating the application and implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against 
organized crime [1997] OJ L344/7. 
88 Orlova, Alexandra V, and JW Moore, ‘"Umbrellas" or “building blocks”? Defining international terrorism and 
transnational organized crime in international law’ (2005) 27 Houston Journal of International Law, 267 at p 285.  
Orlova cites Keith Morrill, the chief Canadian negotiator of the Palermo Convention. 
89 See for example: Council Decision establishing the European Police Office (Europol) [2009] OJ L121/37;  
Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the establishment of a European Police 
Office [1995] OJ C316/1).;  The European Arrest Warrant [2002] OJ L190/1). 
90 United Nations, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘The globalization of crime’ (United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime 2010), at p V and 36.  Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘Palermo on the Pacific Rim’ (United Nations 
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its transnational and supranational level, facilitating cooperation of member states in this field 
and influencing domestic policy and legislations.91  The United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime assists member states to the Palermo Convention in implementing their domestic law to 
fulfill their international obligations under the convention.92  The same United Nation’s body has 
published ’Digest of organized crime cases’ which is a compilation of best practice and case law 
for countering organized crime in line with the convention.93  Together the Palermo convention 
and the guidance of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime must be seen to influence 
domestic policy on how to counter organized crime globally, although probably not as influential 
on its member states as the European Union instruments. 
 
The above coverage shows how international efforts are influencing domestic responses 
for countering organized crime, focusing on harmonization of criminal justice responses. 
 
The Organized Crime discussion within the field of Transnational 
Criminal Law 
 
The main theme of the Transnational Criminal Law discussion regarding organized crime 
evolves about what could be called the definition crises of the organized crime term, as no 
agreed up on definition exists for the term.  Leading to the absence of that fundamental definition 
in all the three international legal instruments for countering organized crime listed above.  All of 
these three international legal instruments instead introduce criminal offences based on a 
marginally different definition for ‘an organized criminal group’ or ‘a criminal organization’.94 
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Political differences between nation states, as to how organized crime should be defined, 
seem to have thwarted the creation of a global definition.  Part of the political difference having 
to do with how some countries feared that a too broad definition would make it possible to class 
cases of terrorism as organized crime, while other countries preferred that exact possibility.95  
However, as stated above, the absent of definition seems to some extent to be caused by the fact 
that the contracting states did not intend to create a definition that would tell the signatory states 
what they should regard to be organized crime – but only to frame the scope of their 
transnational cooperation in the field.96 
Academics have no more than the politicians been able to agree upon a definition for the 
phenomenon.97  Some scholars have argued that the appropriate way to define organized crime 
would be to base a definition on the distinctive features of organized crime.98  However, no 
agreement has been reached as to what those distinctive features are.99  Other scholars have 
claimed: “. . . we might define organized crime as being that crime that is committed by criminal 
organizations.”100  Yet others seem to regard it favourable to consider the method of operation 
(modus operandi) as the basis for describing the characteristics of organized crime.101  Where 
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legal activity or aims can fall within the scope of organized crime legislations where the 
intimidating power of a criminal association is used to bring about submission. 
Calderoni has claimed that although there is no general agreement on a definition for 
organized crime, several studies have indicated four common elements: 
• Continuity. The group must have a stable structure suited to the continuous and 
indefinite commission of crimes, independently of its membership (Finckenauer 2005, 
66; Bäckman 1998, 25; Hagan 2006, 135). 
• Violence. The group exploits its force to use or to threaten to use violence or 
intimidation. This may be addressed to other criminal groups, minor criminals, 
legal/illegal competitors and victims (Finckenauer 2005, 66; Bäckman 1998, 26; von 
Lampe et al. 2006, 36; Spinellis 1997, 813). 
• Enterprise. The group’s main goals are profit and power. These are usually pursued 
through the production and/or exchange of illegal goods and/or services in illegal 
markets (Finckenauer 2005, 66–67; Hagan 2006, 134; Spinellis 1997, 813). 
• Immunity. The group can corrupt or exert influence on other subjects (politicians, 
media, judicial authorities, administrators, enterprises) in order to shield its activities 
from any form of sanctions (Finckenauer 2005, 67; Bäckman 1998, 27; Hagan 2006, 
135; Spinellis 1997, 813).102 
However, he claims that none of the definitions provided in the international legal 
instruments for countering organized crime clearly reflect any of these elements.  Orlova  and 
Moore claim that it would have been better that the state parties would have omitted the 
definition under article 2 of the Palermo convention “rather than create a definition that is 
arguably both overly broad and under-inclusive.”103 
 
Existing definitions have been criticized for overbreadth and vagueness, effectively 
allowing authorities to use organized crime legislations against other groups that are not 
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favoured by the government, but for other reasons than organized criminality.104  As mentioned 
above this was one of the issues thwarting the negotiations about definitions for the Palermo 
convention.105  
Additionally, it has been argued that heavier punishments and increased law enforcement 
powers were justified by elevated harm and danger to the society caused by organized crime.106  
This justification has, however, been argued to fail, on account of vagueness and overbreadth of 
definitions, causing other groups of people than criminal organizations and other activities than 
organized crime to be subject to organized crime legislations.107 
On this same account definitions of organized crime have been said to violate the 
proportionality principle.  By way of providing for increased punishment for organized crime 
activities, without providing definitions that secure that these increased punishments apply only 
for organized crime activities.108  Consequently, failing to recognize how proportionality “. . . 
must always be measured by weighing the freedom of each individual against his/her own 
criminal activity”.109 
Also, this overbreadth and vagueness of the definitions of organized crime, or lack of 
such definition, has been criticized for violating fundamental principles of the criminal law.110  
Estela Baker has pointed out how the definition problem poses a treat to the principle of clarity 
in criminal law, noting that “[I]t is a basic requirement of the rule of law that criminal law should 
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be sufficiently clear for individuals to be able to discriminate between those acts that will 
infringe the norms that it lays down and those which will not”.111   
  
Another important theme of the discussion about organized crime legislations has been 
the extension of criminal liability these laws generally provide for.  As Schloenhardt explains, 
organized crime offences generally extend criminal liability beyond traditional boundaries of 
criminal liability.112  “Liability arises on the basis of loose associations and intentions, rather 
than on the basis of proven physical results or harmful conduct.”113  A person can become 
responsible for actions taken before the preparation and even the planning of the offence in 
question.114  Schloenhardt cites Frank Verbruggen that the classic theory has been: 
“. . . that states should not intervene in human relations with a blunt 
instrument like criminal law unless damage has been done to a specific 
“legally proscribed interest”, “a common good” like property, sexual 
integrity or life and limb. [...] Instead, criminal law becomes a tool to prevent 
the damage from ever happening, by making endangerment the threshold for 
intervention and sanctioning.”115 
Towards the same end Schloenhardt cites Mullins that:  
“[t]his 'remoteness of social danger' can undermine the justification for 
criminal liability to apply.[...] In a properly minimalist system of criminal 
law, conduct that is too remote from social harm should not be 
criminalised”116 
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Schloenhardt remarks that concerns have been raised over the compatibility of this 
broadening of criminal liability with basic ideas of the role of the criminal law and traditional 
principle of criminal law.117  He cites Edward Wise for concerns over compatibility with:  
“. . . traditional principles of criminal law which are supposed to require 
focusing attention on the concrete specific act of a specific individual at a 
specific moment in time and on that individual’s own personal guilt, not on 
that of his associates.”118 
This concern over creating guilt by association has been yet another theme of the 
discussion about organized crime legislations.  David Freedman notes that many countries have 
been introducing new forms of individual criminal liability under organized crime legislations.119  
Where individual conduct is criminalized but the activity that constitutes the substantive offence 
is a group activity.  This Freedman sees as a difficult move: 
“Our criminal law has always professed to be concerned with the acts or 
omissions of a discrete individual, with doctrine crafted to link the requisite 
fault requirements of a given offence with the moral and social 
considerations that rationalize stigma and punishment - in respect of that 
individual and for that offence alone.  With targeted organized crime laws we 
move [...] closer, some might say, to guilt by association.”120 
Additionally, concerns have been expressed over the compatibility of criminalization of 
association with the right to freedom of association as a fundamental Human Right.121  
Concerns have also been raised over what should be a punishable level of involvement 
with a group.122 
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In fact, scholars have claimed that the criminal law is ill suited to deal with collective 
behaviour such as organized crime.123  Estella Baker claims that: 
“The criminal law copes badly when harm amounting to a criminal act takes 
place as a result of the collective actions or omissions of a group of 
individuals or of an organization, especially where the blame for their 
occurrence is widely diffused among a body of actors.”124 
Consequently, it is no small task to draft criminal law provisions capable of effectively counter 
the perceived criminal activity, while still being compatible with fundamental principles of the 
criminal law, principles that have developed in a system that traditionally was mainly concerned 
with individual behaviour. 
 
Finally, the discussion about organized crime in the field of Transnational Criminal Law 
has to some extent evolved around the different models of organized crime offences in the world.  
Schloenhardt has claimed different legislative approaches have created four different models of 
organized crime offences and listed them as: 
“1. The conspiracy model, found in the CTOC125 and in all Australian 
jurisdictions, as well as Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Papua 
New Guinea; 
2. The participation model stipulated by the CTOC126, and also adopted in 
Canada, New Zealand, New South Wales (Australia), China, Macau, Chinese 
Taipei (Taiwan), and in Australian federal criminal law; 
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3. The enterprise model based on the US RICO Act, which is also used in 
many US states, and the Philippines; and 
4. The labelling/registration model of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Japan, New South Wales, Queensland, Northern Territory, and South 
Australia.”127 
Schloenhardt remarks that “. . . the organised crime laws are local responses to local 
problems.”128  Claiming the criminal law provisions are tailored to suit a particular organized 
crime problem perceived to demand a response at a given time in a particular society. 
There are however those that claim that specific organized crime offences are not needed, 
like Kent Roach.  Roach has claimed, speaking in the Canadian domestic context, that new 
offences are not needed and will in fact not ‘get the job done’.129  Some, like Dorean Koenig, 
even consider these offences to have become a problem themselves by threatening to change the 
criminal justice system “. . . by greatly increasing the reach of the criminal law and enhancing 
sentences, while lessening the mens rea requirements.”130 
Schloenhardt has taken similar stance as Orlova and Moor, in their article on international 
response to organized crime and terrorism in 2005, that specific offences are more feasible than 
general ‘catch-all’ offences.131  Orlova and Moor recommended a number of conventions with 
clear definitions and clearly defined and limited offences, which would create a ‘building block’ 
of conventions for countering organized crime.  Rather than creating vague and ill defined 
‘umbrella offences’, like they considered the Palermo convention to have done.  Similarly 
Schloenhardt has recommended specific offences for criminalizing selected key functions of 
criminal organizations, avoiding broad and uncertain terms, and requiring proof of specific 
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mental element.132  He claims that this way the legislations can avoid the criticism of vagueness 
and overbreadth.  Furthermore, he argues this approach to impose penalty that is proportionate to 
the intentions and knowledge of the specific individuals accused, based on their individual 
blameworthiness. 
The four models listed by Schloenhardt above, all fall in the category of what here is 
called ‘catch-all’ or ‘umbrella offences’, including the two model offences of all the three main 
international legal instruments intended to counter organized crime. 
 
Latest developments suggest that the organized crime term is now being complemented, 
or even giving way for the term, ‘serious crime’.  Nicholas Dorn reflects up on this switch from 
the organized crime term towards the serious crime term in his article ‘The end of organised 
crime in the European Union’.133  Dorn claims that the presumption that a crime being organized 
equals that it is serious, and visa versa, is giving way for more harm based assessment.134  
Claiming that the shift towards the ‘serious crime’ term will allow policing prioritization and 
cooperation to be guided by assessment of social harm as opposed to structural assessment such 
as level of organization.  However, the shift towards the ‘serious crime’ term seems not to have 
brought about the emphasize on assessment of social harm that Dorn predicted in 2008. 
Judging from the use of the term ‘serious crime’ within the European Union, the term 
seems to be introduced as a concept that has wider scope than ‘organized crime’, organized crime 
being only but one form of ‘serious crime’.135  One evidence of this is how the term is utilized to 
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describe the objective of the European Police Office (EUROPOL) with the expressed intent to “. 
. . ensure that Europol can assist the competent authorities of the Member States in combating 
specific forms of serious crime, without the current limitation that there must be factual 
indications that an organised criminal structure is involved.”136  Still, this study was unable to 
find any definition for the term ‘serious crime’ in any of the many documents of the European 
Union that use the term, in fact there is little discussion to be found about the term’s definition.137  
Some of the documents present a list of criminal activities that are considered ‘serious crime’, 
however the activities listed as constituting ‘serious crime’ differ between the lists. 
It should, furthermore, be noted that the term ‘serious crime’ was part of the United 
Nations definition of an ‘organized criminal group’ in the Palermo convention.  There ‘serious 
crime’ is defined as a crime, punishable by at least four years maximum penalty.138  This is 
problematic, as the criminal activity considered to be ‘serious crime’ can consequently wary 
between jurisdictions and domestic authorities can choose to include or exclude certain activities 
from being considered ‘serious crime’ simply by changing the maximum penalty under domestic 
law.  Also, the United Nations definition of ‘serious crime’ does not rely on assessment of harm.  
The above listing of the European Union of activities considered to be ‘serious crime’, suggests 
that to the European Union ‘serious crime’ is what the Union sais it is.  
 
The Organized Crime discussion within the field of Transnational Criminal Law shows 
there to be practical and theoretical difficulties with the attempts made to counter organized 
crime by way of criminalizing organized crime specifically.  To large extent caused by the 
absence of consensus of what is the social problem intended to counter and what actions 
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constitute that said social problem.  This definitional issue seems not easily solved, least of all by 
casting the net even wider and less restrictively with the introduction of the new term ‘serious 
crime’, term even less defined than ‘organized crime’. 	  	  
Pluralism as an alternative to ‘harmonization’ 
 
Transnational and international efforts to influence and harmonize domestic efforts for 
countering organized crime should be seen as a form of global governance.  Transnational 
Criminal Law according to Boister is: “the indirect suppression by international law through 
domestic penal law of criminal activities that have actual or potential trans-boundary effects.”139  
By definition it is the global governance of domestic legislation within its limited subject field, 
indirectly governing activities of individuals.  Therefore, Transnational Criminal Law needs to 
be examined in the context of academic discussions about global governance.  That discussion 
has raised a variety of practical and theoretical issues facing global governance.  Academic 
discussion on constitutional pluralism show there to be real problems both theoretically and 
practically with drafting a normative order at the global or even regional level.140 
 
The above discussion shows international efforts for countering organized crime to focus 
largely on the constitutionalization of the field of law governing transnational efforts for the 
countering of organized crime, by creation of universal norms and harmonization of domestic 
legislations towards those universal norms.  Therefore, when considered in the context of 
academic discussion on legal pluralism, these international efforts for countering organized 
crime seem to raise both theoretical and practical issues.  Additionally, Peer Zumbansen’s 
writings claim that constitutional pluralism raises important doubt of current approach, of 
harmonization towards model offences, ability to yield real harmonization.141  Subsequently, 
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international efforts for the countering of organized crime need to be considered in the light of 
pluralist legal thinking in the field of global governance and transnational comparative law.  
After all, these international efforts are part of globalization of governance and transnational 
comparative law is the tool both for assessing existing domestic effort for the selection of best 
practices, and for the drafting of international policies and legal instruments that will truly bring 
about the intended results. 
 
Constitutionalism has become the predominant form of governance and legal ordering, 
but has come under increasing criticism; see for example James Tully’s work titled Strange 
Multiplicity.142  His criticism is primarily focused on the inability of constitutional schemes to “. 
. . cope with serious social and cultural diversity because of its strong link to ideas of impartiality 
and uniformity.”143  Tully’s criticism was primarily concerned with nation states, but his 
arguments have been seen to be even stronger at the subnational level, where diversity can be 
expected to be even greater than in any nation state.144 
Pluralism has been suggested as an alternative to constitutionalism as a normative order 
for global governance and lately global administrative law.  Neil Walker explained that unlike 
the constitutional ideas that saw the world order as “. . . one of completeness and hierarchy 
within each constitutional unit and limited interaction between units, . . .”145 the pluralism sees “. 
. . the incompleteness of the discrete units and an increased emphasis on the heterarchical 
relations between the units.”146 
Similarly Nico Krisch has described constitutional pluralism in the following way:  
“While constitutionalists, drawing on domestic inspirations, generally strive 
for a common frame to define both the substantive principles of the overall 
order and the relations between its different parts, pluralists prefer to see the 
postnational realm as characterised by heterarchy, by an interaction of 
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different sub-orders that is not subject to common legal rules but takes a 
more open, political form.”147 
It is argued here that the international efforts in the filed of Transnational Criminal Law 
strive to constitutionalize the field, by creation of common frame and hierarchical order of norms 
both at the international and the domestic level. 
Krisch has in his writings on global administrative law endorsed Tully’s claim of the 
difficulties that face constitutionalist models, claiming constitutional pluralism as a better 
equipped form of global governance to deal with diversity of loyalty and interests when 
confronted with the fact of this pluralist legal universe.148 Claiming constitutional pluralism to 
have: ”. . . significant strengths in providing adaptability, space for contestation, and a possibility 
of steering between conflicting supremacy claims of different polity levels.“149 
Michel Rosenfeld had previously claimed that pluralism is the right approach for our 
“pluralist-in-fact universe”150, where he sees power to be spread among the national-, 
transnational- and supranational level.151  He argues “that it is possible to reconcile legal and 
ideological pluralism by abandoning hierarchy and countenancing inconsistencies falling short of 
incompatibilities in a highly layered and segmented legal universe.”152  For this Rosenfeld has 
suggested some existing constitutional tools, most of which contribute to the layering of 
communities, administration, conflict resolution and “self”.  He seems to favour conflict 
resolution at the lowest possible level involving only those relevantly affected.153 
Krisch notes that the pluralism approach will not be free from difficulties, but after 
analyses and comparison of the normative appeals and difficulties of different forms of 
constitutionalism on the one hand and different forms of constitutional pluralism on the other, he 
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finds in favour of the pluralist approach.154  “In the divided, highly contested space of the 
postnational, ideal solutions are elusive – and pluralism may be the best option we have.”155 
 
The above discussion claims that we live in a “pluralist-in-fact universe”156 where every 
person finds himself subject to varieties of often overlapping norms and subject to power of 
different levels of governance, domestic, trans- and supranational.  This description seems to 
reflect well the findings of both Calderoni and Schloenhardt in the field of Transnational 
Criminal Law showing the diversity of organized crime legislation and the influence that 
international legal instrument have had on these legislations.157 
 
Academic discussion on constitutional pluralism show there to be real problems both 
theoretically and practically with drafting a normative order at the global or even regional 
level.158  For example, even the relatively homogeneous region of the European Union failed, at 
least for now, in its attempt to create a constitution for the Union.159  The discussion shows the 
difficulty in drafting a system capable of creating norms for such socially and culturally diverse 
polity, as is the ‘global community’.  Whereas scholars like Rosenfeld suggest creating layering 
in the attempt to solve conflict at the lowest possible level, where conflicting interests and norms 
are likely to be fewer in number, involving only those relevantly affected.160 
Surprisingly, in the light of the above detailed discussion, the international efforts in the 
field of Transnational Criminal Law seems nevertheless to emphasize the creation of a common 
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framework to harmonize domestic criminal law as crucial for international efforts intended to 
suppress organized crime.  Furthermore, the emphasize of the academic discussion seems to be 
on the existing norms and constitutionalizing efforts, with the aim of creating universally 
applicable definitions and norms, capable of countering the variety of different organized crime 
problems in the world.  While the pluralist arguments show the feasibility of heterarchical 
relationship and cooperation mechanism, to further common goals and policies, based on best 
knowledge and experience. 
 
Furthermore, Peer Zumbansen’s writings on constitutional pluralism suggest that the 
harmonization of norms in the field of Transnational Criminal Law is not on its own likely to 
yield a real harmonization of responses and effects at the domestic level.  Zumbansen has 
emphasized functionalism, interdisciplinary approach and appropriate context as essential for 
today’s comparative legal studies.161 
Zumbansen has claimed that “[a]t the heart of comparing legal cultures today lies an 
unavoidably interdisciplinary study of legal and non-legal norms, routines and social 
practices”.162  Zumbansen suggests “interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist 
comparisons”163, which he claims cannot be fruitfully realized without drawing from insights of 
other disciplines.164  Zumbansen argues that comparative legal studies in today’s pluralistic legal 
reality have to be conducted in the appropriate legal-, historical-, economic-, political-, social- 
and ideological-context both locally and internationally.165 
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Zumbansen’s writings do not build a good case for harmonization of norms, arguing that 
the same legal text might have different effect or be implemented differently in countries that 
differ in their legal-, historical-, economic-, political-, social- and ideological-context.  
Suggesting that the harmonization of domestic organized crime legislations does not necessarily 
yield harmonization of responses intended to counter organized crime, let alone bring any 
assurance for having the same effects in different contest of different societies.   
Additionally, Zumbansen’s writings suggest that international efforts intended to share 
practices and experiences between nation states, must be based on studies of existing practices 
and experiences in both nation states conducted with “interdisciplinary understanding of 
functionalist comparisons”166, in the appropriate context of legal and non-legal norms, routines 
and social practices.167  Suggesting that such extensive understanding of existing practices and 
experiences in both nation states is fundamental for the apprehension of sound knowledge 
capable of making such information sharing truly beneficial. 
Zumbansen’s writings seem also relevant to any comparative legal studies of 
Transnational Criminal Law in general and in particularly subjects as heavily influenced by 
international efforts as organized crime.  The findings of both Calderoni and Schloenhardt show 
a wide variety of domestic legislations intended to counter organized crime.168  Schloenhardt has 
noted that “. . . the organised crime laws are local responses to local problems.”169  Furthermore, 
he gives a detailed account of relevant political, historical, social and legal context of these local 
responses.170  Subsequently, academic research in the field seems to support Zumbansen’s 
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argument for need for “interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist comparisons”171 in 
appropriate context of legal and non-legal norms, routines and social practices.172 
Such interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist comparison in appropriate context, 
seems to require a study of organized crime legislations in different jurisdictions to take into 
consideration all responses utilized for this purpose, not only criminal justice responses.  If for 
nothing else, for the sake of how availability of additional responses can be expected to affect the 
implementation of criminal justice responses, if only for the fact that the availability of different 
measures for countering organized crime might affect the approaches chosen by the practitioners 
tasked with individual cases. 
 
The field of Transnational Criminal Law can learn three main things from the pluralist 
discussion on global governance.  First, real problems exist both theoretically and practically 
with drafting universal norms to counter organized crime for such socially and culturally diverse 
polity, as is the ‘global community’.  Second, promoting or developing responses to organized 
crime from the practices and experience of different nation states seem to require 
“interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist comparisons”173 of the relevant legal and non-
legal norms, routines and social practices in their appropriate context.  Finally, this contests the 
narrow scope of Transnational Criminal Law as a platform for legal discourse about 
transnational crime, such as organized crime, as Transnational Criminal Law is by definition 
limited to how international law stricto sensu indirectly suppresses criminal activity through the 
use of ‘penal law’ – in the face of evidence of International Soft Law indirectly suppressing 
criminal activity through non-criminal justice responses. 
 
Literature on domestic Non-Criminal Justice Responses to Organized Crime 
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Non-criminal justice responses for the countering of criminal behaviour can be divided 
into two categories: responses that focus on proceeds of crime, versus a wider range of 
preventive and disruptive responses to criminal activities.  The latter approach is the main 
subject of this thesis.  The former approach, to utilize non-criminal justice responses for going 
after assets suspected to be instruments or proceeds of crime, in particular so called non-
conviction based forfeitures and money laundering has been substantively discussed in academic 
debate.  Hence, it is not deemed necessary or useful to re-examine in detail the criminal asset 
approach here, however, a short account must be given for the sake of context and to make use of 
observations already made as part of that discussion.  For a more detailed coverage of the 
proceeds of crime approach Angela Leong offers a good coverage with emphasize on the United 
Kingdom in here book ‘The Disruption of International Organized Crime’.174 
 
Focus on the proceeds of crime 
 
The category that emphasizes the proceeds of crime can be said to have two main 
approaches, one that focuses on preventing assets from the illicit economy from entering the licit 
one, and another that focuses on ways to deprive criminals of assets that are found to be proceeds 
of crime or instruments of crime.  
 
Countering Money Laundering 
 
Wide variety of responses have been introduced for countering money laundering, the act 
of moving assets from the illicit economy into the licit one.  Part of the approach has been to 
criminalize the conduct, but additionally, responses have been introduced for making financial 
information accessible, ensure review of this information and to place duties on the private sector 
to report suspicious transactions.  Moreover, these actions have been promoted at the 
international level.175  
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Most importantly the Financial Action Task Force has contributed heavily to bringing 
about national legislations and regulations to counter money laundering.176  In fact, the 
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force can be said to have set the international 
standards for domestic legislations and regulatory framework for countering money 
laundering.177  The task force even examines if member states adhere to the recommendations, 
and noncompliant member states can be ‘blacklisted’.178 
These recommendations are a unique example of how ‘International Soft Law’, with no 
legally binding force and no formal International Law enforcement mechanism, has been able to 
shape international standards and national legislations.179  Studies have shown incredible 
compliance to the recommendations and suggestions of the Financial Action Task Force, 
showing how soft International Law can bring about just as much compliance or even more 
compliance than International Law stricto sensu sometimes called ‘International Hard Law’.180 
Additionally, the Financial Action Task Force recommendations show non-criminal 
justice responses to be utilized to counter criminal activities, as only a portion of the 
recommendations strive to bring about criminal sanction.181  Many of the recommendations can 
be seen to have primarily preventive purposes, in fact a whole chapter is named ‘Preventive 
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Measures’, these preventive measures should properly be considered non-criminal justice 
responses.182 
Money laundering has been the subject of a substantive academic discussion and has 
been carefully examined, therefore, it will not be re-examined in this work.183  For the present 
purposes it is sufficient to show how this international promotion of domestically originated non-
criminal justice responses raises questions about how restricted Transnational Criminal Law is, 
as a field of law.  Being restricted to the influence of International Law stricto sensu on domestic 
penal law, when apparently not only penal law is utilized to counter organized crime, and 
domestic law in the field is being influenced by ‘International Soft Law’. 
 
Going after the proceeds of crime 
 
The enormous profit that some individuals have been able to reap from their criminal 
activity, despite authorities’ efforts, has been seen as a major problem.184  This profit has been 
said to diminish the deterrence of criminal sanction, where the possible profit is such as to make 
the punishments appear to be worth the gain.185  Additionally, the prosperity of individuals 
involved in criminal activity is seen to serve as an incentive for others to get involved in such 
criminal activities and have damaging effect on the society, when members of the society 
observed how those that do not adhere to it’s rules prosper from their illicit behaviour.186  
Furthermore, the tremendous assets generated by crime creates vast opportunities for further 
                                                
182 Ibid, at p 14. 
Non-criminal justice responses will be used in this work in the wide meaning of all responses that are not criminal 
justice responses.  Criminal justice responses being responses that are based on domestic criminal law of the nation 
state in question. 
183 For further material on ‘Money Laundering’ see for example: Beare, Margaret E, and Stephen Schneider, Money 
Laundering in Canada: Chasing Dirty and Dangerous Dollars (University of Toronto Press 2007);  Alexander, Kern, 
‘The International Anti‐Money‐Laundering Regime: The Role of the Financial Action Task Force’ (2001) 4 Journal 
of Money Laundering Control, 231. 
184 Nikolov, Nikolay, ‘General characteristics of civil forfeiture’ (2011) 14 Journal of Money Laundering Control, 
16, at p 16 - 17;  Gallant, M Michelle, and Colin King, ‘The Seizure of Illicit Assets: Patterns of Civil Forfeiture in 
Canada and Ireland’ (2013) 42 Common Law World Review, 91, at p 93 - 94. 
185 Gallant, Mary Michelle, Money Laundering and the Proceeds of Crime: Economic Crime and Civil Remedies 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2005), at p 3; Nikolov, Nikolay, ‘General characteristics of civil forfeiture’ (2011) 
14 Journal of Money Laundering Control, 16, at p 16; Leong, Angela, The Disruption of International Organised 
Crime: An Analysis of Legal and Non-Legal Strategies (Ashgate Pub Co, 2007), at p 104 – 105. 
186 Ibid. 
   43
criminal activity, where the assets could be used as instruments of crime and to evade detection 
and punitive actions. 
New strategy evolved in some nation states and at the international level, where the 
objective was to go after the proceeds of crime to take away these incentives and instruments of 
crime.187 
 
One of these strategies introduced non-conviction based forfeiture, where the state takes 
actions outside the criminal justice system to deprive those suspected of criminal activity of their 
ill gotten gain.  The utilization of non-criminal justice responses to go after the proceeds of crime 
as an approach to countering criminal activity, and organized crime in particular, has been 
sufficiently examined in academic discussion and it is not considered necessary to re-examine 
the approach in this work.188  Therefor, for present purposes it is sufficient to give a short 
account of the approach. 
 
Non-Conviction Based Forfeiture 
The utilization of non-conviction based forfeiture for the purpose of going after the 
proceeds of crime has been said to have originated from efforts of authorities in the United States 
of America to counter piracy in the Caribbean in the late 1700s.189  Frequently in those piracy 
cases, ship, the cargo and the crew could be seized, but the owner could not be brought to justice.  
Consequently, a new enactment was introduced that allowed the government to bring a case in 
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rem against the pirate ship itself or its cargo.190  By bringing a forfeiture action against the 
properties themselves, the owner was forced to come forward if he wanted to challenge the 
forfeiture. 
Forfeiture as part of the penal process has been knows since the Roman times.  However, 
the criminal forfeiture process traditionally utilized to seize profits of crime has its limitations.191  
Criminal forfeiture can only be executed following a guilty verdict in a criminal proceeding.  
Also, only assets acquired by the crime proven and instruments of that crime can be forfeited 
from the defendant, or in some cases the equivalent of the proceeds of the crime in question if 
the assets themselves can not be acquired.  Additionally, generally only assets of the defendant 
himself can be forfeited in the criminal process, not assets of relatives, companies or other 
related persons or entities - nor criminal organizations or members of such organizations 
suspected of having gained from the criminal actions of the defendant.192  Criminal forfeiture is 
by definition a criminal justice response and as such outside the scope of this thesis, the subject 
will therefore not be examined further here. 
The utilization of non-conviction based forfeiture became common practice in the 1980s 
when the approach was found fitting and useful for the drug prohibition enforcement.193  Much 
like with the piracy cases of the 18th and 19th century, the mastermind of an international drug 
organization and the owner of the drugs and properties used for trafficking or manufacturing 
were not readily identified, let alone brought to justice.  The approach, now increasingly dealing 
with drug enforcement, had to be adjusted to allow for civil forfeiture now dealing with the 
seizure and forfeiture of modern day assets; vehicles, businesses, real estates and bank accounts, 
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had to be adjusted to modern day basic civil rights.194  Still, it is debated if the proceedings have 
reached the point of being compatible with modern day basic rights.195 
It is of specific interest for this work how civil forfeiture has been utilized for countering 
outlaw motorcycle gangs in Canada, where authorities have seized and forfeited club houses of 
gangs such as the Hells Angels MC.196  Many of these cases are still being processed through the 
judicial system.  Amongst the main issues being debated is the procedural rights that should be 
applicable in civil forfeiture cases, and the level of proof required to seize and forfeit assets as 
“instruments of unlawful activity” or “proceeds of unlawful activity.”197 
The approach of using non criminal justice responses to go after the proceeds of crime 
has been further developed to allow for wider variety of ways to go after the suspected criminal 
profits.  In some countries, including Ireland and the United Kingdom, the approach to go after 
criminal profit has been taken one step further, by intertwining in one autonomous agency 
multiple efforts for preventing the enjoyment of the proceeds of crime.198  The agency in Ireland 
investigates suspicions of criminal profits, forfeit such profits if possible, but alternatively makes 
sure it is treated as any other income or asset with regards to revenue law and social benefits.199  
The agency is made up of officials from multiple agencies, including the Irish National Police, 
the Irish Customs, the Irish Revenue Service and the Department of Social and Family Affairs.200  
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The legal framework allows for extensive cooperation of these agencies and information sharing 
between them.201 
The Irish approach has gained well deserved attention, in particular within the European 
Union, where Europol is promoting the Irish model as best practice.202 
 
Considerations relevant for going after proceeds of crime under civil law 
 
A substantive academic discussion has evolved around the subject of non-conviction 
based forfeiture and its use to counter organized crime, for present purposes it is sufficient to 
give an overview of the discussion. 
The argument supporting non-conviction based forfeiture mainly relies on how criminal 
profits give incentive and means for further criminal activities, and the argument that crime 
should not pay, emphasizing that it is socially harmful if they do.203  The argument claims the 
criminal forfeiture process to be insufficient instrument for seizing criminal assets.204  
Subsequently, causing criminally obtained assets to be left at the convicts’ disposal or in the 
hands of individuals involved in crime, as both an incentive and an instrument for further crime.  
In the organized crime context, such assets have been claimed to give high level criminals the 
means to commit crime and avoid being held accountable.  Subsequently, the forfeiture of these 
assets makes them more vulnerable to detection and capture.205 
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Consequently, it has been considered necessary to provide the state with further abilities 
to seize the profits driving from criminal activities, in particular serious and organized crime.206  
This kind of forfeiture has been argued to be a preventive measure and not a punitive one, where 
the state is only recovering illegally acquired assets - assets that have arguably never legitimately 
became the property of those that acquired them through illegal actions.207 
The critics have pointed out that the civil forfeiture remedy has been utilized in cases that 
have nothing to do with organized crime and in some cases the crimes can hardly be argued to 
have been committed for profit.208  Consequently, undermining the argument that this kind of 
approach is necessary for the purpose of countering organized crime kingpins or making sure 
crimes do not pay.  An example of both would be the forfeiture of a house belonging to a sports 
couch guilty of sexually exploiting a teenager, where authorities forfeited the house as an 
instrument of the crimes committed there.209   
Most importantly though, the critics have argued that non-conviction based forfeiture is 
punitive in nature - in fact criminal punishment by another name - and therefore requiring the full 
protection of the criminal procedural safeguards.210  Consequently, the main criticism of non-
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conviction based forfeiture has been focused on its incompatibility with human rights guarantied 
to those criminally accuse and the sidestepping of criminal procedural safeguards.211   
The human rights argument evolves mostly around the right to fair trial for example 
under article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights.212 
A major issue raised with respect to fundamental principles of law has been how the non-
conviction based forfeiture is not based on any requirement to establish personal guilt.213  The 
authorities generally acting in rem, against the property it self, originally based on the legal 
fiction of assigning liability or fault to the property it self.214  This legal fiction is said to be less 
relied up on today, replaced by a pragmatic reasoning that authorities must be able to seize 
illegally acquired property and property used or intended to be used for criminal purposes even if 
requirements for punishment are not, or can not be met.215  Instead of acting against multiple 
individuals, some of which might not be easily reachable, actions are taken against the property 
and all possible stakeholders given notice and the option to get involved in the proceedings and 
defend their interests in the property. 
Another major concern has been the appropriateness of ‘balance of probability’ as the 
standard of proof instead of the criminal standards of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.216  
                                                
211 Campbell, Liz, ‘The Recovery of “Criminal” Assets in New Zealand, Ireland and England’ (2010) 41 Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review.  Gallant, Mary Michelle, Money Laundering and the Proceeds of Crime: 
Economic Crime and Civil Remedies (Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2005).  King, Colin, ‘Civil forfeiture and 
Article 6 of the ECHR: due process implications for England & Wales and Ireland’ (2013) 34 Legal Studies, 371. 
212 King, Colin, ‘Civil forfeiture and Article 6 of the ECHR: due process implications for England & Wales and 
Ireland’ (2013) 34 Legal Studies, 371. 
213 Collins, Martin, and Colin King, ‘The disruption of crime in Scotland through non-conviction based asset 
forfeiture’ (2013) 16 Journal of Money Laundering Control, 379, at p 384;  Campbell, Liz, ‘The Recovery of 
“Criminal” Assets in New Zealand, Ireland and England’ (2010) 41 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 
at p 24 onward; Cassella, Stefan D, Civil Asset Recovery: The American Experience (SelectedWorks, 2013 
<http://works.bepress.com/stefan_cassella/30/> accessed 29 October 2014, at p 5, 11 and 16. 
214 Gallant, M Michelle, ‘Ontario (Attorney General) v. $29,020 in Canadian Currency: A Comment on Proceeds of 
Crime and Provincial Forfeiture Laws’ (2006) 52 Criminal Law Quarterly, 64, at p 68 – 69;  Nelson, Max M, 
‘Federal Forfeiture and Money Laundering: Undue Deference to Legal Fictions and the Canadian Crossroads’ 
(Autumn 2009), 43, at p 45 
215 Cassella, Stefan D, ‘The case for civil forfeiture: Why in Rem proceedings are an essential tool for recovering the 
proceeds of crime’ (2008) 11 Journal of Money Laundering Control, 8, at p 9 – 10;  Kennedy, Anthony, ‘Justifying 
the civil recovery of criminal proceeds’ (2004) 12 Journal of Financial Crime, 8, at p 8 – 10 and 16 – 17. 
216 Gallant, M Michelle, and Colin King, ‘The Seizure of Illicit Assets: Patterns of Civil Forfeiture in Canada and 
Ireland’ (2013) 42 Common Law World Review, 91, at p 95 - 99;  Campbell, Liz, ‘The Recovery of “Criminal” 
Assets in New Zealand, Ireland and England’ (2010) 41 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review.;  Kennedy, 
Anthony, ‘Justifying the civil recovery of criminal proceeds’ (2004) 12 Journal of Financial Crime, at p 17 - 18;  
Cassella, Stefan D, Civil Asset Recovery: The American Experience (SelectedWorks, 2013 
<http://works.bepress.com/stefan_cassella/30/> accessed 29 October 2014, at p 14 - 15. 
   49
Effectively, under this standard of proof the state has only to make it more likely than not for an 
asset to be driving from a criminal activity.  Specifically so, as there is not presumption of 
innocence, the absents of which is another concern that has been raised.217  Together the above 
concerns have been argued to create an unfair dilemma for those suspected of holding criminally 
obtained assets, having to choose if to defend against the non-conviction based forfeiture and 
risk incriminating themselves, or to be able to enjoy their right under the criminal procedural 
safeguards to remain silent in regards to related pending or possible criminal charges.218 
Finally, the disposal of the forfeited assets has been the subject of some discussion.  
Critics have claimed that the practice of having the law enforcement agencies gain from the 
forfeiture of criminal assets, might bring the focus of law enforcement authorities on cases where 
assets could be forfeited, risking to create a policing for profit incentive.219  The 
counterarguments have been that going after the criminal profit can be expensive and therefore 
an incentive is needed, also, that the society as a whole suffers harm from crimes and financing 
effective law enforcement is a suitable compensation.220  Noticeably, some jurisdictions have 
made a policy decision not to have law enforcement agencies benefit from forfeited assets.221   
 
The European Union has taken interest in promoting the approach to go after the 
proceeds of crime.222  The Union enacted a directive ‘on the freezing and confiscation of 
instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union’ in April 2014.  The original 
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proposal would have obligated the member states to adopt non-conviction based forfeiture, but 
was altered so non-conviction based forfeiture does not have to be introduced except in limited 
circumstances where confiscation based on criminal conviction was impossible due to “. . . 
illness or absconding of the suspected or accused person,”223.224  Of the 28 member states of the 
European Union, only Italy, Ireland and the United Kingdom allow for non-conviction based 
forfeiture.225  Never the less, the Commission of the European Union seems to be promoting the 
utilization of non-conviction based forfeitures in the absence of criminal conviction.226 
 
As previously stated the main focus of this thesis is not the proceeds of crime approach.  
The approach has been substantively discussed in the literature and there is no need to re-
examine it in this work.  However, the above literature shows how authorities are utilizing non-
criminal justice responses in their efforts to deprive criminals of their instruments and proceeds 
of crime, in particular when it comes to organized crime.  The next subchapter will introduce 
literature that shows how non-criminal justice responses are being utilized to counter crime, and 
organized crime in particular, in wider context than assets suspected to be instruments or 
proceeds of crime. 
 
Wider variety of non-criminal justice responses 	  
Domestic authorities have utilized a variety of non-criminal justice responses for the 
prevention and disruption of criminal activities such as organized crime.  Some of these 
responses have been discussed in academic literature, while the thesis presupposition is that the 
variety of non-criminal justice responses utilized by domestic authorities is insufficiently 
portrayed by the academic discussion.   
The disruptive and preventive responses seems to have developed from variety of 
measures utilized by authorities in New York in the United States of America, to prevent 
                                                
223 Directive 2014/42/EU on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the 
European Union [2014] OJ L127/39, art. 4, para 
224 Alagna, Federico, ‘Non-conviction Based Confiscation: Why the EU Directive is a Missed Opportunity’ [2014] 
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, at p 9 - 14. 
225 Ibid, at p 7. 
226 Ibid, at p 13. 
   51
criminal organizations from participating in publicly funded or regulated businesses, and from 
control orders that were originally used at the beginning of this century in the terrorism context 
in the United Kingdom.227  Scholars claim control orders to have been initiated to circumvent 
legal obstacles for indefinite detention of terrorist suspects.228  Its uptake in the general criminal 
context happened only a few years later when these control orders inspired new techniques and 
legislations for countering organized crime and anti-social behaviour.229  The new approach was 
introduced on account of the difficulties that criminal law tends to have with countering 
organized crime on one hand, and on the other hand individual behaviour that is either not 
criminal or represented minor offences carrying minor penalties but causes harassment, alarm or 
distress to other people.230  The New York approach inspired variety of responses that allow for 
serious and organized criminality to be considered in a variety of administrative decision 
making, with the objective of preventing or disrupting criminal activity.231 
 
The main discussions in the United Kingdom about non-criminal justice responses has 
evolved around so-called Anti-Social Behaviour Orders proposed in 1995 and introduced as part 
of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.  The Anti-Social Behaviour Order allowed for a court order 
imposed on individuals for anti-social behaviour, banning the individual from certain acts or 
omission from specific locations, etc.  Breach of these orders without a reasonable excuse is a 
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criminal offence - leading to a criminal justice response.232  A variety of actors; local authorities, 
police and other actors can seek the court order.233 
This approach has met heavy criticism for circumventing due-process protections under 
English Law.234  Primarily the approach was criticized for requiring only the civil standard of 
proof of ‘preponderance of the evidence’ and for allowing hearsay witnesses.235  The criticism 
echoes the concerns raised over non-criminal justice responses for depriving criminals of assets 
suspected of being instruments or proceeds of crime, such as non-conviction based forfeitures, 
covered above.  The House of Lords decided to raise the standard of proof to almost the same as 
in criminal law - ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.236   
The implementation of the orders has raised other concerns.  Mainly that the term anti-
social behaviour is so broadly defined that it has allowed for a rapid growth in the scope of the 
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders.  The orders have therefore been utilized to counter behaviour that 
ranges from being criminal, to activity that could be described as a dispute or nuances between 
neighbours.237  Additionally the lack of constraint on the kind of orders that the courts can issue 
has been criticized.  Due to this lack of limitation, the courts have issued wide ranging 
limitations on peoples liberty; sometimes it can even be hard to see the connection between the 
order issued and the behaviour intended to prevent.238  Court orders have been introduced to 
restrict activity that is neither criminal nor anti-social in themselves, such as entering a building 
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taller than four stories high or entering any car park in England or Wales.239  Again, these 
concerns are in line with concerns raised over the utilization of non-conviction based forfeitures 
and their legal basis lacking restrains on the scope of these responses. 
Aside from Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, there are other civil law based court orders 
directed at crimes in the UK that are heavily debated.  The previously mentioned control orders 
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 2005 are a good example.  Scholars have criticized 
that the control orders, amounting to limitation of liberty, are being issued while the standard of 
proof is only that of ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting’.240 
 
Australian authorities enacted control order legislations in the organized crime context 
after a number of violent incidences involving so-called Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (often 
referred to as OMG or OMCG).  In response, a number of the Australian states introduced 
legislation that was tailored to counter the Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, sometimes referred to as 
the OMCG law.  Like in the United Kingdom, and under influence from the United Kingdom, 
control orders had previously been introduced in Australia in the terrorist context.241 
These legislations are marginally different, but bear though many similarities.  These 
legislations all provide a process through which organizations can be declared a ‘declared 
organization’.  The police authorities can then request a court to impose control orders on 
members of the declared organization.   
These control orders can be wide-ranging.  Julie Ayling notes that the control orders are 
intended to limit the ability of a controlled person to associate and communicate with specific 
other individuals. These other individuals can be members of the same or other declared 
organizations, but they can also be non-members.  The control orders “. . . may also prohibit the 
person from entering or being near certain premises, applying for or undertaking certain 
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occupations or possessing specified articles . . .”242  Breach of the control order can bring with it 
a criminal punishment of up to five years imprisonment.   
These legislations have met criticism for being “draconian and inconsistent with the usual 
standards for criminal proceedings”243, particularly caused by evidential and procedural 
innovations as noted by Ayling:  
“The ire of lawyers, in particular, has been sparked by some evidential and 
procedural innovations (varying between the different states’ laws), such as a 
requirement for only a civil standard of proof for questions of fact, the 
removal of any need to give reasons for declaration decisions, the ousting of 
rights of review for decisions about declarations and control orders, and the 
reversal of the onus of proof for exemptions from a control order’s 
prohibitions on associations.”244 
Under the Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs legislations an individual can therefore be 
criminally punished based on a breach of a control order acquired through civil law procedures.  
The standard of proof for having a control order issued is however not the standards of proof 
under the criminal law and ‘criminal intelligences’ are allowed.245  The information that the court 
bases its decision on, to impose the control order, may even be withheld from the accused. 
 
Likewise, non-criminal justice responses introduced in the Netherlands in recent years 
have been developed under influence from the Anti-Social Behaviour Orders in the United 
Kingdom, as well as from administrative responses to organized crime in New York during 
Guiliani’s rule as mayor in the 1990’s.246 
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Part of this responses has been called the ‘administrative approach’ to prevent organized 
crime.247  The initiative is intended to prevent that “. . . services or facilities of the public 
administration can be exploited to carry out criminal activities or to invest illegally acquired 
capital.”248  In the Netherlands, this involves two main projects. 
 
The BIBOB project is a national initiative based on the BIBOB Act.249  The BIBOB Act 
provides a legal basis for “refusal or withdrawal of licenses and subsidies and the refusal of 
participation in public tenders or contracts.”250  These refusals or withdrawals are an 
administrative decision, made by administrative authorities based on a risk assessment conducted 
by a national BIBOB bureau within the Ministry of Justice.251  The act also provides access for 
the BIBOB bureau to information that their risk assessment can be based on, from variety of 
actors within the administrative branch, police and the judiciary.  The scope of the BIBOB Act is 
however limited to selected business sectors. 
The Van Traa project is an initiative by local authorities after the prescript offered by 
Amsterdam’s Red Light District (Wallen) Manager project.252  The project is intended to prevent 
the facilitation of organized crime by the administration and to take administrative measures to 
bar organized crime from legitimate businesses.  Similar projects have been adopted in other 
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municipals in the Netherlands.253  The Van Traa project is both limited to specific areas and 
business sectors, originally established for the Red Light District in Amsterdam but was later 
expanded to other areas within Amsterdam.254  However, the Van Traa project is less restricted 
than the BIBOB Act in the sense that its team does not need indications of organized crime 
connections to instigate a screening; all businesses in a selected area can be subject to 
scanning.255  Additionally, the project is more integrated in the respect that different agencies 
work together within the project.  Consequently a wider range of measures can be taken: 
“. . . these vary from the refusal or withdrawal of licences and permits, the 
levying of taxes, the closure of certain establishments, to the instigation of a 
criminal investigation, and, under certain circumstances, the acquisition of 
real estate by the city itself, all in order to prevent criminals from investing 
their money in specific objects.”256 
Wim Huisman and Monique Koemans state that it was anticipated that information from 
databases of administrative authorities “. . . would provide a first assessment of risk of organized 
crime-related activity”.257  They claim, however, that the information from the police and the 
judiciary, including criminal intelligence, has become decisive for assessing the risk of a 
criminal organization related activity. 
Also, administrative authorities do not have the ability to check the origin or reliability of 
these information.  Furthermore, the BIBOB Act provides limited access to the information on 
which decisions are based on, if the information is confidential, limiting the defendants ability to 
defend against the decision.258 
Additionally, Huisman and Koemans state that the police have started collecting 
information, in large criminal investigations, which might be relevant for the decision of 
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introducing administrative measures.  They claim that judicial authorities use the administrative 
approach of the Van Traa project as an alternative to criminal law enforcement, where the police 
were unsuccessful in securing a criminal conviction.259  Consequently the authors find that the 
distinction between administrative law and criminal law is blurring when it comes to their 
application to counter organized crime.260 
 
The second phase of the development of non-criminal justice responses in the 
Netherlands came in 2007 when legislation titled ‘severe anti-social behaviour’ was proposed, 
introducing measures inspired by the Anti-Social Behaviour Orders in the United Kingdom.261  
The legislation gives local municipal authorities additional powers, and reinforces the existing 
powers, to deal with ‘persistent and grave’ anti-social behaviour.262  Under the legislation local 
authorities can issue restraining orders as an administrative measure, without having to bring the 
matter before the judiciary.263  The injunctions can be based on information from law 
enforcement authorities like the police, but they can also come from administrative authorities 
like the social services and local educational authorities.264  If the injunction is breached 
however, the breach is a criminal act, punishable by fines or imprisonment for up to three 
months.265   
Wim Huisman and Monique Koemans note that the anti-social behaviour measures in the 
Netherlands should be seen as mixture of administrative and criminal law, while the measures in 
the United Kingdom are a mixture of civil and criminal law.266 
 
                                                
259 Huisman, Wim, and Monique Koemans, ‘Administrative Measures in Crime Control’ (2008) 1 Erasmus 
Universiteit Rotterdam: Law Review, 121, at p 138 - 140. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Huisman, Wim, and Monique Koemans, ‘Administrative Measures in Crime Control’ (2008) 1 Erasmus 
Universiteit Rotterdam: Law Review, 121, at p 129 - 130. 
262 Huisman, Wim, and Monique Koemans, ‘Administrative Measures in Crime Control’ (2008) 1 Erasmus 
Universiteit Rotterdam: Law Review, 121, at p 129 - 130.  The proposal introducing ASBO in the Netherlands was 
passed and is now to be found in art. 172a Gemeentewet.  See: Gemeentewet (Municipality Act) from 14 February 
1992, art. 172a. 
263 Huisman, Wim, and Monique Koemans, ‘Administrative Measures in Crime Control’ (2008) 1 Erasmus 
Universiteit Rotterdam: Law Review, 121, at p 130 and 140. 
264 Huisman, Wim, and Monique Koemans, ‘Administrative Measures in Crime Control’ (2008) 1 Erasmus 
Universiteit Rotterdam: Law Review, 121, at p 130. 
265 Ibid; Wetboek van Strafrecht (Penal Code) from 3 March 1881, art 187 
266 Huisman, Wim, and Monique Koemans, ‘Administrative Measures in Crime Control’ (2008) 1 Erasmus 
Universiteit Rotterdam: Law Review, 121, at p 129 - 130.   
   58
Both these initiatives, the ‘administrative approach’ to organized crime and the 
introduction of civil law control orders, are to be seen as a development in the direction where 
policy makers are decreasingly seeing policing and judiciary response as the only feasible 
response to anti social and criminal behaviour.  Previously, detailed evolvement towards 
utilization of non-criminal justice responses for the purpose of depriving criminals of their 
instruments and proceeds of crime seem to bear evidence of the same development.  Authorities 
seem increasingly to consider non-criminal justice responses, such as administrative and civil 
law responses, to be necessary to support existing criminal justice efforts intended to counter 
problems such as organized crime.267   
Scholarly discussions have criticized this change in approach.  The repressive feature of 
these administrative measures has raised concerns over lack of due process safeguards, compared 
to criminal law.268  Dutch legal scholars have reasoned that the procedural rights of criminal law 
should apply to administrative measures under the Van Traa project and the BIBOB Act.  They 
have claimed that by failing to adhere to the criminal standards, the Netherlands are in breach of 
the right to fair trial under article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights.269 
 
The above coverage of existing literature shows how domestic responses for countering 
crime and organized crime in particular are increasingly non-criminal justice responses, as 
opposed to the traditional approach of utilizing criminal justice responses to counter criminal 
behaviour.  Additionally, the existing literature indicates that this development towards non-
criminal justice responses might in fact be to some extent affected by policymaking, promotion 
and soft law at the international level, contrary to what is the presupposition of this thesis.  
Consequently, this study researched if the utilization of non-criminal justice responses to counter 
organized crime was in fact being promoted at the international level. 
While the existing literature shows variety of non-criminal justice responses intended to 
counter substantive criticism and concerns raised, this thesis presupposition is that the variety of 
non-criminal justice responses utilized domestically to counter organized crime is in fact much 
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greater than current academic discussion suggests.  Consequently, a research was conducted to 
examine the utilization of non-criminal justice responses to outlaw motorcycle gangs, in Canada, 
Germany and Iceland.  The research findings will be introduced in the next chapter.  
   60
Domestic Non-Criminal Justice Responses to Organized 
Crimes 
 
This chapter will detail the findings of the research conducted.  The research had two 
phases.  The first phase of the research was intended to provide information about non-criminal 
justice responses utilized to counter organized crime by domestic law enforcement authorities in 
Canada, Germany and Iceland.  The second phase of the research was intended to reveal if non-
criminal justice responses were being promoted at the international level and if their utilization 
by domestic authorities was influencing transnational efforts for countering organized crime.  
This phase of the research was limited to the European Union and the United Nations, these 
being the main international bodies involved in the suppression of organized crime at the 
international level according to the literature review on the system of Transnational Criminal 
Law.   
 
Canada 
 
Canadian authorities use four methods that should be considered to be non-criminal 
justice responses: 
First, deportation under the immigration law of non-citizens that are involved in 
organized crime; Second, denial of entry of foreign nationals on the borders on the same 
grounds; Third, the use of roadside check stops the police conducts during rides of Outlaw 
Motorcycle Clubs from what it appears, mainly for the purpose of information gathering; And 
fourth, the use of different legislations to close down clubhouses of Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs. 
Deportation 
 
The approach of using deportation to counter organized crime attracted some media 
attention in 2011 when Mr. Mark Alistair Stables fought deportation from Canada after having 
been found inadmissible based on his organized criminality.  Mr. Stables fought the deportation 
before the Immigration and refugee board and then brought a case before the Federal Court of 
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Canada for a judicial review.270  Both the Immigration and refugee board and the Federal Court 
took the matter under careful consideration, offering a detailed coverage of the relevant 
arguments and issues that need to be considered for the deportation of an individual based on 
organized criminality. 
 
Mr. Stables was a permanent citizen who moved to Canada from Scotland with his 
parents at the age of 7 in 1969, he grew up, attended school, lived and worked in Canada after he 
arrived.  What lead to Mr. Stables’ deportation, started when he arrived on the borders to enter 
Canada on November 7th, 2006.  Before being allowed to enter, he was interviewed by 
Immigration officials.271  On that occasion he was found to have in his possession Hells Angels 
MC paraphernalia and related phone numbers.  Resulting from this interview, the Immigration 
Officer wrote a report of inadmissibility on account of organized criminality. 
The Immigration and Refugee board consequently conducted an admissibility hearing.272  
Mr. Stables’ membership in the Hells Angels MC was found to be a basis for inadmissibility on 
ground of organized criminality under subsection 1 of section 37 of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act.  Based on that hearing the board member decided that Stables was inadmissible 
to Canada, he was consequently issued a deportation order.   
The provision of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act based on which Mr. 
Stables was found inadmissible, provides that a permanent resident or a foreign national can be 
found inadmissible on grounds of organized criminality for: 
“(a) being a member of an organization that is believed on reasonable 
grounds to be or to have been engaged in activity that is part of a pattern of 
criminal activity planned and organized by a number of persons acting in 
concert in furtherance of the commission of an offence punishable under an 
Act of Parliament by way of indictment, or in furtherance of the commission 
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of an offence outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute 
such an offence, or engaging in activity that is part of such a pattern; or 
(b) engaging, in the context of transnational crime, in activities such as 
people smuggling, trafficking in persons or money laundering.”273 
Mr. Stables admitted that he was a member in the Hells Angels MC from 2000 but 
claimed that he terminated his membership in December 2009, after the organization had denied 
him of support for fighting the deportation.274  He, however, denied that the Hells Angels MC 
were criminal organization.275  Furthermore, he denied any personal involvement in organized 
crime or crime in general, emphasizing the fact that he has no criminal record.   
The Immigration and Refugee board and the Federal Court of Canada found it, however, 
to be established that the Hells Angels MC were an organization and a criminal organization in 
the meaning of the Act.  The Federal Court quoted the following conclusion of the board: 
“There is enough evidence to prove, on reasonable grounds, a connection 
between criminal offences of Hells Angels members, associates and puppet 
groups, and the organization. There is evidence of the criminality of its 
members. Their criminal acts have included drug trafficking, extortion, 
firearms and explosives offences, and the rampancy of such criminal acts are 
probative in establishing that the Hells Angels is a criminal organization. It is 
also apparent that the affiliation with the Hells Angels furnishes members 
with opportunities to be involved in crime at a depth that may not otherwise 
be available to them. The panel is also satisfied that the nature and existence 
of the hierarchy within the Hells Angels, the influence of its leadership, and 
the incumbent obligations of the members and associates to one another, all 
foster and under gird the criminal event. This is also an organization that 
relishes in the power and notoriety of its members, and will employ violence 
and intimidation to preserve its power and enhance its reputation. It 
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maintains the sanctuary or fortress of a Hells Angels clubhouse to minimize 
criminal exposure and infiltration.”276 
 
The judge in Stables’ case before the Federal Court of Canada states “it is undeniable that 
Courts have often upheld a very broad application of subsection 37(1), on the basis that such an 
interpretation was consistent with Parliament’s objective to ensure the security of Canadians”.277  
The judge never the less finds the term neither to be impermissibly vague nor overbroad, stating 
the terms in the article “though quite broad and open-ended, are not without limit and do provide 
sufficient guidance for a legal debate”278.279   
The judge specifically noted that Mr. Stables had not even tried to challenge the findings 
of Hells Angels MC involvement in organized crime activity or endeavour to show them to be 
unreasonable in his request for a judicial review by the Federal Court.280 
The federal judge, like the Immigration and Refugee board, found that Mr. Stables was 
not an “innocent” member that did not know the nature of the organization he was joining until it 
was too late.  On the contrary he found that due to his long standing membership during which 
he held senior positions in the organization Mr. Stables knew the nature of the organization, 
finding that “either he did not care or choose to be willfully blind to its activities”.281 
 
To establish inadmissibility, evidence must be lead to prove the organized criminality up 
to the standard of “reasonable ground to believe” under section 37 (1) of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act.282  The board cited the Federal Court of Canada case Chiau v. Canada: 
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“[t]he standard of proof required to establish “reasonable grounds” is more 
than a flimsy suspicion, but less than the civil test of balance of probabilities. 
And, of course, a much lower threshold than the criminal standard of 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” It is a bona fide belief in a serious possibility 
based on credible evidence.”283 
The Federal Court of Canada took under consideration two issues relevant to this study in 
Mr. Stables’ application for judicial review.284  First, whether the legislative scheme described in 
section 37 violated his rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association under the 
Canadian Charter of rights.  Second, whether section 37 of the Act deprived Mr. Stables of right 
to life, liberty and security of the person in a manner that is not in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice. 
The court found that section 2 of the Canadian Charter of rights does not protect Mr. 
Stables right to join the Hells Angels MC, given the violent and criminal activities of that 
organization.285  Noting as basis for its decision the Supreme Court of Canada case Suresh v 
Canada. 
“It is not in dispute that freedom of expression does not protect expressive 
activity that take the form of violence.  Violence or criminal activity do not 
involve any of the recognized rationales underlying the constitutional 
protection of freedom of expression, namely its role as an instrument of 
democratic government, of truth and of personal fulfilment. Similarly, 
freedom of association has been found to encompass only lawful activities 
and cannot protect a person who chooses to belong to a criminal 
organization.”286 
                                                
283 ‘Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Stables’, 2010 CanLII 96602 (IRB), 
<http://canlii.ca/t/fpt1z> Accessed on 3 July 2012, para 12.  As cited in Canada v Stables [2010]: ‘Chiau v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 9042 (FC)’ (CanLII 3 February 1998), page 3. 
284 ‘Stables v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)’, 2011 FC 1319 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fp0km> Accessed 
on 10 July 2012, para 13. 
285 Ibid, para 37. 
286 Ibid, para 33.  Citing: ‘Suresh v Canada (MCI)’, 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), [2002] 1 SCR 3. 
   65
The court furthermore found that due to Mr. Stables long standing membership during 
which he held senior positions in the organization, Mr. Stables knew the nature of the 
organization and could not claim to be an ‘innocent’ member.287  
 
With regards to principles of fundamental justice Mr. Stables’ claimed that the terms 
‘membership’ and ‘criminal organization’ were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  The 
court found first that Mr. Stables could in this particular case not claim protection under section 
7 of the Canadian Charter of rights - as the principles of fundamental justice under section 7 are 
not independent rights - but can only be considered after it has been established that an 
individual is being deprived of life, liberty or security of the person.288  Still the court decided to 
examine the arguments and finds the threshold to have been set by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society.  Accordingly:  
“a law will only be found unconstitutionally vague if it so lacks in precision 
as not to give sufficient guidance for legal debate.  Absolute certainty is not 
necessary, so long as citizens have a broad understanding of what is 
permissible and what is not.”289 
The court finds it undeniable that “Courts have often upheld a very broad application of 
subsection 37(1), on the basis that such an interpretation was consistent with Parliament’s 
objective to ensure the security of Canadians.”290  The court finds however that even if the terms 
are broad and open ended, they are not without limitations and do provide sufficient guidelines 
for a legal debate.291  Therefore the terms fall short of being impermissibly vague. 
 
Mr. Stables’ case shows the Canadian Immigration and Refuge Protection Act to be used 
to deport individuals on basis of organized criminality and how low level of involvement and 
proof is needed for the implementation of such deportation.  Even more interestingly Mr. 
Stables’ case, as well as a few additional cases should be seen to indicate that Canadian 
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authorities are in some cases opting to deport non-citizens suspected of involvement in organized 
crime instead of criminally charging them for such involvement.292  This raises the concern if 
deportation is sought where evaluation of the evidence concludes then not to be strong enough to 
prove organized criminality up to the standard of the criminal law. 
Denial of entry 
 
The case of Collins v Canada before the Immigration and Refugee board is an example of 
a case where a foreign national is stopped at the borders and found inadmissible for reasons of 
organized criminality.293  The application for judicial review by the Federal Court of Canada was 
rejected. 
 
Mr. Collins arrived at the Canadian border station from the United States.294  Mr. Collins 
claims that he did not intend to enter Canada, but had not realized he was approaching a border 
station until he could not turn around because how the road was constructed.  He claims to have 
informed the immigration officers of this as soon as he arrived at the border station and asked to 
be allowed to turn around, without entering Canada.  Mr. Collins was wearing clothing bearing 
the insignia of the Bandidos MC, a well known Outlaw Motorcycle Club, when he arrived at the 
borders.  He was not allowed to turn around but asked if he had any weapons.  He admitted to be 
carrying a gun, which he had a permit for.  He was consequently arrested and brought into 
detention in Canada.295   
An immigration officer then wrote a report of inadmissibility under article 44 of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, claiming him to be inadmissible on grounds of 
organized criminality, based on his involvement with the Bandidos MC. 
 
The Immigration and Refugee board consequently conducted an admissibility hearing.296 
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Mr. Collins conceded to that he was a member of a specific chapter of the Bandidos MC 
and that the Bandidos were an organization, “like the Boy Scouts”.297   
The hearing proceeded to examine if the Bandidos MC were a criminal organization, 
finding reasonable grounds to believe the association to be a criminal organization.298 
Based on Collins’ acknowledgment that he was a member of Bandidos MC, found to be a 
criminal organization, Mr. Collins was found inadmissible on the grounds of organized 
criminality and deported.299 
 
It can be seen from Mr. Collins’ case that Immigration authorities can detain an 
individual that arrives at Canada’s borders, upon suspicion of his organized criminality, and 
bring him to a hearing where he could be found inadmissible to Canada.  Should the individual 
be found inadmissible, he cannot return to Canada, except by way of specific permission.300 
Inadmissibility can be based on mere membership in an organization if there are found to 
be reasonable grounds to believe the organization in question is involved in crimes301 or, in the 
absence of such membership, on the grounds of participation and involvement in the activities of 
such organization.302  The standard of proof for findings of fact for such organized criminality is 
“reasonable grounds to believe”.303 
The check stops 
 
Canadian authorities have used so-called “Check Stops” to be able to stop motorists they 
suspect of being involved in organized crime, especially Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs.  The police 
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Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 9042 (FC)’ (CanLII 3 February 1998), page 3. 
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has executed these Check Stops as traffic security monitoring, based on provisions of the 
Highway Traffic Act.304 
In the cases examined, the police intended these Check Stops to be conducted for 
multiple purposes in addition to highway safety concerns, including the purpose of gathering 
intelligence.305  Showing strong police presence and inconspicuously collecting information 
about those that were attending specific gatherings seems also to have been intended to reduce 
the risk of crimes to occur, as those in attendance would know that their presence was known and 
that a strong and rapid police response was to be expected. 
It is in any case evident that the police intended to use powers provided to them by law to 
conduct Check Stops for purposes other than the legislator intended for when enacting the law 
providing these powers.  Intending to utilize police powers, intended to enhance traffic safety, 
for the additional purpose of countering organized crime. 
 
The two cases examined reached contradictory conclusions as to the question whether the 
use of the Check Stops was lawful and withstands Constitutional scrutiny.  A full diagnosis of 
the cases, that potentially could explain these different conclusions, is not necessary for present 
purposes.  For the purpose of this work it is deemed sufficient to assess if Canadian authorities 
have had and still have the option of using Check Stops as parts of their efforts to counter 
organized crime. 
 
In R. v. McCurrach the detention and photographing at the Check Stops was found to be 
unconstitutional, while in Brown v. Regional Municipality of Durham Police Service Board the 
                                                
304 ‘R. v. McCurrach, 2000 ABPC 127 (CanLII)’, para 122.  In the case the crown claimed that the powers to 
execute the Check Stop were granted by section 119 of the Highway Traffic Act, RSA 2000, c H-8, section 89 of the 
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305  Brown v. Regional Municipality of Durham Police Service Board, 1998 CanLII 7198 (ON CA), 
<http://canlii.ca/t/6gkq> Accessed on 10 July 2012, at para 2 - 8.  R. v. McCurrach, 2000 ABPC 127 (CanLII), 
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detention and videotaping at the Check Stops was found lawful and withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.306  
In both cases the judges examined and rejected the Crowns claim that the Police act or 
the common law gave the police power for the detention at the Check Stops.307 
 
The judge in R. v. McCurrach carefully examined the evidence showing that the police 
had multiple purposes for conducting the Check Stop, and assessed the weight he saw the police 
put on the different purposes.  The judge found the highway security concerns to have been 
minimal and merely a means to an end - to justify the introduction of the Check Stop for the 
furtherance of the real purposes for the stop.308  The judge found, therefore, that the detention 
was in fact not made on grounds of Highway security concerns, making the detention under the 
Highway Traffic Act unlawful, even if such detention if made primarily based on highway 
security concerns could have been lawfully made under the Act.309  
The judge in Brown pursues a different line of reasoning.  He rejects that other purposes 
in addition to the highway security concerns should render the stop and detention unlawful,310 
citing the Supreme Court of Canada case R. v. Storrey that the intention to use a lawful detention 
to further other legitimate purposes did not make a detention unlawful.311  Except only if: the 
additional police purposes are illegal; have nothing to do with the execution of a police officer’s 
public duty; infringe the liberty or security of the detained person beyond that contemplated by 
the purpose that is the basis for the detention; or are in other ways improper.312  The judge gives 
                                                
306  Brown v. Regional Municipality of Durham Police Service Board, 1998 CanLII 7198 (ON CA), 
<http://canlii.ca/t/6gkq> Accessed on 10 July 2012, at para 49, 54 – 55.  R. v. McCurrach, 2000 ABPC 127 
(CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/5qx9> Accessed on 10 July 2012, at para 112 - 116. 
307  Brown v. Regional Municipality of Durham Police Service Board, 1998 CanLII 7198 (ON CA), 
<http://canlii.ca/t/6gkq> Accessed on 10 July 2012, at para 49, 54 – 55 and 78 - 80.  R. v. McCurrach, 2000 ABPC 
127 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/5qx9> Accessed on 10 July 2012, at para 139 - 141. 
308 R. v. McCurrach, 2000 ABPC 127 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/5qx9> Accessed on 10 July 2012, at para 112 - 
116. 
309 R. v. McCurrach, 2000 ABPC 127 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/5qx9> Accessed on 10 July 2012, at para 116. 
310 Brown v. Regional Municipality of Durham Police Service Board, 1998 CanLII 7198 (ON CA), 
<http://canlii.ca/t/6gkq> Accessed on 10 July 2012, at para 31 and 49. 
311  Brown v. Regional Municipality of Durham Police Service Board, 1998 CanLII 7198 (ON CA), 
<http://canlii.ca/t/6gkq> Accessed on 10 July 2012, at para 32 - 33.  Citing: ‘R. v. Storrey, 1990 CanLII 125 (SCC)’ 
(CanLII February 15, 1990). 
312  Brown v. Regional Municipality of Durham Police Service Board, 1998 CanLII 7198 (ON CA), 
<http://canlii.ca/t/6gkq> Accessed on 10 July 2012, at para 31 and 39. 
   70
examples of unlawful additional purposes such as stopping persons of colour or conducting an 
unconstitutional search.313 
The judge in Brown states that he agrees with the trial judge that “. . . known criminals 
should not be more immune from s. 216(1) stops than law abiding citizens who are not known to 
the police.”314  Additionally he find that the “gathering of police intelligence is well within the 
ongoing police duty to investigate criminal activity”.  He therefore finds the police to be allowed 
to use the opportunity produced at the Check Stop.315 
Brown has been cited, as having established the principle “that a lawful police interest 
beyond highway safety concerns”316 does not taint a lawful stop based on the Highway Traffic 
Act.317  While the Supreme Court of Canada has cited Brown as establishing the same, the court 
has emphasized that “[a] valid regulatory purpose, whether predominant or not, would not 
sanitize or excuse a Charter violation.”318 
 
An additional consideration was how those that were stopped at the Check Stops were not 
randomly selected.  The police decided time and place of the stops on basis of information about 
activities of specific Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, and the police stopped only those that were 
considered to be members of, or involve with outlaw motorcycle gangs.319 
The judge of the Provincial court of Alberta in R. v. McCurrach found that the targeting 
of the Hells Angels MC at the Check Stops was arbitrary.320  The judge found the police had not 
been able to provide reasonable and probable grounds for their claim that the Hells Angels MC 
were involved in crime as a group.321  The judge noted that none of those stopped at the Check 
Stop had been charged for participation in a criminal organization under the criminal law.  Based 
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on this he found that the targeting of the Hells Angels MC was unreasonable, suggesting that it 
was arbitrary.322 
In Brown the judge found that the police had sufficient cause to stop the appellants and 
additionally that reasonable cause was not needed as the stop was lawfully made under the 
Highway Traffic Act, which does not require cause.323  The judge was satisfied that members of 
the Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs were more prone to violations that compromised highway safety 
than the general public.324  Agreeing with the trial judge, that the police had information that 
raised reasonable grounds to believe that an identifiable group raised particular highway safety 
concerns.  Also agreeing that the selective criteria was not “tainted by any coexisting improper 
purpose.”325 
 
At last the judge in Brown examined specifically the videotaping by the police of the 
Check Stops.  The judge accepted the Crowns submission that the videotaping was not improper 
nor did it violate any rights of the individuals stopped.  Noting that the videotaping was 
conducted without any secrecy, in a public place and did not in any way affect the length nor 
condition of the detentions.326  The judge referred to Ontario Court of Appeal case R. v. Parsons 
where the judge accepted that videotaping by the police was an example of the use of modern 
technology by the police, neither illegal nor intrusive upon the person in question.327 
However, in R. v. McCurrach the judge found that the coerced taking of videos and still 
photos of the detained individuals, by the police at the Check Stop, amounted to an unlawful 
seizure of permanent records.328 
The factual differences of the two cases can, however, explain these different findings.  
In Brown the videotaping discussed in that case were not found to affect the condition of the 
detention.  In R. v. McCurrach the police made the detained persons remove their helmets, 
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sunglasses, scarfs, etc., which the judge found to have been to facilitate the taking of the 
individuals photos, for intelligence purposes.329  This makes the additional police purposes seem 
more intrusive for the detained person beyond that contemplated by the purpose that is the basis 
for the detention, the traffic security concerns. 
 
The conclusion is that the police in Canada are able to use Check Stops based on the 
Highway Traffic Act for the purpose of countering organized crime, where the selected groups 
being stopped pose genuine highway security concerns.  This seems possible to argue in the case 
of outlaw motorcycle gangs and other identifiable groups, if for example drug and alcohol 
consumption can be shown to be particularly common among members.  
At a Check Stop the police can then seize the opportunity to pursue other lawful and 
proper purposes within their spear of duty.  Other proper and legitimate purposes might be 
intelligence gathering related to organized crime or crime in general.  However, these additional 
purposes can not cause more interference to the detained person than needs be for the purpose of 
the highway traffic security concerns.  This use of the Check Stops should be considered not 
only legitimate but necessary for the police to perform their “essential role” of investigating 
crime.330 
News coverage shows that police in Canada continues to use Check Stops based on the 
Highway Traffic Act as part of their efforts to counter outlaw motorcycle gangs.331 
Administrative approach 
 
Authorities in Canada, on occasions, take an administrative approach to countering 
organized crime.  Example of this is the efforts undertaken by authorities to close down the 
activities of the Bacchus MC’s clubhouse in Saint John, New Brunswick and efforts of 
authorities in Ontario to revoke the liquor licence of a known member of the Hells Angels MC.   
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According to media coverage the Bacchus MC chapter of Saint John moved out of their 
clubhouse due to a “do not occupy” order the police sought from the fire marshal’s office.332 
The Criminal Intelligence Service Canada considers Bacchus MC an outlaw motorcycle 
gang with strong connections with the Hells Angels MC.333 
 
After an incident close to the clubhouse, the president of the Bacchus MC was charged 
with second degree murder.  As part of the criminal investigation that followed, the police 
obtained a search warrant for the clubhouse.  Based on that warrant, the police offered city 
officials to examine the facilities, in what seems to have been an effort to use administrative 
powers to bar the group from using this particular facilities.334  The city officials that the police 
invited to inspect the premises found “various deficiencies” under “various acts”.335  
Subsequently, he police obtaining a “do not occupy” order. 
This seems to be an administrative effort to remove specific activities or specific group 
from a specific area rather than routine law enforcement in relation to housing in general or 
clubhouses in particular.  This assumption is supported by a statement given by the Saint John 
police: "We told them we were going to use every means possible to remove them from this area 
and as a result of that, they are moving voluntarily. We haven't evicted them."336  This 
assumption is also supported by the words of Saint John city councillor who claims he was 
assured by the police that the Bacchus MC were moving out of the city.337  He also praised the 
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police for their effort, not only to relocate the club, but also to relocate the club out of the city of 
Saint John. 
Additionally, the police were working on getting the Bacchus MC permanently removed 
from the property on basis of a Safer Communities and Neighbourhoods legislation.338 
 
The ‘Safer Communities and Neighbourhoods legislation is of specific interest to this 
study as it is a legislation that provides non-criminal justice responses to counter variety of social 
problems both criminal and non criminal, including organized crime.  The legislation provides 
for a community safety order to be made to prevent activities on or near a property, from 
adversely affecting a community or neighbourhood, if the activities indicate that the said 
property “. . . is being habitually used for a specified use.”339  “ [S]pecified use” is detailed in 
article 1 paragraph 1, and can, for example, be the commission or promotion of a criminal 
organization offence, or accommodation, aid, assistance or support of criminal organization or its 
activities.340 
The order can prohibit individuals from continuing the said activity, require any or all 
persons to vacate the property, prohibit them from re-entering or re-occupying the property.341  
The order can also require authorities to close the property from use and occupation for a period 
of up to 90 days.342 
Also, according to the Act, fortified buildings can be designated as a threat to public 
safety, providing a basis for ordering such fortifications to be removed.343  Clubhouses of outlaw 
motorcycle clubs are known for being fortified. 
 
Police and city authorities in Saint John jointly used administrative measures in an effort 
to prevent or at least discouraging a specific association, considered to be involved in organized 
crime, from operating in the city of Saint John. 
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Administrative measures are therefore considered by this study to be available to, and 
used by, Canadian authorities for the purpose of countering organized crime. 
 
Licensing 
 
Considering involvement in criminal organizations such as outlaw motorcycle gangs as 
part of the criteria for issuing or revoking licences is another example of the administrative 
approach in Canada. 
In 2010, the Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario applied to the 
Board of the Commission to revoke Mr. Barletta’s liquor licence for his bar, ‘the Famous Flesh 
Gordon’s’.  The Registrar claimed that on account of his membership in the Hells Angels MC, 
Mr. Barletta failed to fulfill one of the requirements for being issued a license to sell liquor in the 
first place, allowing the Registrar to revoke the licence under section 15 of the Liquor Licence 
Act.344  The requirement that Mr. Barletta is considered to fail to fulfill on account of his 
membership in the Hells Angels MC is described in subsection 2(d) of section 6: 
“(d) the past or present conduct of the persons referred to in subsection (3) affords 
reasonable grounds for belief that the applicant will not carry on business in 
accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty;”345 
However, he Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario did not find Mr. 
Barletta’s membership in the Hells Angels MC as such to cause him to fail to fulfill the 
requirement.  The board found that his membership as such was not criminal and that the 
Registrar had to prove the alleged criminal activity of Mr. Barletta to be able to revoke his 
licence on grounds of “past conduct” under previously mentioned section of the Act.346 
The Board emphasized that there were no reasons to consider Mr. Barletta to have acted 
impropriety in operating his licensed establishment nor were there reasons to think he will not 
comply to these rules in the future. 
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The decision was appealed on the basis that the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming 
Commission had erred in Law.347  The Court of Appeal for Ontario accepted the appeal and 
found the Board to have erred in Law, after an unsuccessful appeal to the District Court. 
First, the Court of Appeal found that the Board had erred in applying the standard of 
proof on ‘balance of probability’, instead of the appropriate lower standard of ‘reasonable ground 
for belief’.348  Second, that the Board erred in interpreting too narrowly the test for determining if 
a licence should be revoked.349  The Court found the Board to have considered primarily Mr. 
Barletta’s conducts that had to do with his operation of his licensed establishment and 
compliance with relevant law and regulations.350  When in fact the Board would have been right 
to consider his conducts well beyond his operation of the licensed establishment, as well as his 
compliance with the law generally and his integrity and honesty.  The court noted the legislative 
intent behind the Act to be “. . . to ensure that licensed establishments will be operated by those 
who can be counted on to properly serve the public interest, . . .”351 
The Court of Appeal did, however, not accept that if the Board had proceeded correctly, 
revocation would have been the only reasonable conclusion that it could have reached.352  The 
Court of Appeal’s ruling was, therefore, to send the Registrar’s application for revoking Mr. 
Barletta’s liquor licence back to the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario 
for reconsideration in accordance with the courts guidance as to the Law.353 
In it’s ruling, the Court can be seen to reject the Board’s decision that mere membership 
in a criminal organization could not establish a ground for revoking a licence based on the past 
or present conduct provision of section 6(2)(d).  Also, the Court rejects that the Registrar needs 
                                                
347 Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario) v. 751809 Ontario Inc., 2012 ONSC 2484 (CanLII April 
24, 2012). 
348 Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario) v. 751809 Ontario Inc. (Famous Flesh Gordon's), 2013 
ONCA 157 (CanLII March 18, 2013). 
349 Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario) v. 751809 Ontario Inc. (Famous Flesh Gordon's), 2013 
ONCA 157 (CanLII March 18, 2013), at p 9 - 12.  The test is provided for in section 6(2)(d) of the ‘Liquor Licence 
Act, RSO 1990, c L.19’, 1990.  
350 Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario) v. 751809 Ontario Inc. (Famous Flesh Gordon's), 2013 
ONCA 157 (CanLII March 18, 2013), at p 9 - 12. 
351 Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario) v. 751809 Ontario Inc. (Famous Flesh Gordon's), 2013 
ONCA 157 (CanLII March 18, 2013), at p 10. 
352 Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario) v. 751809 Ontario Inc. (Famous Flesh Gordon's), 2013 
ONCA 157 (CanLII March 18, 2013), at p 12 - 13. 
353 Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario) v. 751809 Ontario Inc. (Famous Flesh Gordon's), 2013 
ONCA 157 (CanLII March 18, 2013), at p 13. 
   77
to prove criminal activity of the licensee or applicant, pointing out that the standard of proof is 
only reasonable ground to believe and that conduct that is not criminal may also provide the 
grounds for such reasonable ground to believe.354  Furthermore, the Court of Appeal seems to 
invite the Board to evaluate if a membership in a criminal organization establishes “. . . 
reasonable grounds for belief that the applicant will not carry on business in accordance with the 
law and with integrity and honesty;”355 under the court’s guidance of the required standard of 
proof and the appropriate interpretation of the legislative test.356 
Mr. Barletta appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court of Canada, who dismissed the 
appeal.357  Consequently, the Ontario’s Licence Appeal Tribunal issued a decision on October 
6th 2014, where Mr. Barletta’s liquor licence was revoked.358  The tribunal found that Mr. 
Barletta’s membership in the Hells Angel’s MC, found to be a criminal organization, provided 
grounds for revoking his licence.359  Finding his devotion to the club and it rules, requiring him 
to put the interests of the club above everything else, established reasonable grounds to belief 
that he will not carry on business in accordance with law and with integrity and honesty.  Mr. 
Barletta appealed the decision of the Ontario’s Licence Appeal Tribunal to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice Divisional Court, which dismissed the appeal after a hearing.360 
 
Mr. Barletta’s case suggests that authorities in Canada can reject liquor license to 
individuals on grounds of their membership in criminal organization such as the Hells Angels 
MC, as providing grounds to believe that an individual “. . . will not carry on business in 
accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty;”361.   
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Considering affiliation with criminal organizations when making administrative decisions 
such as licenses applications should be seen as a mobilization of administrative law for 
countering organized crime.  The efforts bear some similarities to the administrative approach in 
the Netherlands, discussed in the literature review chapter.362   
Summary of Non-Criminal Justice Responses found to be used in Canada 
 
Authorities in Canada can detain an individual that arrives at its borders and find him 
inadmissible to Canada, on basis of his organized criminality.  They are also able to deport a 
non-citizen that is within the borders on the same grounds, even if he is a permanent resident. 
Such inadmissibility can be based on mere membership in organizations if the 
organization in question is involved in crimes363 or, in the absence of such membership, on the 
grounds of participation and involvement in the activities of such organizations.364  Also the 
standard of proof for finding inadmissibility on grounds of organized criminality is “reasonable 
grounds to believe” and not the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.365 
 
Additionally the police in Canada are able to and use Check Stops based on the Highway 
Traffic Act for the purpose of stopping groups considered to be involved in organized crime, 
where the selected group being stopped pose genuine highway security concerns.  At a Check 
Stops the police can then seize the opportunity to pursue other lawful and proper purposes within 
their sphere of duty, such as intelligence gathering related to organized crime or crime in general.  
These other purposes can however not cause more interference to the detained person than needs 
be for the purpose of the highway traffic security concerns. 
                                                
362 See for example: Fijnaut, Cyrille, ‘The administrative approach to organised crime in Amsterdam: Background 
and developments’ in Cyrille Fijnaut (ed), The administrative approach to (organised) crime in Amsterdam 
(repository.uvt.nl 2002), 15.  Nelen, Hans, and Wim Huisman, ‘Breaking the Power of Organized Crime? The 
Administrative Approach in Amsterdam’ in Frank Bovenkerk and others (eds), Studies in Organized Crime, vol. 7 
(Springer New York 2008), 207. 
363 ‘Stables v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)’, 2011 FC 1319 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fp0km> Accessed 
on 10 July 2012..  ‘Collins v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 CanLII 87292 (IRB)’. 
364 ‘Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Thanaratnam, 2005 FCA 122 (CanLII)’, at para 31 - 37. 
365 ‘Stables v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)’, 2011 FC 1319 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fp0km> Accessed 
on 10 July 2012..  ‘Collins v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 CanLII 87292 (IRB)’.  
‘Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Thanaratnam, 2005 FCA 122 (CanLII)’, at para 31 - 37.  See 
on Standard of proof: ‘Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Stables’, 2010 CanLII 96602 (IRB), 
<http://canlii.ca/t/fpt1z> Accessed on 3 July 2012, para 12.  Also as cited in Canada v Stables [2010]: ‘Chiau v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 9042 (FC)’ (CanLII 3 February 1998), page 3. 
   79
 
Finally Canadian authorities seem to be utilizing an administrative approach to counter 
organized crime.  Safe Communities and Neighbourhoods legislations have been enacted to give 
municipal authorities powers to prevent properties within the municipal from being used by 
those considered to be involved in organized crime activities.  Also, powers of the fire marshal 
and other municipal authorities seem to be used for similar preventive purposes.  Finally, 
Canadian authorities can be seen to be introducing membership in criminal organizations as a 
consideration in administrative decision making such as public licensing.  However, it should be 
noted here that the latter two examples of administrative approach to counter organized crime 
can not be seen to have been enacted with the intention of being utilized for countering organized 
crime. 
 
Germany 
 
Germany is most noteworthy for the scope of this study for its efforts to ban criminal 
organizations.  The only nation state known to this study to have banned Outlaw Motorcycle 
Clubs under civil law, on grounds of activity of it’s members. 
Banning Associations 
 
The first case where an organization, perceived to be a criminal organization, was banned 
as an effort to counter organized crime was the banning of the “Hells Angels MC Hamburg e.V.” 
by the Federal Minister of the Interior in 1983.366  Followed by the banning of “MC Hells Angels 
Germany Chapter Düsseldorf” by the Ministry of the Interior of the State of North Rhine-
Westphalia in 2000.367  Since then media coverage shows that German authorities have 
continued to ban motorcycle clubs that they claim to be involved in criminal activity and 
                                                
366  Bundesministerium des Innern (the Federal Ministry of the Interior) decision from 21 October 1983 file 
reference S 1-619 313/13. 
367 Ministerium für Inneres des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (Minister of the Interior of the State of the Northern 
Rhine-Westphalia) decision from 11 December 2000, file reference IV A 3 - 2205 
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organized crime, predominantly clubs that are part of the Hells Angels MC or the Bandidos 
MC.368 
Both the Hells Angels MC and the Bandidos MC are considered to be outlaw motorcycle 
gangs.  At the annual meeting of the 16 Ministers of Interior and the Federal Minister of Interior 
in May 2010, the Ministers of Interior reached a consensus of a nation wide ban on the Hells 
Angels MC and the Bandidos MC.369  At the time this is written it seems that such a nation wide 
ban has not yet been put in place. 
 
German authorities have banned the clubs under article 9 of the Basic Law (the German 
constitution).  Article 9 protects the freedom of association and outlines the restrictions to that 
same right.  The second paragraph of article 9 prohibits associations that have aims contrary to 
the criminal law, or who’s activities are such as to contravene the criminal code.  The provision 
says:  “Associations whose aims or activities contravene the criminal laws, or that are directed 
against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding, shall be 
prohibited.”370 
Based on article 9 of the Basic Law, article 3 of the Association Act (the Act Regulating 
Public Association from 5 August 1964) authorizes to dissolve associations whose aims or 
activities are found to be contrary to the criminal law.  Dissolving an association requires, 
according to article 3, an administrative decision of the ministry of interior, but the law provide 
for a judicial review of the decision.371 
                                                
368 Hartman, Trinity, ed., ‘Brandenburg bans motorcycle gang’ (Deutsche Welle, August 27, 2009) 
<http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,4598039,00.html> accessed 22 November 2011,;   
Houlton, Susan, ed., ‘Hell's Angels ride no more in German state’ (Deutsche Welle, April 29, 2010) 
<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5519489,00.html> accessed 22 November 2011; 
 Chelsom-Pil, Charlotte, ‘Hell's Angels biker gangs shut down in Frankfurt’ (Deutsche Welle, September 30, 2011) 
<http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15429845,00.html> accessed 24 March 2012.  Heine, Hannes, ‘Rockers want to 
defend themselves against ban plans’ (Der Tagesspiegel, December 11, 2011 
<http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/hells-angels-kontra-rot-schwarz-rocker-wollen-sich-gegen-verbotsplaene-
wehren/5945216.html> accessed 15 May 2012 
369 Lichtenberg, Arne, ‘German police target criminal biker gangs’ (Deutsche Welle, April 26, 
2012)<http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15912602,00.html> accessed 15 May 2012. 
370 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany) from 23 May 
1949 (BGBl. S. 1), art. 9 para 2. 
371 Gesetz zur Regelung des öffentlichen Vereinsrechts  (The Association Act), from 5 August 1964 (Federal Law 
Gazette I, p 593), article 3. 
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The scope of the ban is wide as it also bans other organizations from continuing the 
efforts of the banned association and the forming of substitute or replacement organizations.372  
The Act furthermore allows for seizure and confiscation of properties of the banned 
association.373   
 
The first ban was the Federal Minister of the Interior decision to dissolve the “Hells 
Angels MC Hamburge.V.” in 1983.  The decision was appealed to the Federal Administrative 
Court.  The appeal was brought forward on three separate grounds. 
The first ground for appeal was lack of jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of the Interior.  
Additionally, if the federal ministry had jurisdiction under the statute, such jurisdiction was 
claimed to be unconstitutional. 
The court found the Federal Minister of the Interior to have jurisdiction, based on the 
court’s finding that the activity of the association extended beyond a single German Lander.374  
The court also found the jurisdiction to be constitutional, with reference to its previous case 
law.375 
The second ground was that the banning order was unlawful, as the plaintiff had not been 
heard before it was made.  The court found this not to make the banning order unlawful, citing 
the German Administrative Proceedings Act that a hearing can be dispensed of where immediate 
decision appears necessary in the public interest.376 
The third ground for appeal was that the requirements for imposing the ban were not met.  
The plaintiffs argued that three requirements for the ban were not met.  First, claiming that the 
criminal acts of the members were not based on the association’s objective and the acts did not 
constitute activities of the association.  Second, that it should affect the decision of dissolving the 
                                                
372 Gesetz zur Regelung des öffentlichen Vereinsrechts  (The Association Act), from 5 August 1964 (Federal Law 
Gazette I, p 593), art. 8 para 1. 
373 Gesetz zur Regelung des öffentlichen Vereinsrechts  (The Association Act), from 5 August 1964 (Federal Law 
Gazette I, p 593), art. 3 para 1 and art. 11. 
374 Bundesverwaltungsgericht (The Federal Administrative Court) case no BVerwG 1 A 89.83 judgment of October 
18, 1988, p 10 – 12. 
375 Bundesverwaltungsgericht (The Federal Administrative Court) case no BVerwG 1 A 89.83 judgment of October 
18, 1988, p12 and 13.  Citing its case law: BVerwGE (Decisions of the Bundesverwaltungsgericht) 55, 175 <176>; 
61, 218 <219>; judgment of 13 May 1986 – BVerwG 1 A 12.82 – Buchholz 402.45 VereinsG No 8. 
376 The German Administrative Proceedings Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz – VwVfG) Section 28 para 2 
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association that the “Hells Angels MC Hamburge.V.” was not found to be a criminal association 
in the meaning of article 129 paragraph 1 in a resent criminal proceedings.  Finally, no facts were 
claimed to support that the association had wanted to conceal offences committed by its 
members. 
 
The court declared that the initiative of criminal proceedings is not required to establish 
that an association contravenes the criminal law for the purpose of banning it under article 9 
paragraph 2 of the Basic law.  Also, the court notes how the banning offence of article 9 of the 
Basic Law was differently framed from Article 129 paragraph 1 of the German Criminal Code 
(Strafgesetzbuch - StGB). 
Furthermore, the court explains the purpose of the banning offence, as not intended as an 
additional sanction for criminal acts of individual persons, but rather intended to:  
“counteract a particular threat to public safety or order resulting from the 
founding or continuation of an organisation from which criminal acts are 
planned or committed.  Such organisations constitute a particular threat to the 
legal interests protected by the criminal law.  They have an inherent dynamic 
of their own and an organised potential in terms of resources and persons, 
which facilitate and favour criminal behaviour.  At the same time, the 
individual member’s feeling of responsibility is frequently reduced, 
individual inhibitions about committing offences are destroyed and there is a 
stimulus to commit further offences.”377 
The court acknowledged that legal interests of the community, protected by the criminal 
law, can be particularly threatened by organizations that contravene the criminal law. 
 
The court found the “Hells Angels MC Hamburg e.V.” to be an association for the 
purpose of the banning provision, based inter alia on the fact of it being registered as such.378 
 
                                                
377  Bundesverwaltungsgericht (The Federal Administrative Court) case no BVerwG 1 A 89.83 judgment of October 
18, 1988a, p 23. 
378  Bundesverwaltungsgericht (The Federal Administrative Court) case no BVerwG 1 A 89.83 judgment of October 
18, 1988, p 21. 
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The court proceeded by examining whether the criminal conducts of the members can be 
attributed to the association.  The court explained that despite lack of criminal capacity, as only 
natural person have criminal capacity, associations can contravene the criminal law.379  
Furthermore, that through its members and the club officers, an association can form a group 
intent that is separate from that of the individual member.  This group intent allows the 
association its own purpose and to act independently.  The court acknowledged that an 
association could have more than one such purpose at the same time, legal, illegal or criminal.  
Also the court noted that criminality needs not to be the main purpose or activity of the 
association, nor does it have to be on a permanent basis.   
The court made it clear that an association can be found unlawful, based on the acts of its 
members when they commit criminal acts spontaneously and based on their own decision.380   
Such a finding could be based on acts of the members if they repeatedly act as unified 
association, so from the outside the criminal acts appear to be activities of the association and the 
association is aware of and approves this fact or at least accepts it without contradiction.381  The 
court additionally noted that criminal behaviour on the part of the club members could also be 
attributed to the association if the association attempts to cover it up by offering the members its 
own assistance or assistance from other members.382   
Interestingly, the court here found that the association can become accountable ‘after the 
fact’ by supporting activities of its members, without the association as such having initially 
participated in its commission or the decision to commit these acts.  The court explained what 
constitutes such a support.  Neither needs such support to be formally decided or directed at the 
commission of specific offences.  Nor, is such support determined from a criminal law point of 
view, such as reference to participation or assistance in criminal acts.383  The court stated that it 
is sufficient that it is made clear to the members or the public, especially to the victims of the 
offences, that the association will support its members in relation to the offences.384 
 
                                                
379 Bundesverwaltungsgericht (The Federal Administrative Court) case no BVerwG 1 A 89.83 judgment of October 
18, 1988, p 21 - 22. 
380 The Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), Case no BVerwG 1 A 89.83, p 22. 
381  The Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), Case no BVerwG 1 A 89.83, p 22. 
382  The Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), Case no BVerwG 1 A 89.83, p 22. 
383  The Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), Case no BVerwG 1 A 89.83, p 23. 
384  The Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), Case no BVerwG 1 A 89.83, p 24. 
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After having explained in this way how an association can contravene the criminal law 
for the purpose of a ban under article 9 of the Basic Law, the court found the “Hells Angels MC 
Hamburg e.V.” to contravene the criminal law.385 
 
The court accepts the purpose of the association as stated in the article of the association 
the ‘pursuit of the sport of motorcycling’.386  However, the court claims there to be an additional 
objective of offering full supports to its members in their criminal offences. 
The court notes that all and every member declares support and solidarity to all and every 
other member - support and solidarity that is also publicly declared and displayed.  Due to this 
publicly declared support and solidarity, the court found non-members reasonably to think, that 
the acts of individual members would be supported by all the other members.387  Furthermore the 
court found this to give the members confidence of the support of their fellow members for their 
acts, criminal or not.  The court also noted that members of the association, by their violent 
behaviour, created a reputation for themselves as a violent group.  This reputation was used 
effectively, by individual members in committing offences, where the reputation would 
intimidate non-members and ensure compliance.388  The court found it clear that all the members 
of the “Hells Angels MC Hamburg e.V.” knew of the violent acts committed by members of the 
association as Hells Angels and the reputation the association acquired as a consequence of these 
acts.389  The court found that the association did not try to counteract this reputation.390  The 
court gives account of how members holding leading role within the association failed to 
condemn the violence and, in some cases, supported or lead the violent activity.391 
Finally the court notes how the club had prepared a list of lawyers stating which lawyer 
was to represent which members when necessary; this the court found to be evidence of the 
members’ criminal defence being organized in advance.392  Based on these findings, the court 
                                                
385  The Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), Case no BVerwG 1 A 89.83, p 24. 
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found that the association had supported the criminal activity of its members, which is sufficient 
on its own to constitute a banning offence.393 
 
Consequently, the court finds the purpose and activities of the “Hells Angels MC 
Hamburg e.V.” to contravened the criminal law.  Based on its finding that individual criminal 
offences of the members were seen, for external purposes, as activities of the “Hells Angels MC 
Hamburg e.V.” and accepted by the association.  Additionally, based on the court’s finding that 
the association supported the criminal activity of its members.394   
 
The court seems to agree with the Hamburg Landgericht judgment that it is not possible 
to establish that activities of the group were planed or that a group intent was formed.395  
However, this is not found to be necessary for a banning offence.   
The court finds the ban to be in accordance with the principle of proportionality and finds 
no reason to take any less severe measure against the “Hells Angels MC Hamburg e.V.”396 
The ban on the “Hells Angels MC Hamburg e.V.” is therefore upheld by the court.397 
 
The second case examined was the decision by the Ministry of the Interior of the State of 
North Rhine-Westphalia to dissolve the “MC Hells Angels Germany Chapter Düsseldorf” in the 
year 2000.  
The ministry, like the judge in the “Hells Angels MC Hamburg e.V.” case, finds the 
criminal activities to have been known, accepted and supported by the association.398  
Consequently the association is found to contravene the criminal law and banned. 
However the ministry of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia reaches further than its 
federal counterpart in its decision, by claiming that offences were planned at the association’s 
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meetings and qualify as organized crime.399  This would suggest that a common intent was 
formed by the members and that the members, and others, committed offences on the 
organizations behalf. 
 
The ministry claims these activities can only be prevented by banning the association and 
that lesser measures are insufficient.400  The ministry argues that criminal activity is the main 
source of income for the association and therefore a ban on the activities of the association will 
not effectively change its objectives or prevent the criminal activities of the association or its 
members.   
Furthermore, the ministry claims the expected criminal conviction of the association’s 
leading members cannot be expected to become effective in changing the objective of the 
association or stop the illegal activity.401  The ministry claims the way the association supports 
its incarcerated members as well as the support they get through connections with other Hells 
Angels chapters are the reasons for this assessment.  This arrangement is said to allow 
incarcerated members to rely on the support of the association while they serve time in prison.402  
The ministry claims this support is financed by illegal activity and therefore the illegal activity 
will have to continue to maintain the support.403 
Summary of Non-Criminal Justice Responses found to be used in Germany 
 
The only Non-Criminal Justice Response to organized crime in Germany that this study 
was able to find sufficient evidence for was the ban on organizations that contravene the criminal 
laws. 
Under German law, organizations can contravene the criminal law, even though only 
natural persons can have criminal capacity.404  However, criminal conducts of its members can 
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be contributed to the organization, allowing the organization to form purpose and act 
independently from its individual members.405  Criminal conduct of members can be attributed to 
the organization if, from the outside, the criminal acts appear to be activities of the association 
and the association is aware of and approves this fact or at least accepts it without 
contradiction.406  Also, criminal behaviour on the part of the club members can be attributed to 
the association if the association covers it up by offering the members its own assistance or 
assistance from other members.407  Furthermore, criminality needs not to be the main purpose or 
the main activity of the association, nor does it have to be on a permanent basis. 
The purpose of a ban is to prevent the “. . . threat to legal interests protected by the 
criminal law . . .”408 posed by organizations that contravene the criminal law.  The purpose is 
therefore not punitive and the ban is not intended to be an additional sanction for criminal acts of 
individual persons. 
 
Iceland 
 
This study found two approaches to be utilized to counter organized crime in Iceland that 
are not based on criminal justice responses.  The most frequently used measures are based on 
border control, where known members of alleged criminal organizations have been denied entry 
into Iceland, based on restrictions to their treaty based “right” of entry.  Also, evidence were 
found of an administrative approach for disrupting activities of organizations considered to be 
involved in organized crime. 
Border control 
 
Icelandic authorities stopped 19 individuals on its borders in 2002 based on their 
involvement with the Hells Angels MC.  Eleven individuals were denied entry on the ground of 
their criminal record.  The Directorate of Immigration decided the day after to deny the 
remaining eight individuals of entry, based on the Act on control of Foreigners No 45 from 
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1965.409  They were subsequently arrested and escorted by police back to Denmark from where 
they came. 
Statements given by officials to the media, suggest that the involvement of these 
individuals with the Hells Angels MC association was a deciding factor.  Stefán Eiríksson, then 
director at the Ministry of Justice, stated that Icelandic authorities intended to use all available 
measures to counter organized crime activities, including activities of the Hells Angels MC.410  
Sólveig Pétursdóttir, the Minister of Justice stated that there was a wide solidarity between 
administrative institutions in Iceland to fight organized crime activities with all available 
measures, including activities that thrive within the Hells Angels MC.411  Haraldur Johannessen 
the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police stated that the police considered the Hells 
Angels MC to be an organized criminal group and other members of the Hells Angels MC could 
expect similar measures to be taken.412 
Similar measures were taken against members of the Hells Angels MC and their support 
clubs in November 2007 and March 2009.413  Press releases show that these measures were 
intended to counter organized crime in Iceland.414 
 
Iceland is a member of the Schengen treaty and the European Economic Area (EEA).  
The Schengen treaty abolished border control on the internal borders of the member states.  The 
European Economic Area was established by an agreement that expands the four freedoms of the 
European Union – the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital - to the three 
member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), that are not members of the 
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European Union.415  Consequently, the EFTA member states are obligated to adapt their 
legislations to the European Union’s legislations in these fields, to guarantee equal rights and 
obligations for citizens and economic operators in the European Economic Area.416   
Consequently, the reintroduction of border control on Iceland’s internal borders with the 
Schengen states and the denying of entry to Schengen citizens had to be in accordance with 
exceptions and limitations allowed for in the treaties of the Schengen and the European 
Economic Area.417  In a notification to the European Commission in 2009, Iceland states that the 
border control is being reintroduced for reasons of “. . . specific threat to the public order and the 
national security of Iceland, . . .”.418  The intended aim is declared to: “. . . prevent the entry of 
potentially defined group of dangerous persons from and via neighbouring European 
countries”419, the implementation of the border control shows that this defined group was the 
Hells Angels MC.420 
 
The measures first received a judicial review in 2010 when Mr. Kristiansen and Mr. Wahl 
brought a civil case against Icelandic authorities based on the unlawfulness of their deportation, 
after having unsuccessfully appealed the decisions of the Directory of Immigration to the 
Ministry of the Interior.421 
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The District Court of Reykjavík decided upon both cases and cleared Icelandic authorities 
of all claims.422  These cases could have been appealed to the Supreme Court of Iceland, but they 
were not.  The time frame for such appeals has expired and the court’s rulings have therefore 
become final in these cases. 
The European Court of Human Rights hears cases brought by individuals against its 
member states for alleged breach of the Convention.  Iceland is a member state, applicants are, 
however, required to exhaust domestic remedies before bringing cases before the court; to fulfill 
this requirement an appeal to the Supreme Court had to be made.423 
 
The facts of Mr. Kristiansen’s and Mr. Wahl's cases are similar and the rulings by 
Reykjavík district court are almost identical, made by the same judge on the same day.  This 
work will therefore discuss Mr. Kristiansen’s case and only reflect briefly on few distinctive 
issues in Mr. Wahl’s case. 
 
The facts of the case are that customs authorities stopped Mr. Kristiansen when he 
arrived at the Icelandic borders from Norway on February 8th of 2010.424  He refused to answer 
police questioning but dressed himself in a vest with the Hells Angels MC insignia.  Mr. 
Furuholmen, Mr. Kristiansen’s lawyer who accompanied him, informed that they were to meet 
an Icelandic lawyer Mr. Oddgeir Einarsson hdl., and that his client intended to leave the country 
the day after. 
 
The National Commissioner of the Police made a risk assessment for Mr. Kristiansen’s 
arrival on the day of his arrival.  The assessment informs that an Icelandic motorcycle club, MC 
Iceland, had the status of a prospect club within the Hells Angels World association and that the 
club was seeking full membership.425  The entry process of the Icelandic club is said to be under 
                                                
422 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010.  Reykjavík district court 
(Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6159/2010. 
423 See on the rule that domestic remedies must be exhausted: Convention for the protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR), para 1, art 35. 
424 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 1. 
425 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 2. 
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the Norwegian club’s supervision and the assessment concludes that Mr. Kristiansen’s arrival is 
related to this entry process, as he is thought to be the president of the Norwegian club.   
The assessment claims that organized crime has increased everywhere where the Hells 
Angels have established themselves and the emerging of a club in Iceland creates a risk of 
increase in organized crime in Iceland and is, therefore, a threat to the society.426  To become full 
members, the Icelandic club would have to show that their activity and organization is consistent 
with Hells Angels MC requirements.  This would increase the risk that the Icelandic members 
take up methods and modus operandi of the foreign Hells Angels members, as might be required 
by the foreign members.  A membership is additionally considered to constitute a formal 
cooperation between the domestic members with individuals, many of which are hardened, 
heavily organized and dangerous criminals.  Reference is made to members of the Hells Angels 
MC in Denmark having participated in violent conflicts with migrant gangs and motorcycle 
gangs involved in organized crime.427  These conflicts are considered to be largely over 
dominance of the narcotic market. 
 
After receiving the risk assessment, the Directorate of Immigration decided on the same 
day to deny Mr. Kristiansen entry into Iceland.  Entry was denied on the basis of Act on 
Foreigners, claiming necessity on grounds of public order and public safety, depending upon “if 
the foreign national exhibits conduct, or may be considered likely to engage in conduct, that 
involves a substantial and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental attitudes of society.”428  
The directorate relies here on legitimate limitation to the right to free movement of person within 
the EEA.429 
 
The Reykjavík district court rules against Mr. Kristiansen who claimed the risk 
assessment of the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police to be misleading, incorrect and 
                                                
426 Ibid. 
427 Ibid. 
428 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 2.  See on the legal provision: 
Act on Foreigners no. 96/2002.  Subsection c paragraph 1 of article 41 as referred to in the judgment; paragraph 1 of 
article 42 as referred to in subparagraph c; as well as paragraph 2 of article 42 for clarification. Act on Foreigners no 
96/2002, para. 2, article 42. 
429 Lög um útlendinga (Act on Foreigners), no. 96 from 15 April 2002, art. 41 and 42.  Decision of the EEA Joint 
Committee No 158/2007 on free movement of persons [2007] OJ L124/20;  Decision of the EEA Joint Committee 
No 158/2007 on free movement of persons [2007] OJ L124/20, art 5 para 1 and art. 27, para 1 and 2. 
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lacking references for its sources.  The court found the assessment to be sufficient, noting it to be 
based on confidential information from police authorities of the Nordic countries, public 
information, especially media coverage in the Nordic countries and reports from EUROPOL.430  
The court finds there to be no need to disclose the sources for the assessment and notes that there 
might be vested interests against publication of confidential information.  The court found the 
National commissioner of the Icelandic Police to have legal competence to create risk 
assessments of this kind, finding the police to be the right authority to assess if circumstances 
required that a foreigner be denied entry.431 
Furthermore the court finds the Directorate Of Immigration and the ministry to have the 
role to decide, based on that assessment, if legal requirements were sufficiently satisfied, but not 
to review the assessment made by the police.432 
The court also finds against Mr. Kristiansen’s complaint that his denial of entry to 
Iceland had not sufficient basis in law.  The court finds that the domestic legislation affords 
authorities leeway for interpreting what constitutes public order and public security.  Authorities 
would however have to interpret these concepts in accordance with objective arguments and the 
states obligations under the EEA treaty.433  The court finds the right of citizens to move and 
reside freely within the European Union to have been provided for in Iceland by an amendment 
to the Act on Foreigners in 2008, in accordance with Iceland’s obligations under the EEA 
treaty.434 
The court finds therefore that Mr. Kristiansen’s denial of entry is an exception from the 
main rule of free movement of persons within the EEA.435  Finding such an exception has to be 
interpreted strictly and therefore this freedom can only be limited based on public order, public 
                                                
430 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 9. 
431 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 9. 
432 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 9. 
433 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 10;  Directive 2004/38/EC on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States [2004] OJ L158/77, para 1 art 27 
434 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 10.  See further on the 
Directive: Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77.  See on the changes made to the Icelandic Act 
on Foreigners: Lög um breyting á lögum um útlendinga (Law Amending the Icelandic Act on Foreigners) no 85 
from 12 June 2008 
See on how the EC Directive was adopted to the EEA treaty: Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 158/2007 on 
free movement of persons [2007] OJ L124/20 
435 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 10 and 11. 
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safety and public health.436  It is noteworthy that the court refers to the legitimate aims for 
restrictions as listed in the EC directive, but not the differently worded domestic legislation.437 
The court notes how serious organized crime is considered to go against public interests 
and the security of the citizens.438  The court notes the Hells Angels MC was assessed to be 
involved in organized crime and that authorities have countered them as such both domestically 
and abroad.439  The court concludes that in the light of the nature of the Hells Angels MC and 
their involvement with criminal activity, their members have been assessed to be a threat to 
public order and public safety, and are therefore denied entry on the borders.440 
Furthermore, Mr. Kristiansen claimed he had not been assessed individually as a person, 
based on his personal activity, as is required by the EC directive of free movement of persons 
from 2004.  According to which, the denial of entry of an EES citizen requires personal conduct 
of the individual concerned to represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat.441  The 
directive specifically notes that justifications based of general prevention are not sufficient. 
An important distinction has to be made here between Mr. Wahl’s case and Mr. 
Kristiansen’s case.  Mr. Wahl claimed he arrived to Iceland as a tourist, for the purpose of 
sightseeing in Reykjavík and Icelandic nature, as well as intending to visit his friends in the 
Fáfnir association (later MC Iceland).442  While Mr. Kristiansen claimed he arrived to Iceland to 
meet with an Icelandic lawyer about matters related to the Hells Angels MC and MC Iceland.  
However, the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police found the arrival of both men to be 
interrelated to MC Iceland’s entry process into the Hells Angels MC.443 
The court finds the involvement of each man with the Hells Angels MC to entail their 
participation in the association’s activity, and finds that with their membership and participation, 
                                                
436 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 10 and 11. 
437 Lög um útlendinga (Act on Foreigners), no. 96 from 15 April 2002, subpara c, para 1 art 41 and para 1 art 42.  
Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77, para 1 art 27 
438 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 11. 
439 Ibid. 
440 Ibid. 
441 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 11.  Further on the directive 
see: Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77, article 27. 
442 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6159/2010, p 1. 
443 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6159/2010, p 1 - 2. Reykjavík district court 
(Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 2 
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they have taken up the position of supporting the activities and aims of the association.444   Here 
the court seems to be making a reference to the European Court of Justice decision in the Van 
Duyn case.445  There, the court found that while ones involvement in an organization did not in 
and of it self establish that a person is more or less likely to engage in some specific conduct, it 
still was a factor that domestic authorities were entitled to take into account. 
The court found that both visits would have been instrumental to facilitate the entry of 
MC Iceland into the Hells Angels MC, increasing the association’s presence in Iceland and 
increasing the risk of organized crime.  Based on this assessment the court concluded the arrival 
of both men to have generated a genuine and serious threat to public order and public security.446 
The court does not give clear guidance as to what would be sufficient connection to the 
Hells Angels MC or MC Iceland.  Arguably, membership in the Hells Angels MC is sufficient 
for denial of entry on the borders.  This assumption is based on the court’s finding that 
membership establishes participation in the association’s activities and consequently the 
individual has taken the position of supporting the activities and aims of the association.447  
Furthermore the court states: “In the light of the nature of the Hells Angels MC and their linkage 
with criminal activity the members of the association have been assessed to be a threat to public 
order and public security and hence have been denied entry on the borders.”448   The threat they 
are found to pose is based on the risk of them facilitating the increased presence of the Hells 
Angels MC and thereby increased risk of organized crime.  No reference is made to the two 
men’s own reputation or criminal record. 
 
The Court rejects the interpretation maintained by the plaintiffs that denial of entry on the 
basis of public order and public security is not permitted unless the same measures could be 
                                                
444 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6159/2010, p 10.  Reykjavík district court 
(Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 11. 
445 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] Ch 358 (C-41/74) European Court of Justice, at para 17 - 18 and 24. 
446 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6159/2010, p 10.  Reykjavík district court 
(Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 11. 
447 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6159/2010, p 10.  Reykjavík district court 
(Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 11. 
448 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 11.  Reykjavík district court 
(Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6159/2010, p 10.  The author’s own translation. 
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taken against an Icelandic citizen.449  The Court notes that authorities can take various different 
measures against Icelandic citizens on grounds of threat to public peace and public order while 
as the Icelandic constitution bars deportation or denial of entry of Icelandic citizens.450  
Therefore, the Court finds that denial of entry on the basis of public order and public security is 
permitted under the Act on Foreigners although the same measure cannot be taken against an 
Icelandic citizen. This is again in line with the Van Duyn judgment that found domestic 
authorities entitled to put restrictions on foreign nationals even where the state did not put similar 
restrictions on its own nationals.451 
In the case of Van Duyn, the European Court of Justice notes the principle of freedom of 
movement within the European Economic Community without any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, to be a fundamental principle.452  The court, however, notes that there are particular 
circumstances that justify measures to be taken on the ground of public policy for limitation of 
this freedom.  The court also recognizes that the domestic public policy may vary between the 
member states and between periods of time.453  The court therefore reserves an area of discretion 
for the authorities of the member states within the limitations imposed by the Treaty.  
Subsequently the European Court of Justice finds that “. . . the Member State cannot be required, 
before it can rely on the concept of public policy, to make such activities unlawful, if recourse to 
such a measure is not thought appropriate in the circumstances.”454  Finding this conclusion to 
flow from its arguments “. . . where the competent authorities of a Member State have clearly 
defined their standpoint as regards the activities of a particular organization and where, 
considering it to be socially harmful, they have taken administrative measures to counteract these 
activities, . . .”455  Finally, the court finds that a member state can, for reasons of public policy, 
restrict freedom of movement based on individuals association with an organization even though 
that state does not place similar restriction upon its own nationals with regards to the same 
                                                
449 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6159/2010, p 10.  Reykjavík district court 
(Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 11. 
450 Reykjavík district court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6159/2010, p 10.  Reykjavík district court 
(Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) judgment no. E-6158/2010, p 11.  See for the constitutional provision:  Stjórnarskrá 
Lýðveldissins Íslands (The Constitution of the Republic of Iceland) no 33 from 17 June 1944), para 2 art 66. 
451 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] Ch 358 (C-41/74) European Court of Justice, at para 20 - 23. 
452 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] Ch 358 (C-41/74) European Court of Justice, at para 18.  The European 
Economic Community (EEC) became the European Union (EU) in 1993. 
453 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] Ch 358 (C-41/74) European Court of Justice, at para 18. 
454 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] Ch 358 (C-41/74) European Court of Justice, at para 19. 
455 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] Ch 358 (C-41/74) European Court of Justice, at para 19. 
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organization.456  Where the state considers the activities of the organization to be socially 
harmful even if the activities of the organization are not unlawful. 
 
Icelandic authorities can therefore deny foreigners of entry on the borders if it is deemed 
necessary for public order or public safety.  On this basis, members of organizations found to be 
involved in organized crime have been denied of entry on the borders, as they were considered to 
increase the risk of organized crime and thereby being a genuine and serious threat to public 
order and public security. 
Administrative approach 
 
Attempts to Close Club Houses 
 
This study found Icelandic authorities to be using an administrative approach to counter 
organized crime.  A statement from the police shows that after the police raided the clubhouse of 
Fáfnir, as part of a criminal investigation in 2007, they summoned different city and state 
authorities to inspect the building.457  These authorities included the fire department, building 
inspector, electricity inspector and health authorities.  The study was unable to verify the 
response of these authorities, but shortly thereafter the club moved out of the facilities they then 
occupied in downtown Reykjavík (the capital of Iceland).  Fáfnir has since become MC Iceland, 
a prospect club of the Hells Angels MC, and later a full patched club of the Hells Angels MC.  
Over a period of less than ten years the club has relocated at least three times, and been located 
in three different municipals.458 
                                                
456 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] Ch 358 (C-41/74) European Court of Justice, at para 23 and 24. 
457 National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police, ‘Lögregluaðgerð vegna komu Hell's Angels til landsins’ (Police 
actions on account of Hell’s Angels arrival to Iceland) (Lögregluvefurinn (National Commissioner of the Icelandic 
Police, press release), November 2, 2007) 
<http://www.logreglan.is/subqa.asp?cat_id=81&module_id=220&element_id=10647> accessed 23 April 2012 
458 ‘National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police, ‘Lögregluaðgerð vegna komu Hell's Angels til landsins’ (Police 
actions on account of Hell’s Angels arrival to Iceland) (Lögregluvefurinn (National Commissioner of the Icelandic 
Police, press release), November 2, 2007) 
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Mbl.is, ‘Vítisenglar á ólöglegum veitingastað’ (Mbl.is, February 9, 2013) 
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This seems to suggest that authorities in Iceland are using administrative powers in 
efforts to close the clubhouses of associations considered to be involved with organized crime. 
 
Denial of Trademark Registration 
 
The Icelandic Patent office rejected in 2011 the application of the Hells Angels MC 
Iceland to register their trademark, both logo and name.459  The rejection was based on legitimate 
limitations for registration under article 14 of the Icelandic Trade Mark Act no. 45/1997.  
Subparagraph 3 provided that: “if the mark is contrary to law or public order or likely to cause 
offence”460. 
The reason given for the denial was that the mark is intended to stand for activity that 
was thought to be organized crime.  The patent office stated that a recent judgement of the 
district court of Reykjavík revealed that the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police 
considered the motorcycle association Hells Angels to be involved in organized crime, operating 
globally.461  This assessment was supported by the assessment of EUROPOL that the Hells 
Angels MC falls within its definition of organized crime.   
The patent office notes in it’s reasoning that organized crime is a social threat directed at 
public interests and public safety.462  The Icelandic Patent Office has emphasized that the 
travaux préparatoires for the Trade Mark Act explains that the used of a mark, if not the mark 
itself, can be a reason for denial of registration.  Consequently, the Patent office finds the law not 
to allow the registration of a Hells Angels MC Iceland’s trademark, as the activity the mark 
would stand for is thought to be organized crime.463 
                                                
459 Icelandic Patent Office, ‘Vörumerkjaumsókn nr. 2539/2011, HELLS ANGELS MC ICELAND, (orð- og 
myndmerki)’ (Trademark application no 2539/2011, HELLS ANGELS MC ICELAND, (word and logo)) (Icelandic 
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The attorney for the Hells Angels has twice requested for the decision to be reversed.  
The attorney argues that Hells Angels MC Iceland is not involved in organized crime and that 
evidence to the contrary is ill supported and in fact only based on police investigative 
evidence.464  The attorney also argues that the association has a right to register its name and 
logo, just as its members have a constitutional right to associate in the association.465 
The Icelandic Patent Office has at the time of writing still not given its answer to the 
Hells Angels MC Iceland’s attorney’s second request.466 
 
Summary of Non-Criminal Justice Responses found to be used in Iceland 
 
Authorities in Iceland are denying members in associations found to be involved in 
organized crime from entering the country, as an effort to prevent organized crime activity.  The 
denial is based on genuine and serious threat to public order and public security. 
Authorities even restrict in this way the right to freedom of movement that citizens of the 
Schengen states enjoy within the Schengen area, based on these members being a genuine and 
serious threat to public order and public security.  The assessment of the associations lies with 
the National Commissioner of the Police as the competent authority. 
Authorities in Iceland can also be seen to be using Administrative measure to counter 
organized crime by taking evidence of organized criminality into consideration when making 
administrative decisions.  This can be seen from the denial of registration of the name and 
insignia of the Hells Angels MC by the Icelandic Patent office, as well as from the use of 
municipal powers in efforts to prevent the use of properties for activities of associations 
considered to be involved in organized crime. 
                                                
464 Icelandic Patent Office, ‘Vörumerkjaumsókn nr. 2539/2011, HELLS ANGELS MC ICELAND, (orð- og 
myndmerki)’ (Trademark application no. 2539/2011, HELLS ANGELS MC ICELAND, (word and logo)) (Icelandic 
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466 As of June 2013 
   99
 
The use of non-criminal justice responses to counter criminal behaviour in general and 
organized crime in particular should be relevant to discussions in the field of Transnational 
Criminal Law.  Indubitably, this should be relevant to the discussion if criminal law is suitable to 
counter collective behaviour such as organized crime.  Also, the above described use of non-
criminal justice responses to counter organized crime should make Boister’s statement 
questionable that Transnational Criminal Law is a doctrinal match to Transnational Crime, based 
on how Boister excludes non-criminal justice responses from the field of Transnational Criminal 
Law. 
Finally, the above coverage must raise the question whether transnational efforts to 
counter organized crime are promoting non-criminal justice responses to counter organize crime, 
and if not, should they be promoting them in the light of the criticism that the criminal justice 
responses meet?  This will be researched in the next subchapter. 
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Transnational promotion of non-criminal justice responses 
 
The study has at this point confirmed the utilization of non-criminal justice responses by 
domestic authorities for the purpose of countering organized crime, beyond the approaches that 
focus at the proceeds of crime and crime related assets.  The second phase of this research 
examined if such non-criminal justice responses are being promoted at the international level.  
To investigate if non-criminal justice responses are being promoted, the study continued by 
reviewing official documents from the European Union and the United Nations that have to do 
with cooperation in criminal matters.  The documents were reviewed in search for evidence of 
promotion of non-criminal justice responses for countering organized crime, utilizing the 
understanding gained by the first phase of the research of what kind of non-criminal justice 
responses were used for this purposes by domestic authorities. 
 
The search revealed no evidence of the United Nations promoting such non-criminal 
justice responses. 
 
The European Union was found to be promoting a variety of non-criminal justice 
responses that have a different focus than the criminal asset approaches.  The European Union is 
influencing the approach taken by its member states for countering organized crime, by 
promoting non-criminal justice responses.  Additionally, not only is the European Union 
facilitating the sharing of information between its member states, but is in fact an important part 
of developing the non-criminal justice responses that are being promoted seems to take place at 
the transnational or even the supranational level within the Union. 
 
Evidence for promotion of non-criminal justice responses by the European Union in it’s 
policy was found as early as 1997.  That year the Council of the European Communities 
promoted the utilization of preventive approach to counter organized crime, claiming prevention 
to be “. . . no less important than repression in any integrated approach to organized crime, to the 
extent that it aims at reducing the circumstances in which organized crime can operate.”467 
                                                
467 Action plan to combat organized crime[1997] OJ C251/1, at p 2. 
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This was followed up by Council Resolution, ‘on the prevention of organised crime with 
reference to the establishment of a comprehensive strategy for combating it’ in 1998.468  In the 
resolution the Commission and Europol are given the task of making a proposal on how 
preventive measures could be promoted in future work at the European level and in particular in 
its legal instruments.  More specifically these supranational bodies are invited to assess the most 
effective preventative measures, by which bodies and at what level, including to which extent 
these measures could be taken at the European Union level. 
In ‘A European Union Strategy for the beginning of the new millennium’ from the year 
2000 the European Union promotes a preventive and multidisciplinary approach to counter 
organized crime.469  Ten years later in 2010, the roadmap for the European Union in the area of 
justice, freedom and security, the Stockholm Programme, promotes the use of an administrative 
approach to prevent and counter organized crime.470   Furthermore, in its conclusion on setting 
the EU’s priorities for the fight against organised crime between 2011 and 2013, the Council 
appeals to its member states “. . . to actively use, in addition to the traditional criminal justice-
based approach, alternative and complementary approaches and instruments to fight serious and 
organised crime”.471  Finally, the Council adopted the same wording in ‘Council conclusions on 
setting the EU’s priorities for the fight against serious and organised crime between 2014 and 
2017’, appealing again to its member states to actively use alternative and complementary 
approaches and instruments to fight serious and organised crime.472 
 
Furthermore, the Council of the European Union in 2012 sent the Standing Committee on 
operational co-operation on internal security (COSI) “. . . a number of proposals and suggestions 
to take forward the multidisciplinary and administrative approach to combat organised crime”473.  
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Showing a political body of the Union to be directing a bureaucratic ‘expert’ body of the Union 
towards an emphasize on non-criminal justice responses. 
 
A survey conducted by the Netherlands delegation to the European Union shows that the 
member states of the Union suggest and welcome facilitation, cooperation and guidance at the 
level of the European Union for countering organized crime by way of a Non-Criminal Justice 
approach.474  Furthermore, the supranational bodies of the Union, such as Europol and Eurojust, 
are seen by the member states as suitable for playing a role in transnational cooperation for Non-
Criminal Justice Response to organized crime.475 
The survey reveals that the member states see the European Union to have an important 
role to play in sharing of information about and developing non-criminal justice responses to 
counter organized crime.  The survey finds the member states to call for the union to contribute 
in three ways.476  First, the member states request that the future policy of the Union facilitates 
international cooperation on “an integrated, non-penal administrative approach”477.  Second, to 
facilitate the sharing of information about existing practices and experience.  Finally, to provide 
a platform at the Union level where the member states can address “. . . proposals and initiatives 
with regard to the administrative approach to organised crime.”478 
The above coverage shows how the European Union is promoting non-criminal justice 
responses in its policy. 
 
The European Union has also taken active part in the selection and development of non-
criminal justice responses to be implemented at the domestic level. 
As early as in 2011 the European Union made a handbook describing good practices in 
administrative approach to countering organized crime.  The Handbook is entitled: 
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“Complementary approaches and actions to prevent and combat organised crime – A collection 
of good practice examples from EU Member States”, frequently referred to as “The Hungarian 
Handbook”.479  The Hungarian handbook is not a one-time compilation, the handbook is 
continuously upgraded and maintained by experts within domestic law enforcement agencies and 
Europol.480 
Additionally, the European Union has provided two platforms where the Union and the 
member states can address existing and new non-criminal justice responses to counter organized 
crime. 
An informal network group has been established under the Presidency of the Union, 
made up of one representative from each member state.481  The network group’s mandate 
according to publicly available information is to promote administrative measures as an 
approach, as well as to share information about its use amongst the member states and encourage 
sharing of best practices.482  The network is also intended to propose new initiatives in 
developing administrative measures and make suggestions to highest authorities in the European 
Union.  The network will provide information and give advise to the Council of the Union on 
policy and the Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI) on operational oriented 
proposals.483  The Europol Platform for Experts, under Europol, is intended to support the 
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informal network group.484  The platform for experts and the informal network seem to be 
intended to exchange information on each network’s knowledge and suggestions. 
The Europol Platform for Experts is intended to facilitate compilation of national 
legislations; examples of best practice in administrative approaches; and provide questions and 
answers for practical difficulties.485  As well as facilitating focus groups on specific criminal 
activity; collaboration in the preparation of documents; and facilitating a contact point between 
those tasked with the administrative approaches in different countries.  The Europol Platform for 
Experts is, by invitation only, secure virtual community of experts on law enforcement.  The 
virtual platform offers variety of forums, some are made up of law enforcement officials only, 
but others also have members that are not law enforcement officials, such as experts from the 
private sector and the academia.  The Europol Platform for Experts has a forum named 
“Administrative approaches to tackling organised crime”.486  It is, however, unclear what forums 
are for law enforcement officials only and which are open to external experts.  It is however 
unclear if that forum or any of the others is closed to law enforcement officials, or open for 
external experts.  Additionally, the variety of expertise having been gathered by the forum is 
unclear.  Europol seems therefore to be reaching out for expert knowledge.  However, it remains 
indeterminate to what extent this knowledge influences or guides the discussion and knowledge 
generation within Europol. 
 
Additionally, the research conducted shows how the supranational bodies of the 
European Union actively engaged in the implementation of both criminal and non-criminal 
justice responses at the domestic level.487 
Two cases, where known Hells Angels MC members were denied access on the borders, 
show that Icelandic authorities relied on Europol’s criteria for assessing as to whether or not the 
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Hells Angels MC were involved in organized crime.488  The use of Europol’s definition is 
interesting, as the Icelandic Parliament had two years earlier for the first time defined criminal 
organization as part of its enactment that criminalized participation in organized crime.489  Yet, 
the case makes no reference to this definition in the Criminal Code. 
A reference to Europol’s assessment of Hells Angels MC being a criminal organization is 
again made in a criminal case in Iceland from 2012, where a report from Europol was submitted 
titled: “Knowledge Report: The Hells Angels MC: A Criminal Organisation”490.  In the 
testimony of an Icelandic police officer in the case Europol is said to have reached the 
conclusion that the Hells Angels MC were a criminal organization based on the criteria set by the 
European Union.  The report is not accessible to the public and Europol denied the request for 
access for the purpose of this study.491 
The report referred to in the 2012 criminal case is from February 2012 so it might not be 
the same report as referred to in the 2011 case.  Still, both these cases show an example of 
supranational institution of the European Union, in this case Europol, to be directly involved in 
the implementation of a domestic responses by offering information, definition, methodology 
and assessment. 
 
This study therefore claims, based on the above coverage, that an emerging or established 
transnational system of non-criminal justice responses is to be found within the European Union 
- one fully comparable to the system of Transnational Criminal Law in terms of its influence on 
domestic morality and substantive norms.  
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Compatibility of Promotion of Non-Criminal Justice 
Responses under International Law with Fundamental 
Principles of Law and Good Governance. 
 
This study intends next to examine if the promotion of non-criminal justice responses 
under International Law raises less concerns for incompatibility with fundamental principles of 
law and good governance than the system of Transnational Criminal Law currently does.  
The study has already established that domestic authorities are utilizing a wide variety of 
non-criminal justice responses to counter organized crime.  Additionally, some examples have 
been found of what kind of non-criminal justice responses domestic authorities are utilizing for 
counter organized crime, looking at outlaw motorcycle gangs as an example.  Furthermore, the 
literature review chapter detailed some of the concerns and criticisms that have been raised with 
the utilization of non-criminal justice responses to counter criminal activity. 
Finally, the study has shown how the European Union is promoting non-criminal justice 
responses as a complementary approach and specific responses as best practice amongst its 
member states.  This promotion of the European Union is found to represent the promotion of 
non-criminal justice responses to counter organized crime under International Law.  
Consequently, the study shows International Law to be indirectly suppressing organized crime 
through domestic legislations outside the sphere of domestic criminal law. 
The promotion of the European Union of non-criminal justice responses is therefore 
considered suitable for examining if the promotion of non-criminal justice responses under 
International Law raises less concerns for incompatibility with fundamental principles of law and 
good governance than the system of Transnational Criminal Law currently does. 
 
The promotion of the European Union of non-criminal justice responses was tested 
against criteria of five issues that can be identified as important concerns previously raised with 
the globalization of crime control, notably by Boister and Parkin.492  The five issues examined 
are: Justification for transnational response; legitimacy for the promotion; doctrinal weaknesses; 
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emphasize on compatibility with Human Rights and other fundamental principles of law;493 and 
finally, the knowledge base of the transnationalization494. 
At the offset it should be acknowledged that the restricted access to information about 
promotion of non-criminal justice responses by the European Union and the process for selection 
and development of non-criminal justice responses proved to be problematic for the examination. 
 
Justification for transnational response 
 
The first part of the criteria examines if the transnationalization of non-criminal justice 
responses is a justifiable approach to the perceived social problem.  The issue of lack of 
justification has been raised with the transnational criminalization under the system of 
Transnational Criminal Law.495   
The promotion of non-criminal justice responses within the European Union is largely 
part of the same policy as promotes the system of Transnational Criminal Law within the Union 
and relies largely on the same justification.496  The issue in this context is the appropriateness of 
transnational efforts, as opposed to solely domestic efforts for countering organized crime.  The 
promotion of non-criminal justice responses under international law is seen to need a specific 
justification, justifying why the selection of approaches and responses of domestic authorities to 
domestic social problems should be governed at the international level. 
Boister warned against using the system of Transnational Criminal Law to form 
transnational morality.  He claims the system to lack holistic policy based on sound knowledge 
of the social construction of the transnational threats and the appropriateness of transnational 
penal response to these threats, based on scientific knowledge free from rhetoric.497  Boister 
claims the assessment of the appropriateness of transnational promotion of the penal approach to 
require discussion of coherent principles about individual autonomy, welfare, harm and 
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minimalism, justifying or constraining the criminalization.  He claims the establishment of the 
system of Transnational Criminal Law to fail in discussing these coherent principles.  
Additionally, Boister claims transnational criminalization to rest upon, “. . . assumptions about 
the legitimate political, social and economic interests of states, and assertions about the harm 
caused to these interests by the conduct criminalized”498, while claiming the question to be 
largely absent, as to whether there would be any direct harm to individuals. 
 
The European Union’s involvement in countering organized crime is mainly justified by 
the rational that organized crime is on the rise within the union and is increasingly costly to the 
society.499  Also, that crime are increasingly being organized and committed across borders, 
while law enforcement authorities remain for the most part restricted to operating within the 
borders of nation states, making transnational response necessary.500 
Unfortunately however, the claim for organized crime being on the rise is mainly 
established with reference to assessments made by Europol, assessments that have and continues 
to be criticized, by the academic community, inter alia for being methodologically flawed and 
for lacking definition of core terms such as organized crime, risk, etc.501  Scholarly writings have 
emphasized the need for a scientifically sound risk assessment to decide, and clearly state, the 
risk being assessed, in terms of what harm is being posed by what threat.502  For such an 
assessment it would have to be decided, for example, whether to assess either the risk of violence 
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or of monetary loss.  Such decisions having to be made in order to avoid other normative 
decisions such as whether violence or corruption creates more risk.503  The same scholarly 
discussion has shown that risk assessment for organized crime suffers from imperfect 
information about organized crime, caused inter alia by the lack of consensus for definition - or 
even common understanding - of what constitutes organized crime.504  That is not to deny the 
existence or extent of the threat but to point out the important fact that currently ‘knowledge’ of 
the perceived threat has a poor evidential basis, affecting the justification for a transnational 
response and selection of approaches and responses. 
 
The European Parliament reflected upon the justification for specific efforts to counter 
organized crime in its Resolution on organised crime in the European Union in 2011, stating that:  
“. . . organised crime has a substantial social cost, in that it violates human 
rights, undermines democratic principles, diverts and wastes financial, 
human and other resources, distorting the free internal market, contaminating 
businesses and legitimate economic activities, encouraging corruption and 
polluting and destroying the environment;”505 
The European Union has ranked organized crime to be among the biggest threats to 
internal security of the union and its citizens, frequently placing organized and serious crime side 
by side with terrorism in this context.506  The Union has stated that this threat will only be 
adequately dealt with by a joint effort of its member states and the union itself.  “This calls for a 
dynamic and coordinated response by all member states, a response that not only takes into 
account national strategies but also seeks to become an integrated and multidisciplinary 
European strategy.”507 
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It is therefore unsettling in this context, that at a meeting of the Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs Committee of the European Parliament - with Rob Wainwright, Director of 
Europol, and Martin Power, Chair, Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal 
Security - committee members saw reasons to discuss “. . . the need to develop better the 
definitions in relation to organised crime, . . .”508  Further, the Commission of the European 
Communities has recognized in its communication to the Council and the European Parliament 
how the difficulties in defining ‘criminal organisation’ have a bad impact on efforts for 
countering organized crime.509  This apparent difficulty in defining organized crime is not 
surprising in the light of Calderoni’s finding that “. . . a common understanding of the concept of 
criminal organization is lacking . . .”510 amongst the member states of the European Union. 
 
From early on the European Union has promoted the use of non-criminal justice 
responses based on the experience of its member states.511  Reference has been made to how 
member states have had good experience with utilization of non-criminal justice responses, but 
no empirical evidence have been cited for this, nor has it been explained how the assessment was 
conducted.512  Scholars have, however, claimed that political interests and particular incidents, 
more than scientific research, have driven domestic organized crime legislations.513  
Additionally, research has found the policymaking of the European Union in the field of criminal 
matters to be based on less than sound knowledge.514 
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Still, the European Union has seen it as its role to facilitate information sharing of 
existing responses and experience, on the union level, encouraging member states to introduce 
responses in line with a selection of existing practices of its member states.515  Furthermore, the 
Union has considered its supranational institutions best fit to collect existing experience in this 
field, and assess what practices should be promoted as best practice.516   
 
The social problem perceived to be organized crime requiring specific legal remedies has 
not been shown to be the same or similar social problems between the member states.  Lack of 
consensus about what are the constitutive characteristics suggest also a lack of consensus about 
what are the characteristics of organized crime that justify specific legal remedies.517  It seems 
questionable to introduce harmonized regional response to an unknown variety of marginally 
different social problems. 
The same reasoning raises important doubt about the promotion of a particular domestic 
responses in one member state as best practice, suggesting that other member states should 
model their responses on this best practice.518  The social problem perceived to be organized 
crime might be different between the member states.  Additionally, the response is not 
guaranteed to have the same legal and social impact in different social, cultural, historical, 
economic and legal context.519 
The above reasoning brings about Boister’s concern for forming transnational morality 
by way of using the system of Transnational Criminal Law.520  The union is ‘appealing’ to its 
member states, as part of the policy for joint efforts of the member states, to adopt non-criminal 
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justice responses to behaviour that the union is describing in its definition of organized crime.521  
Consequently, the Union can be argued to be creating transnational morality.  However the 
following subchapter about legitimacy suggests that the Union lacks democratic legitimacy to do 
so. 
Finally, a major justification for the involvement of the European Union in the promotion 
of non-criminal justice responses and development of responses is its Union wide knowledge and  
unique ability to create further such knowledge.  However, the following subchapter about the 
knowledge base of the promotion of non-criminal justice responses raises important concerns 
about the soundness of the knowledge generated by the Union within the field.522 
The appropriateness of the European Union’s involvement in the promotion of non-
criminal justice response to organized crime seems therefore to have questionable justifications.  
This is not to say that the transnational efforts to counter organized crime can not be justified.  
Rather the above examination portrays how the appropriateness of the transnational efforts has 
been poorly justified and how the current initiative needs to be amended in order to become 
justifiable. 
  
Legitimacy 
 
The second part of the criteria is to examine the legitimacy for the transnationalization of 
non-criminal justice responses.  This requires to examine the legitimate authorization behind the 
actions taken for the transnationalization of non-criminal justice responses. 
 
Legal authorization within the European Union and its member states is governed by 
democratic form of governance.523  The treaty on the European Union states that the Union is “. . 
. founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of 
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law and respect for human rights, . . .”524  For the present purposes it is not necessary to provide 
a comprehensive review of the political and ideological literature that the discussion about 
democracy has generated, as the term ‘democracy’ is contested as well as the notion of what 
constitutes this form of governance.  A more general account is deemed sufficient. 
Democracy is generally perceived to be a form of governance where state power is vested 
in the ‘demos’ (the general public), where the demos are involved in decision making of the 
state, generally through some system of voting.525  Democracy is generally perceived of as being 
participatory, consultative, transparent and publicly accountable, resting in one way or another 
on the consent of the governed.526  Rule of Law is generally considered to be an inherent part of 
democracy.527  The ‘Rule of Law’ is associated with the notion that authorities just as well as the 
people should be governed by law and limited in their action by the same law.528  The law being 
laid down beforehand, make it possible for the individual to plan their affairs in accordance with 
knowledge of what is allowed in the society and the foreseeable actions of authorities.529 
 
The treaty on the European Union describes the decision makers of the Union to be 
democratically accountable either directly to the citizens of the Union at the Union level, or in 
case of representatives of the member states in the European Council to the citizens of the 
relevant nation state or to the national Parliament.530 
Transparency is ensured under Article 10 that requires the Union to make decisions to be 
taken as openly and as closely to the citizen as possible, ensuring the citizen’s right to 
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530 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
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democratic participation.531  Without transparency, the citizens would not be able to participate 
in the democratic governance of the Union, as they would not be able to make informed 
decisions when choosing representatives or keeping representatives democratically accountable. 
‘Rule of law’ is described to be one of the founding values of the European Union.”532  
‘Rule of Law’ is recognized as a fundamental principle by both the European Court of Justice, 
the Union’s own court, and the European Court of Human Rights, which the union adheres to.533  
 
The European Union competence to act is further limited by the principles of conferral, 
subsidiarity and proportionality. 
The principle of conferral limits the Union to acting only within the limits of the 
competence granted to it by the member states, and only to obtain the objectives set out by the 
member states.  The principle of subsidiarity requires the Union should only act, in areas where 
the Union does not have exclusive competence, where “. . . the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and 
local level, . . .”534  The principle of proportionality dictates that the Union shall not act beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.535 
 
The member states have granted the European Union competence to act to prevent and 
combat crime, with the objective of providing its citizens “freedom, security and justice”.536  For 
this purposes, the member states have granted the Union competence to arrange for cooperation 
and coordination between police, judicial authorities and other competent authorities.537 
It can, however, be argued to be questionable if the assessment and promotion of specific 
responses by the Union fits within the limitations of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
                                                
531 Ibid, title I, art 1, para 2 and title II, art. 10, para 3. 
532 Ibid, title, I, art. 2. 
533 Popelier, Patricia, ‘Five Paradoxes on Legal Certainty and the Lawmaker’ (2008) 2 Legisprudence, 47, at 
footnote 3. 
534 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union[2012] OJ C326/1, title I, art 5, para 3. 
535 Ibid, title I, art 5, para 4. 
536 Ibid, title I, art. 3, para 2. 
537 Ibid, title I, art. 3, para 2, and title V, art. 67 para 3. 
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With regards to the Union’s principle of subsidiarity, domestic authorities can be argued 
to be sufficiently and even more sufficiently capable of developing and assessing approaches and 
specific responses best fit for countering their domestic organized crime problem, in their 
respective legal system and society.  This can primarily be argued on the basis of the above 
detailed arguments that there is no consensus amongst the Member States of the Union about 
what constitutes organized crime and based on the difference between organized crime 
legislations in the member states.538 
Furthermore, the previously detailed discussions from the field of pluralism and 
comparative law, suggest that real harmonization is hard to achieve especially if evaluated from 
a functionalistic perspective.539  Additionally, these discussions show that each legal system is 
unique to its society and each society is unique to the legal system that governs it.540  The 
assessment of best practice and experience by the European Union is therefore bound to either 
disseminate the Unions own perception of the social problem intended to counter, or that of one 
or more of the member states.  In so doing, the Union or influential member states might unduly 
influence other member states.541  Consequently, centralized development and assessment of 
responses to varieties of marginally different social problems, for multiple marginally different 
societies and legal systems, seems not to be a viable approach, nor seems it to be compatible 
with the European Union’s principle of subsidiarity. 
The principle of proportionality, requires the Union not to act beyond what is necessary 
to achieve the objectives sought.  The Union’s involvement in selection and development of 
approaches and responses is arguably disproportionate to the objective of promoting the use of 
non-criminal justice responses to counter organized crime, if information sharing would be 
sufficient to achieve the objective.  
                                                
538 Calderoni, Francesco, Organized crime legislation in the European Union (Springer Verlag 2010). 
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2000), at 88.  As cited by: Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International 
Law, 953, at p 969. 
541 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at 968 - 970. 
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The European Union action, to select specific responses and appeal to its member states 
to adopt the selected responses, seems therefore questionable in the light of its principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. 
 
When examining democratic legitimacy for the promotion on non-criminal justice 
responses, it is important to note that the European Union has for a long time been criticized for 
democratic deficiency.542  The democratic deficiency is said to be caused by variety of factors. 
The Union is criticized for contributing to increased powers of the Executive at the cost 
of the national parliaments of the member states, as the national governments are represented by 
both the Council and the Commission and acting on that level, they are not much accountable to 
their national parliaments.543  Additionally, the Union is seen to adopt policies that are not 
supported by a majority in many, or even most member states.544  Finally, the citizens of the 
European Union are said not to understand the Union, and are therefore unable to take part in it 
as a democratic system.545   
This criticism is particularly relevant for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
where the parliament of the European Union has limited competence and the national 
parliaments can be argued to have little influence.546  Additionally, the European Parliament had 
no formal jurisdiction in criminal matters, until the field came to a limited extent under the 
supranational power of the European Parliament in 2009.547  Furthermore, part of the criticism on 
the European Union’s ‘democratic deficiency’ claims the European Parliament too weak to 
                                                
542 Follesdal, Andreas, and Simon Hix, ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and 
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547 Baker, Estella, and Christopher Harding, ‘From past imperfect to future perfect? A longitudinal study of the 
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European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union[2012] OJ C326/1. 
   117
balance the executive power within the Union, and suffers it self from ‘democratic 
deficiency’.548   
Sheptycki claims that “. . . the assumption in a democratic society is that the elected 
control penal policy”549.  This might not be accurate when it comes to policies and norms created 
by the European Union in the field of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.  Consequently, 
the above coverage raises concerns if the promotion of non-criminal justice responses as an 
approach to counter organized crime, as well as specific responses as best practices, lacks 
democratic legitimacy. 
 
The involvement and influence of bureaucratic institutions and law enforcement 
authorities in creation of soft law and recommendations of the European Union raises concerns 
over legitimacy do to incompatibility with the Rule of Law and in particular the ‘separation of 
powers doctrine’550.  Law enforcement officials and bureaucrats, domestically and at the 
international level, are seen to be instrumental in the creation of the different guidelines and 
recommendations created by the European Union on how to increasingly utilize non-criminal 
justice responses to counter organized crime.551  The creation of these guidelines and 
recommendations seems not to be sufficiently guided by the legislative or reviewed by the 
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judiciary.552  Consequently, bureaucratic institutions of the executive, at the national and 
subnational level, are effectively influencing the legislative development under the authority of 
the European Union and obligations of member states of the Union under different international 
legal instruments in the field of crime control.553   
Additional concerns must be raised over compatibility with the principle of ’legal 
certainty’554, also embedded in the Rule of Law.  The principle requires the rules of the society to 
be fixed and announced beforehand, making the authorities use of its coercive power in given 
circumstances foreseeable with adequate certainty, permitting those subject to the rules to plan 
their affairs so as not to become subject to the states coercive power.555  Concerns for lack of 
legal certainty are caused by the secrecy of the European Union’s evaluation and selection of best 
practices, from existing practices of the member states.556  Particularly, as this study has shown 
domestic authorities to utilize existing legislations, not intended for countering organized crime, 
in a creative manner with low requirement of involvement and fault for the organized criminality 
– consequently this use of coercive state power may be argued not to be adequately foreseeable 
in some circumstances.  Furthermore, the argument for the need for secrecy in the name of public 
security, arguing that individuals involved in organized crime could misuse the compilations 
made by the European Union to identify weaknesses in the system and avoid efforts of the 
authorise if they were publicly available, seems incompatible with the principle of Rule of 
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Law.557  The concerns for incompatibility with the Rule of Law will be discussed in further 
details under a separate subchapter on fundamental principles of law below. 
 
The final democratic criteria to be examined here is that of transparency.  Transparency is 
ensured under Article 10 that requires the Union to make decisions as openly and as close as 
possible to the citizen, ensuring the citizen’s right to democratic participation.558  Without 
transparency, the citizen would not be able to participate in the democratic governance of the 
Union, as he would not be able to make informed decisions when choosing representatives or 
keeping representatives democratically accountable.  Transparency has been argued to be crucial 
for democratic decision making, in particular within the EU.559 
As detailed above, the research into the promotion of non-criminal justice responses by 
the European Union shows transparency to be lacking in the promotion of non-criminal justice 
responses.  Information about the responses being promoted is not publicly available, for reasons 
of public security, and the approach is ill defined in publicly available documents.560  
Additionally, the process and criteria for selecting responses to be promoted is not publicly 
available.  Furthermore, the problem intended to counter is ill defined and consensus is lacking 
amongst the member states of what are the constitutive characteristics of the social problem that 
has been called organized crime.561  Finally, the justification for the necessity of the response is 
primarily based on threat assessments, which again are largely based on restricted information.562 
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The European Union is therefor promoting non-criminal justice responses as an approach 
to counter organized crime, without informing the public about what constitutes such an 
approach.  Neither, what responses are being promoted, nor what constitutes the behaviour that 
will initiate the utilization of these responses.  This lack of transparency effectively prevents 
democratic accountability. 
 
The examination of the transnationalization of non-criminal justice responses within the 
European Union raises concerns for lack of legitimacy.  The concerns have to do with the 
decision making at the European Union level, as well as absence of efforts by the Union to 
secure or promote legitimate authorization at the domestic level.  In fact, the initiative could be 
argued to promote non-criminal justice responses through law enforcement agencies of the 
member states in a way that by design boycotts both legislative authorities and public discussion.  
This process seems to be in line with Nadelmann’s claim of international law being used to “. . . 
develop a cosmopolitan international morality without the citizens of state parties having much 
to do with their adoption or application.”563 
 
Doctrinal Weaknesses 
 
The third part of the criteria is if the transnationalization of non-criminal justice 
responses raises concerns for doctrinal weaknesses.  The examination focuses on doctrinal 
weaknesses that have previously been claimed to haunt the system of Transnational Criminal 
Law.564 
The previously mentioned lack of consensus for what are the constitutive characteristics 
of the subject matter of the initiative, organized crime, must be considered a major doctrinal 
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weakness for any initiative for the development of approaches or responses to the said social 
problem. 
There is little to be found about the definition of organized crime in the publicly available 
documents mapping the development of transnational non-criminal justice responses within the 
European Union.  However, what can be found suggest that those concerned consider the 
definition in need of improvement.  The Commission of the European Communities noted in its 
communication to the Council and the European Parliament the challenge in tackling organized 
crime caused by difficulties in defining “criminal organisation”.565  Similarly, at a meeting of the 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, committee 
members saw reasons to discuss “. . . the need to develop better the definitions in relation to 
organised crime, . . .”566  The survey presented to the EU by the delegation of the Netherlands 
touches on this when discussing how to strengthen European cooperation, where France is 
reported to stress: “. .  . the need to first agree on the definition and scope of the non-penal 
approach towards organised crime before taking steps towards joint European measures.”567  
Judging from the academic discussion about Transnational Criminal Law, it seems that such 
agreement would better have been reached before the steps were taken towards strengthening 
European cooperation in that field.  This problem is highlighted by academic discussions 
showing lack of consensus about what constitutes organized crime and criticism of the 
definitions that have been drafted at the international level.568  This has been covered in details in 
the literature review. 
Calderoni showed that within the European Union “. . . a common understanding of the 
concept of criminal organization is lacking and that there are significant inconsistencies among 
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national legal systems.”569  Additionally, he claims that the definition adopted by the European 
Union as part of its Framework Decision of 2008 does not reflect best knowledge and scientific 
research in this field and is in fact inferior in quality than the definitions adopted by some of its 
member states.570 
The longstanding difficulty with creating sufficient definition for organized crime makes 
it difficult to select and develop responses that fit the social problem intended to counter, do to 
lack of clarity as to what kind of behaviour these responses are intended to counter.  
Additionally, the insufficient definition makes the scope of the responses adopted insufficiently 
restricted to only the social problems intended to counter.  Nevertheless, the transnationalization 
of non-criminal justice responses is carried on based on the criticised definitions, without much 
apparent efforts to improve the definition or make up for the flaws by further defining the subject 
of individual initiatives, approaches or responses. 
 
Widening scope of criminal liability is a concern that has been addressed in the context of 
promotion of organized crime legislations by the system or Transnational Criminal Law, 
particularly the element of conduct, culpability and level of involvement.571  Surely, by 
definition, the non-criminal justice responses do not carry with them criminal liability, but they 
do carry consequences that often are repressive to individuals.  For example, Huisman and 
Koemans, when discussing the administrative approach in the Netherlands, noted that: 
“Measures are individualised and are based on information (suspicions) regarding previous 
behaviour. The consequences of these administrative measures can also be more far-reaching 
than those of criminal sanctions, while the safeguards of due process are considerably less so.”572  
 
This study has shown non-criminal justice responses to be utilized to counter organized 
crime in ways that bring far-reaching and repressive consequences for individual, raising 
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important concerns for widening of legal liability.573  This research shows low requirements for 
showing involvement, fault and causation for domestic authorities to be able to utilize non-
criminal justice responses.574  Authorities were found to introduce remedies against individuals 
without having established any element of criminal conduct or fault for the criminal conduct in 
question.  Some remedies seem to have been introduced mainly based on the individual’s 
involvement with an association considered to be involved in organized crime.  Such 
involvement may not be limited to formal membership or proven participation, but can be based 
on much lesser involvement where no act of participation is required.  An example would be 
previously detailed case of Mr. Stable’s.575  Also, and most importantly, there seems to be no 
requirement to show an individual to be at fault for the criminal activity attributed to the criminal 
organization in question.  In fact it seems to be possible to introduce non-criminal justice 
responses that are repressive on individuals, based on assessment of the threat posed by 
organizations of which the individual is involved with.576  Some of the cases that were found 
may even raise concerns for establishing guilt by association. 
Furthermore, the non-criminal justice responses that establish grounds for criminal 
sanctions have attracted criticism for widening the scope of the criminal law, inter alia by: 
bringing minor social problems within the scope of the criminal law, providing authorities a 
remedy for sanctioning individuals where previously there are no grounds for criminal sanctions, 
for circumventing procedural safeguards, for providing repressive measures against individuals 
without the involvement of the judiciary, and for incompatibility with Human Rights 
requirements for standard of proof and individual’s right to fair trial.577  An example would be 
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where non-criminal justice responses are introduced that place conditions on individuals, the 
breach of which attracts criminal liability, such as the control orders under ‘the bikei law’ in 
Australia.578 
The European Union seems to have failed to address the lack of a doctrinal basis for this 
apparent widening scope of liability caused by utilization of non-criminal justice responses to 
organized crime, before promoting the approach. 
 
Deciding up on the appropriate procedural rules and safeguards for non-criminal justice 
responses is yet another doctrinal issue that has been raised with non-criminal justice responses 
before courts in different jurisdictions and has been the subject of an extensive academic 
discussion.579  Concerns have been raised over the exception of non-criminal justice responses 
that are repressive on individuals and seem to be punitive in nature, from procedural safeguards 
and Human Rights attributed to criminal proceedings, in the absence of sound doctrinal basis for 
such exception.  The main concerns have been covered in the literature review and will be 
discussed in details in the subchapter on compatibility with Human Rights and fundamental 
principles of Law.  Addressing the concerns for the appropriate procedural rules seems of a 
particular importance, as the utilization of these responses to criminal activity has been argued to 
origin from efforts to bypass procedural safeguards that limited criminal justice responses.580 
 
Furthermore, as discussed in detail in the literature review, scholarly work on pluralism 
in global governance and on comparative legal studies suggest there to be important theoretical 
                                                
578 Ayling, Julie, ‘Pre-emptive Strike: How Australia is Tackling Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs’ (2011) 36 American 
Journal of Criminal Justice, 250, at p 258.  Loughnan, Arlie, ‘The Legislation We Had to Have?: The Crimes 
(Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW)’ (2009) 20 Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 457, at p 258 - 
259. 
579 Huisman, Wim, and Monique Koemans, ‘Administrative Measures in Crime Control’ (2008) 1 Erasmus 
Universiteit Rotterdam: Law Review, 121, at p 142; Ayling, Julie, ‘Pre-emptive Strike: How Australia is Tackling 
Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs’ (2011) 36 American Journal of Criminal Justice, 250, at p 256; Crawford, Adam, 
‘Governing Through Anti-social Behaviour’ (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology, 810 at p 818 footnote 5.  
Von Hirsch, Andrew, Ashworth, Andrew, Wasik, Martin, Smith, ATH, Morgan, Rod, and Gardner, John, 
‘Overtaking on the Right’ (1995) 145 New Law Journal, 1501, at fourth subchapter;  R (McCann and others) v. 
Crown Court at Manchester [2003] 1 A.C. 787. (UK case) As cited in Crawford, Adam, ‘Governing Through Anti-
social Behaviour’ (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology, 810, at p 818 footnote 5 
580 Ayling, Julie, ‘Criminalizing Organizations: Towards Deliberative Lawmaking’ (2011) 33 Law & Policy, 149 at 
p 164.  Zedner, Lucia, ‘Preventive Justice or Pre-Punishment? The Case of Control Orders’ (2007) 60 Current Legal 
Problems, 174 at 175 - 176.  Loughnan, Arlie, ‘The Legislation We Had to Have?: The Crimes (Criminal 
Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW)’ (2009) 20 Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 457 at 458 - 459. 
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and practical difficulties with the creation of universal norms and comparison of legislations 
between jurisdictions.581  Furthermore, the existing literature on legal comparison suggests that 
transnational legal comparison requires “interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist 
comparisons”582 in its appropriate context.  Such transnational legal comparison has been 
suggested to require the appropriate legal-, historical-, economic-, political-, social- and 
ideological-context both locally and internationally.583  Such comparison would require 
interdisciplinary study of the relevant legal and non-legal norms, routines and social practices.584  
Current attempts of the European Union to select and promoter best practices based on existing 
practices and experience of member states, seems to contradict this pluralist legal thinking.  As 
the selection seems to failing to acknowledge how difference between the member states, such as 
social and legal difference, might affect the implementation and effects of the responses - 
effectively making it hard to select single set of best practices for all the member states. 
 
The existing literature on domestic non-criminal justice responses shows the responses to 
have raised important and relevant concerns for doctrinal weaknesses of these responses at the 
domestic level.585  Study of the publicly available document in this subject area does not reveal 
any evidence of the European Union having, in its promotion of non-criminal justice responses 
to criminal behaviour, attempted to address the above mentioned doctrinal issue. 
                                                
581 Walker, Neil, ‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies, at p 533 - 541.  Krisch, 
Nico, ‘The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law’ [2009] Law Society and Economy Working Papers, at p 7 - 9 
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governance’ in Jacco Bomhoff and Maurice Adams (eds), Theroy and Practice in Comparative Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2012), 186, at p 204 and 206 
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Maurice Adams (eds), Theroy and Practice in Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2012), 186, at p 204 
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585 Ayling, Julie, ‘Pre-emptive Strike: How Australia is Tackling Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs’ (2011) 36 American 
Journal of Criminal Justice, 250;  Huisman, Wim, and Monique Koemans, ‘Administrative Measures in Crime 
Control’ (2008) 1 Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam: Law Review, 121;  Macdonald, Stuart, ‘A Suicidal Woman, 
Roaming Pigs and a Noisy Trampolinist: Refining the ASBO's Definition of ‘Anti-Social Behaviour’’ (2006) 69 
Law & Policy, 183. 
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Consequently, the European Union seems to be promoting domestic responses that are 
haunted by doctrinal weaknesses, while the promotion it self seems equally haunted by doctrinal 
weaknesses.  The Unions seems to do so without either addressing the issues, or bringing those 
issues to the attention of its member states, to ensure that they will be adequately addressed in 
the evidence based decision making at the domestic level. 
 
Human Rights and Fundamental Principles of Law 
 
Emphasize on compatibility with fundamental principles of law and Human Rights in the 
promotion of non-criminal justice responses by the European Union is the fourth part of the 
criteria examined.  Compatibility with Human Rights in the promotion of non-criminal justice 
responses is of particular importance in the light of the value that has been given to Human 
Rights in International Law in general and by the European Union in particular.586 
The treaty on the European Union states that the Union is “. . . founded on the values of 
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, . . .”587  Additionally, member states of the European Union have recognized Human 
Rights as being of a higher status and even made themselves subject to jurisdiction of an 
international court to ensure this higher status of Human Rights to be respected.588  Furthermore, 
the European Union is itself in the process of accessing the European Convention of Human 
Rights, and subsequently becoming subject to its international court.589  These commitments 
                                                
586 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union[2012] OJ C326/1, at p 15 and art. 2; Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR);  International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) 
587 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union[2012] OJ C326/1, title, I, art. 2. 
588 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union[2012] OJ C326/1, at p 15;  Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR);  International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR);  Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/02 
589 Council of Europe, ‘Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights’ (Council 
of Europe, official website, no date) <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/default_en.asp> 
accessed 19 July 2014;  Gragl, Paul, ‘A giant leap for European Human Rights? The Final Agreement on the 
European Union’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law 
Review. 
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should put compatibility with Human Rights into the forefront of all actions of the European 
Union. 
Still, the evidence show that in discussing the promotion of non-criminal justice 
responses within the European Union, different bodies of the Union have seen reasons to 
specifically emphasize that responses utilized to counter organized crime need to be compatible 
with Human Rights and fundamental rights of the Union.590  Arguably suggesting that such 
compatibility was lacking.   
However, both the Council and the Commission have in the context of the promotion of 
non-criminal justice responses raised the view that fundamental rights need to be balanced 
against the interest of efficient law enforcement and prosecution.  In 2005 the Commission 
stated, in the context of developing strategy for countering organized crime:  “In fighting this 
scourge all actors must balance efficient law enforcement and prosecution of OC, and the 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.”591  A similar statement by the Council, in its 
2000 millennium strategy, states that development of legal means to provide investigative 
methods with respect to organized crime “. . . requires finding the proper balance between 
effectiveness and the protection of fundamental human rights.”592  The view expressed here is 
problematic as fundamental rights are generally considered fundamental set of rules, limited only 
by the legitimate restrictions allowed for and described in the relevant texts and judicial 
precedence.  The main international Human Rights conventions do not allow for limitation in the 
interest of effective law enforcement and prosecution.593  Nor are such restrictions known to 
exist as legitimate limitations on fundamental Human Rights. 
  
As covered in the literature review, various non-criminal justice responses in different 
jurisdictions have been criticized for incompatibility with fundamental principles of law and 
Human Rights. 
                                                
590 European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2011 on organised crime in the European Union [2013] OJ C131 
E/66, at p 72. 
591 European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2011 on organised crime in the European Union [2013] OJ C131 
E/66, at p 2. 
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millennium [2000] OJ C124/1, at p 15. 
593 Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR);  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)  
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Non-criminal justice responses have been criticized for failing to provide procedural 
safeguards compatible with fundamental principles of law and Human Rights.  The main 
argument is that the non-criminal justice responses are de facto criminal in nature.594  This de 
facto criminal nature is argued to be caused by characteristics such as the proceedings being 
intended to counter criminal problems, being based on previous behaviour, even criminal 
behaviour.  Furthermore, the criminal nature of the responses has been argued based on the 
ability of the non-criminal justice responses to bring about remedies, which although not 
criminal punishments, are repressive on individuals and can in fact be more far reaching than 
criminal sanctions.595  Additionally, the ability of the non-criminal justice responses to place 
conditions on individuals that will bring criminal sanctions if breached has been argued to show 
its nature as criminal sanctions.596 
Based on their de facto criminal nature and their ability to provide grounds for criminal 
sanctions, non-criminal justice responses have been argued to require the full range of the 
procedural safeguards of the criminal law to be applied.597  Failure to secure procedural rights up 
to the level of the criminal law standards has been argued to be a breach of the right to fair trial 
under article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.598  Additionally, concerns have been raised with some of 
those non-criminal justice responses being incompatible with the right to freedom of 
association.599 
                                                
594 King, Colin, ‘Civil forfeiture and Article 6 of the ECHR: due process implications for England & Wales and 
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The European Court of Human Rights has decided that although the requirements 
guarantied by the concept ‘fair trial’ may differ between trials that evolve around criminal 
charges and those determining civil rights and obligations, the rights restricted to criminal 
charges under paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 6 may also be applicable in cases determining civil 
rights and obligations.600  The Court has claimed the authority to examine if sanctions are to be 
considered ‘criminal’ for the purpose of the convention.  Subsequently, the court has decided that 
disciplinary or regulatory sanctions can be subject to the rights guarantied to those facing 
criminal charges under the article.601  In its criteria, the Court looks at the classification of the 
domestic legislation, the nature of the offence, and finally, the nature and degree of severity of 
the sanction at risk for the individual.  The court has decided that “. . . the general character of 
the rule and the purpose of the penalty, being both deterrent and punitive, . . .”602 is decisive for 
evaluating if the offence in question is criminal in nature, for the purpose of Article 6 of the 
Convention.603  The Hungarian handbook is cited to explain the concept of administrative 
approach, stating for example that “The administrative approach has both a penal and preventive 
aspect.”604  The European Court of Human Rights might therefore see it fit to examine if non-
criminal justice responses should be considered ‘criminal’, not only for the purpose of article 6, 
but all rights and freedoms under the convention.605 
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However, the European Court of Human Rights has decided against applicability of 
rights specific for criminal cases under the right to fair trial, in cases that had to do with civil 
forfeiture.606  The Court stated, in it's leading case, that it was decisive for the non criminal 
nature of civil forfeiture that these preventive measures were neither designed to punish a 
specific offence, nor do these measures imply a finding of a guilt for a specific offence.607  The 
decision suggests that preventive non-criminal justice responses that do not rely on a finding of 
guilt for a specific offence should not be considered criminal in nature. 
 
The main issues that have been raised with the various non-criminal justice responses for 
incompatibility with the right to fair trial, have primarily to do with the evidential rules of these 
responses.  It has been argued that the required standard of proof needs to be the ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ standard of the criminal law, as opposed to the ‘preponderance of the 
evidence’ of the civil law.608   
Additionally, the ability of authorities to rally on ‘criminal intelligence’, that may not be 
disclosed to the defence in obtaining court orders as under the ‘bikie law’ in Australia, has been 
argued to violate the right to fair trial, specifically paragraph 3 of article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.609  However, rights under paragraph 3 are granted 
exclusively to those facing criminal charges. 
Furthermore, concerns have been raised with allowing the use of hearsay evidence, for 
example for obtaining Anti-Social Behaviour Orders in the United Kingdom.610  Again however, 
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the right to fair trial generally only caries with it the right for a person to examine witnesses 
relied on in a case against him, when that person is accused of a crime.611 
Finally, the ‘bikie law’ in Australia allows for control orders that ban individuals from 
communicating with other individuals, based on involvement with an organization that has 
previously been declared criminal, but without establishing personal guilt.612  The High Court of 
Australia has recently rejected a challenge that sought for the measure to be found incompatible 
with fundamental rights of freedom of association.613  It is in fact well established that the right 
to freedom of association is not an absolute right, the right is generally limited by legitimate 
restrictions such as in the interest of national security or public safety; for the prevention of 
disorder or crime; for the protection of health or morals; or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.614  These restrictions need generally to be prescribed by law and be 
necessary in a democratic society.615  Such legitimate restrictions can arguably provide a basis 
for limiting freedom of association in cases of, organized, serious and violent criminal activity. 
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Concerns for the incompatibility of some non-criminal justice responses with the right to 
freedom of association have been raised in other jurisdictions as well.616  The Federal Court of 
Canada has rejected this challenge on the basis that freedom of association under the Canadian 
Charter does not protect criminal or violent activity.617  Moreover, the European Court of Human 
Rights has on a number of occasions accepted limitations of rights and freedoms of the European 
Convention of Human Rights for the legitimate aim of prevention of crime.618 
 
Regarding fundamental principles of law, all the above issues can be said to raise 
concerns for violation of established fundamental principles of the criminal law, were they to be 
found applicable to the non-criminal justice responses, based on their punitive in fact nature, 
reliance on criminal behaviour, etc. 
Additionally, concerns have been raised for incompatibility of non-criminal justice 
responses with the Rule of Law.  In particular concerns have been raised with the incompatibility 
with ‘legal certainty’ a fundamental principle of law embedded in the Rule of Law.  Friedrich A 
Hayek has elegantly described the principle of legal certainty: 
“Stripped of technicalities this means that government in all its actions is 
bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand – rules that make it possible to 
foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in 
given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge.”619 
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These concerns have been raised with for example the Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, 
based on the insufficient definition of behaviour that could be considered anti-social for the 
purpose of obtaining a court order.620  Consequently, the citizens is not able to anticipate with 
fair certainty what kind of behaviour might be deemed anti-social for the purpose of the Anti-
Social Behaviour Orders, and subsequently not sufficiently able to avoid acting in a way that 
does not initiate the coercive powers of the authorities. 
Furthermore, non-criminal justice responses that lack clear legal basis, raise concerns for 
violating the Rule of Law and in particular the principle of legal certainty.  Such clear legal basis 
has been claimed to be lacking for some of the non-criminal justice responses utilized by 
authorities in member states of the European Union.621 
Finally, as previously noted, concerns for lack of due process in depriving individuals of 
their liberty have been raised with the ‘bikie laws’ in Australia.622 
 
As previously noted, Human Rights and the Rule of Law are stated to be amongst the 
founding values of the Union in the Treaty on European Union.623  Admittedly, without an 
access to the criteria for selection of the non-criminal justice responses to be promoted by the 
Union or information about the responses being promoted, the compatibility of the promotion 
with Human Rights and the Rule of Law in selection of responses to promote can not be 
adequately examined. 
However, the very secrecy that surrounds the promotion of non-criminal justice responses 
by the European Union suggests lack of respect for the principle of legal certainty, and thereby 
the Rule of Law.  By concealing the non-criminal justice responses that the European Union is 
appealing to its member states to adopt, the Union can be seen to limit the ability of its citizens to 
foresee how authorities within the Union can be expected to use its coercive powers in given 
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circumstances and thereby limiting their ability to plan their affairs based on that knowledge.624  
Furthermore, request for access to the Hungarian handbook, previously mentioned compilation 
of non-criminal justice responses promoted as best practice by the European Union, was denied 
with arguments that seem to be incompatible with the principle of legal certainty.625  The General 
Secretariat of the Council of The European Union emphasized the importance of keeping secret 
the details of preventive measures and actions to counter organized crime, so individuals 
involved in organized crime could not find possible weaknesses for furthering their activities.626  
This is in turn argued to weaken the efforts of various law enforcement authorities to counter 
organized crime in the interest of public security.  These arguments seem not to be compatible 
with the principle of legal certainty.  However, it is unclear to what extent this response reflect 
the emphasize placed in the Rule of Law by the European Union when it comes to utilization of 
non-criminal justice responses. 
 
Transnationalization of non-criminal justice responses seems therefore to raise no lesser 
reasons for concern for incompatibility with fundamental principles of law and Human Rights 
then has been claimed to be the case with the system of Transnational Criminal Law.627  Firstly, 
transnational efforts for promoting the approach and specific responses seem to fail to emphasis 
compatibility of approaches and responses with Human Rights and fundamental principles of 
law.  Secondly, concerns have to be raised over the very origin of domestic non-criminal justice 
responses to criminal activity seems to have been to bypass procedural safeguards.628  
Furthermore, as detailed above, this study shows that existing non-criminal justice responses, 
utilized by domestic authorities to counter organized crime, raise concerns for incompatibility 
                                                
624 See Hayek’s insightful explanation of the Rule of Law: Hayek, Friedrich A, The Road to Serfdom: with The 
Intellectuals and Socialism (The Institute of Economic Affairs 2005), at p 57. 
625 Email from Jakob Thomsen for the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union to author (24 July 
2013). 
626 Ibid. 
627 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953, at p 959;  
Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘PalermoPalermoo on the Pacific Rim’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime August 
2009), at p 15, 37 - 38, 288 - 289, and 296. 
628 Ayling, Julie, ‘Criminalizing Organizations: Towards Deliberative Lawmaking’ (2011) 33 Law & Policy, 149 at 
p 164.  Citing Zedner.  Zedner, Lucia, ‘Preventive Justice or Pre-Punishment? The Case of Control Orders’ (2007) 
60 Current Legal Problems, 174 at 175 - 176.  Loughnan, Arlie, ‘The Legislation We Had to Have?: The Crimes 
(Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW)’ (2009) 20 Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 457 at 458 - 459. 
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with fundamental principles of law and Human Rights.629  Finally, the policy documents 
promoting non-criminal justice responses do not address the criticism that these kinds of 
responses have met, nor does the policy clearly emphasize the importance of compatibility of 
such responses with fundamental principles of law and Human Rights.  In fact, the above 
mentioned statements about the need to balance fundamental right and freedoms against efficient 
law enforcement and prosecution, raise important concerns for the intentions of the Union to 
honour fundamental right and freedoms in its efforts to counter organized crime.630  
Consequently, concerns must be raised over compatibility of the promotion of non-criminal 
justice responses with Human Rights and fundamental principles of law. 
 
Knowledge as basis for Transnationalization of Non-Criminal 
Justice Responses 
 
The final part of the criteria is to examine the knowledge base for the transnationalization 
of non-criminal justice responses. 
The above examination shows the promotion by the European Union of non-criminal 
justice responses for countering organized crime to raise concerns much in line with those raised 
over the transnationalization of criminal justice responses under the system of Transnational 
Criminal Law.631  Even more problematically, many of these issues have not been addressed in 
the context of the promotion of non-criminal justice responses.  This might suggest that those 
developing and promoting non-criminal justice responses within the European Union were not 
sufficiently knowledgeable about the issues that have previously been raised with the system of 
Transnational Criminal Law.  This in turn raises concerns for the knowledge base on which the 
promotion and development of non-criminal justice responses rests.  Resent studies into the 
evidential basis of policymaking within the Area of Freedom Security and Justice suggest in fact 
                                                
629 See this thesis examination of existing non-criminal justice responses, and concerns raised about compatibility 
with Human Rights, p 65 – 103. 
630 European Union, Commission of the European Communities, ‘Developing a strategic concept on tackling 
organised crime’ (European Union, June 2, 2005), at p 2;  The Prevention and Control of Organised Crime: A 
European Union Strategy for the beginning of the new millennium [2000] OJ C124/1, at p 15. 
631 Boister, N, ‘'Transnational Criminal Law'?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law, 953. 
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dependency on less than sound knowledge and lack of sound knowledge within the entire policy 
field.632 
 
Joanna Parkin criticized policy making within the European Union’s new Internal 
Security Strategy for being based on questionable evidence.633  Her study shows the policy 
making to be based mostly on what she chooses to call ‘agency generated knowledge’, generated 
by Home Affairs agencies of the European Union.  The study reveals why most of the 
knowledge that these agencies are producing should not be considered knowledge, but rather 
intelligence and why as such it should not be presented as grounds for evidence based decision 
making.   
Parkin’s study examined the agency generated knowledge and found it “. . . presents 
several shortcomings when measured against criteria of objectivity, scientific rigour, reliability, 
relevance and accuracy.”634  Methodology and information based on for this agency generated 
knowledge were frequently not made available for critical review.  Furthermore, the information 
based on were frequently not gathered in accordance with any sound methodology, but provided 
by law enforcement institutions of the member states on a voluntary basis.635  This is found to be 
problematic for lack of mechanism to ensure consistency in the selection of information that the 
research is to be based on, creating concerns for the objectivity and completeness of the 
information. 
Additionally, the ‘knowledge’ being produced is kept beyond scrutiny, such as scientific 
assessment of the quality and reliability of the process or the information used.636  This limits the 
field of expertise to the expertise that exists within the agencies.  Consequently, the limited field 
of expertise and lack of critical review was found to generate risk for gaps in the knowledge 
base, unidentified flaws in the methodology or failure to identify relevant information or 
alternative interpretations.   
                                                
632 Parkin, Joanna, ‘EU Home Affairs Agencies and the Construction of EU Internal Security’ [2012] CEPS Pepars 
in Liberty and Security in Europe;  Boswell, Christina, ‘The political functions of expert knowledge: knowledge and 
legitimation in European Union immigration policy’ (2008) 15 Journal of European Public Policy, 471. 
633 Parkin, Joanna, ‘EU Home Affairs Agencies and the Construction of EU Internal Security’ [2012] CEPS Pepars 
in Liberty and Security in Europe. 
634 Ibid, p 33 and 40 
635 Ibid, at p 8. 
636 Parkin, Joanna, ‘EU Home Affairs Agencies and the Construction of EU Internal Security’ [2012] CEPS Papers 
in Liberty and Security in Europe, at p 36 and 40. 
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Furthermore, the agencies of the European Union Home Affair claim to be a source of 
knowledge in the field and in unique position to create Europe wide knowledge, when in fact 
they are producing less than sound knowledge, and more in line with intelligence.637  
Subsequently, Parkin’s study suggests that policymaking within the subject area of internal 
security of the European Union is in fact largely based on intelligence portrayed as sound 
knowledge.  This is problematic for a number of reasons. 
Intelligence is neither scientific knowledge, nor evidence.  Intelligence has even been 
described as an educated guess.638  Where the intelligence is the best guess of what has or will 
happen based on some information but not necessarily based on evidence,639 while evidence are 
necessarily subject to one or another standard of proof, generally excluding opinions and 
guesswork.  Intelligence differ from scientific research in that it is not intended to acquire 
knowledge on a chosen subject.640  Rather it is intended to provide educated guess of “. . . what 
has happened, is happening now, or could happen in the future”641, to direct the facilitation of 
effective intervention.642  The analysis that create intelligence differ from research that create 
sound scientific knowledge in a number of ways, such as intelligence’s need for speed, secrecy 
and professional trust, as well as being expected to include bias and guesswork.643  While 
scientific research capable of creating or contributing to sound knowledge is “. . . measured 
against criteria of objectivity, scientific rigour, reliability, relevance and accuracy”644, as well as 
having to pass critically reviewed by academic experts in the subject field  before being accepted 
for publication.645  Consequently, scientifically sound knowledge has to be able to state what 
                                                
637 Parkin, Joanna, ‘EU Home Affairs Agencies and the Construction of EU Internal Security’ [2012] CEPS Pepars 
in Liberty and Security in Europe. 
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information is the basis for its conclusions, and how the said conclusions were reached from the 
information cited. 
Finally, the agencies are found to rely predominantly on expert knowledge within the law 
enforcement and security professions, both for the gathering of information and processing of 
information, while independent academic research seems not to carry much weight.646  This last 
point is found to generate three additional issues. 
First, the ‘knowledge’ claimed to be created is generated in a closed circle of likeminded 
experts with similar experience and expertise, having similar goals and interests, while criticism 
based on related interests, goals and related experience or expertise is held at bay.647  Examples 
of different interests, that might be necessary to given priority over efficient law enforcement 
interventions, would be: Civil liberty, fundamental rights, and proportionality.648  Potentially 
valuable complementary expertise can for example be drawn from the fields of: Global 
governance, legal comparison, and different forms of social science casting light on the social 
problem and the effects of the proposed responses on that said social problem and the society at 
large. 
Second, Parkin’s study finds intelligence to be circulated as knowledge in inter agency 
cooperation, and to policy decision makers, while sheltered from outside scrutiny.649  This 
creates the problem that “. . . intelligence as ‘knowledge’ is being circulated, re-packaged and re-
cycled inside and between agencies, becoming self-reinforcing, yet increasingly separated from 
its original evidence base.”650 
Finally, the study identifies objectivity as a specific problem with creation of sound 
knowledge within agencies which existence and role so heavily relies on the decisions made on 
the basis of this same ‘knowledge’.  The study finds agencies to be engaged with identifying 
problems and developing solutions that ultimately have established or strengthened the role of 
                                                
646 Parkin, Joanna, ‘EU Home Affairs Agencies and the Construction of EU Internal Security’ [2012] CEPS Papers 
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the agencies themselves.651  This concerns for objectivity then escalates with the secrecy that 
prevents public discussion and review of the ‘knowledge’ and how it is produced. 
Parkin insightfully points out that “. . . the question of ‘what is knowledge’ is intimately 
linked with the question of what constitutes objective evidence.”652  Consequently, by 
introducing non-objective information as knowledge, such information can be mistaken for 
objective evidence. 
 
Parkin’s study raises concerns for the knowledge base for the promotion of non-criminal 
justice responses by the European Union.  As detailed in the chapter on transnational promotion 
of non-criminal justice responses653, the European Union is actively involved in developing 
specific responses and select best practices, practices that the Union then promotes amongst its 
member states.654  The Union gets involved in this way, and is being called up on to do so by its 
member states, based on its unique position to facilitate sharing of information amongst the 
member states and ability of its supranational institution to create Union wide knowledge.655  
The knowledge created, as well as best practices selected on basis of that knowledge, are referred 
to in the legal instruments and policy documents created by the Union.656  Subsequently, this 
creates legal obligations and soft law pressure for member states, to adopt the suggested policies, 
approaches and responses - potentially affecting domestic policy and norms. 
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Study of the publicly available documents about the selection and promotion of non-
criminal justice responses at the level of the European Union shows Parkin’s concerns to be 
relevant to the promotion of non-criminal justice responses. 
First, the knowledge being generated at the level of the European Union about non-
criminal justice responses as part of the Unions promotion of such responses seems to be 
predominantly generated by expert practitioners in law enforcement.657  As pointed out by 
Parkin, law enforcement agencies have been criticized for fostering an occupational culture that 
might emphasize effective intervention over considerations criticizing or limiting such effective 
law enforcement.658  This raises concerns for objectivity and impartiality of the knowledge 
created.   
Regarding the concerns raised by Parking about knowledge generated in a closed circle 
of likeminded experts, the Europol Platform for Experts has experts from outside the circle of 
law enforcement practitioners.  However, available information does not reveal how extensive 
expertise is to be found within the forums of the platform, what forums have experts external to 
law enforcement agencies, and to what extent the platform influences the knowledge on which 
the European Union bases its work.659  Secrecy clocking the knowledge generated and how it is 
generated shelters from criticism and prevents external input. 
The development of non-criminal justice responses at the level of the European Union 
seems to be based on information offered on voluntary basis from the member states about 
responses being or having been utilized by their domestic authorities.660  No independent 
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collection of information seems to take place, nor review of the information shared by the 
domestic expert practitioners.  Additionally, concerns must be raised over the objectivity and 
impartiality of experts within agencies that are being affected by the policy or responses 
promoted.661  These concerns can best be objected to with transparency and review of the work 
being conducted – unfortunately transparency is not part of the description of the process for the 
assessment and promotion of non-criminal justice responses at the level of the European Union. 
Similar concerns as Parkin raised about self-reinforcing of less than sound knowledge by 
way of circulation between agencies of the European Union, must be raised over the Union’s role 
in sharing information about non-criminal justice responses between the member states, as well 
as collection, assessment and selection of best practice at the Union level.662  Concerns must be 
raised for the involvement of the Union to cause to some extent separation between the 
knowledge being shared and its original evidence basis.  Additional, emphasize on less than 
sound knowledge and lack of truly sound knowledge, may raise concerns for undue influence of 
the European Union, based on its own policy and interests of its agencies, on the information 
shared and the responses selected as best practices. 
Finally, Parkin identifies objectivity as a specific problem for creation of sound 
knowledge within agencies, which existence and role relies so heavily on the decisions made on 
the basis of the knowledge being generated.663  Such concerns for objectivity must, also, be 
raised over the knowledge about non-criminal justice response generated by national and 
supranational agencies that have, or are intended to play a role in countering organized crime or 
crime in general by utilizing non-criminal justice responses.664  Additionally, different nation 
states seem to have different level of involvement in the knowledge generation.  For example, 
the Hungarian handbook was created primarily by representatives of eight of the then 27 member 
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states of the European Union.665  These concerns for objectivity then escalates with the secrecy 
that prevents public discussion and review of the knowledge and how it is generated.  
Furthermore, as noted by Parkin, knowledge is considered to represent objective evidence.  
Consequently, it seems misleading to represent non-objective information as knowledge. 
 
Parkin points out how the Home Affair agencies are trying to establish themselves as “. . . 
‘centres of expertise’ or ‘law enforcement knowledge bases’.”666  The same seems to be the case 
with transnationalization of non-criminal justice responses, the European Union and its 
supranational institutions are trying to establish themselves as a basis for knowledge in the field, 
while at the same time ignoring established ideas about how sound knowledge is produced.  
Unfortunately, no attempts seem to have been made to establish why sound knowledge should be 
differently produced in the field of law enforcement than in other fields.  Even if reference has 
been made to the importance of intelligence over scientific research, based on need for speed, 
secrecy and professional trust.667  Unfortunately, secrecy and professional trust has frequently 
been misused and the need for prompt results seems not to be the only consideration for policies 
that have been developing for tens of years.  Too much dependency of police on intelligence has 
been criticized.668  Established principles for generation of scientifically sound knowledge and 
evidence seem therefore not to have been altered, objectivity, scientific rigour, reliability, 
relevance, accuracy, and critical review seem still to be at the heart of the creation of sound 
knowledge.669 
 
The European Union’s contribution to the selection of existing non-criminal justice 
responses and development of new responses seems therefore to run into the same criticism, for 
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lacking knowledge base and being based on less than sound knowledge, as the Union’s policy 
making in the field.   
Knowledge of non-criminal justice responses seems to be lacking and the knowledge 
relied on seems to be less than sound knowledge.  Still the Union is appealing to its member 
states to adopt responses based on this work.  Furthermore, the member states of the Union are 
seeking increased involvement of the European Union, and agencies of the Union are seeking to 
play a role in the promotion of non-criminal justice response.  This reliance of the member states 
on the Union is likely caused by the claim of the European Union Home Affairs agencies to be in 
a unique position to create superior knowledge in this field due to their Union wide overview and 
access to information.  Truly, the Union and its institutions are in a unique position to create 
superior knowledge, but this study indicates that this position is not utilized to generate 
objective, evidence based, and sound knowledge.  
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The elephant in the room:  international promotion of non-
criminal justice responses to organized crime – raises 
substantive and relevant concerns 
 
This study claims to have confirmed its presumption that domestic authorities are 
utilizing great variety of non-criminal justice responses to counter organized crime, and greater 
than existing academic literature suggests.  Additionally, the utilization of this approach seems to 
be more vide spread worldwide than the literature indicates.  The research shows domestic 
authorities in Australia, Canada, Iceland, and most or all of the member states of the European 
Union to be utilizing non-criminal justice responses.670  In fact, non-criminal justice responses 
have become a major complementary approach for countering organized crime, and there seems 
to be reasons to think this approach is on the rise.  However, existing literature on domestic non-
criminal justice responses raises numerous concerns with both individual responses and the 
approach of utilizing non-criminal justice responses for countering organized crime and crime in 
general.  These concerns have mainly to do with compatibility of the non-criminal justice 
responses with fundamental principles of law and Human Rights, as well as lack of restrain on 
the scope of the responses, to some extent due to difficulty with providing sufficient definition 
for the subject of the response. 
 
Furthermore, the study found the European Union to utilize International Soft Law for the 
promotion of non-criminal justice responses to organized crime, both the approach as such and 
specific responses as best practice.  Consequently, rejected its second presupposition, that non-
criminal justice responses to organized crime were not part of international efforts for countering 
transnational crime, including organized crime.  The soft law approach is found to create legal 
obligations as well as pear pressure, effectively influencing the member states to adopt non-
criminal justice responses as a complementary approach to traditional criminal justice responses.  
Additionally, the Union can be seen to promote the utilization of non-criminal justice responses 
by facilitating information sharing between the member states, assessment and selection of best 
                                                
670 The Council of the European Union, the Netherlands delegation, ‘Analysis Administrative/Non-Penal 
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practices from existing practices and experience of its member states, and by contributing to the 
development of new and existing responses.   
 
Surprisingly, no academic literature was found that discussed specifically this promotion 
of the European Union of non-criminal justice responses for countering organized crime, and 
little or no scientific research seems to have been conducted on this aspect of globalization of 
crime control under International Law.  Transnational Criminal Law, claiming to be the main 
venue within the field of law for academic discussion about international efforts for indirectly 
suppressing organized crime through domestic law, seems to continue to exclude non-criminal 
justice responses and the effects of International Soft Law on domestic legislation.  
Consequently, much of the influence that International Soft Law and information sharing at the 
level of the European Union seems to have on domestic authorities adopting non-criminal justice 
responses for countering organized crime, goes largely unnoticed by the academic discussion 
about international efforts for countering organized crime. 
These considerations seem to be of an importance as the examination conducted as part 
of this study shows the promotion by the European Union of non-criminal justice response to 
organized crime to raise concerns for incompatibility with fundamental principles of law and 
good governance.  In fact the examination shows the promotion by the Union to raise concerns 
much in line with those that have previously been raised over the system of Transnational 
Criminal Law.  This study argues these concerns to be caused by a combination of lack of sound 
knowledge and lack of emphasize on fundamental principles of law, Human Rights and good 
governance.  The concern for lack of sound knowledge is base on academic researches finding 
lack of reliance on sound knowledge within the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice.  Additionally, showing reliance on less than sound knowledge and intelligence, 
misconceived as sound knowledge. 
 
 
Based on findings of lack of knowledge and incompatibility of the international 
promotion of non-criminal justice responses with fundamental principles of law, Human Rights 
and good governance, detailed in previous chapter, this study suggests pluralist thinking as a 
favourable approach to international efforts for countering organized crime. 
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The pluralist perspective suggested there to be real problems, both theoretically and 
practically, with creation of universal hierarchical normative order at the global or even regional 
level due to the diversity of the world’s societies.671  This is in line with academic writings in the 
field of Transnational Criminal Law that suggest harmonization of organized crime legislation to 
be a goal that would be hard to reach, due to the variety of social problems perceived to be 
organized crime, the diversity of organized crime legislations and lack of consensus amongst 
nation state about what kind of activities should be seen to constitute organized 
crime.672Academic discussions, although predominantly within the pluralistic school of thought, 
seem therefore to suggest that not only are domestic responses to counter organized crime 
designed to counter the particular social problem perceived to be organized crime in that 
particular jurisdiction, they are designed to work in a specific domestic social, economic and 
legal contexts. Pluralist legal thinking seems therefore to suggest that transnational 
harmonization is not the way ahead for international efforts to counter organized crime, in a 
“pluralistic-in-fact universe”673 where “every legal system has its own society”674. 
 
Finally, this study finds the European Union to be facilitating information sharing 
between its member states and influencing the development of non-criminal justice responses 
based on existing domestic practices and experience.   
Existing academic writings suggest, however, that using practices and experience from 
one nation state to develop responses in another nation state, is a difficult and complicated 
process.  Writing on pluralist legal thinking and legal comparison Zumbanse emphasizes the 
need for “interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist comparisons”675, in the appropriate 
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context.676  Consequently, an ‘interdisciplinary understanding of functionalist comparisons’ of 
the existing practices and experience needs to be reached, in their ‘appropriate context’ of both 
jurisdictions.677 Subsequently, it should be possible to identify relevant similarities and 
differences, making it possible to see if and how one jurisdiction can draw from the other’s 
practices and experience. 
Furthermore, the discussion suggests it to be scientifically flawed to promote the 
practices and experience from one jurisdiction as best practices, to be adopted by other 
jurisdictions, only based on assessment of the practices and experiences in that jurisdiction.  
Arguing that the implementation of the same practices in different jurisdiction may yield 
completely different experience, based on the domestic context.  The European Union is found to 
be promoting best practices, seemingly based only on assessment of existing practices and 
experience in their jurisdiction of origin, encouraging its member states to adopt specific non-
criminal justice responses. 
Substantive concerns are therefore raised over the information sharing of existing 
practices and experience of non-criminal justice responses to organized crime, and promotion of 
best practices within the European Union. 
 
This study claims to raise considerable and relevant concerns with current international 
efforts for the promotion of non-criminal justice responses for countering organized crime.  Not 
because the utilization of non-criminal justice responses can not be a good approach to organized 
crime or criminal activities in general, but because the promotion of the approach and specific 
responses fails to rely on best available knowledge in the field and seems tainted by less than 
sound knowledge and lack of emphasize on Human Rights, fundamental principles of law and 
good governance.  
                                                
676 Ibid; Zumbansen, Peer, ‘Transnational comparisons: theory and practice of comparative law as a critique of 
global governance’ in Jacco Bomhoff and Maurice Adams (eds), Theroy and Practice in Comparative Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2012), p 186. 
677 Ibid; Zumbansen, Peer, ‘Transnational comparisons: theory and practice of comparative law as a critique of 
global governance’ in Jacco Bomhoff and Maurice Adams (eds), Theroy and Practice in Comparative Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2012), p 186. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis has been much critical on the current international efforts for the promotion of 
non-criminal justice responses for countering organized crime.  However, this is not to say that 
the approach to counter organized crime by utilizing non-criminal justice responses can not be a 
good approach – only that current international efforts for promoting the approach raise concerns 
and deserve criticism. 
This study has shown how practitioners are increasingly reaching out for non-criminal 
justice responses to counter organized crime.  The main argument for the adoption of non-
criminal justice responses seem to be that traditional criminal justice responses have proved to be 
insufficient in dealing with transnational and organized crime.  This is in fact supported by 
academics that have argued traditional criminal justice responses to be neither well suited to deal 
with collective behaviour such as organized crime, nor criminal activities that transcends borders 
such as transnational crime.  Additionally, development of criminal justice responses aimed at 
organized crime have meet criticism for unacceptably widening the scope of criminal liability, 
lacking the establishment of the fault requirement and bordering on guilt by association.  
Consequently, the development of non-criminal justice responses, for the purposes of prevention 
and deterrence, seems not that far fetched or unreasonable complementary approach to the 
traditional criminal justice response, seemingly struggling in this field.  However, existing 
practices and experience have raised concerns, and some responses have even been found 
unconstitutional in their jurisdiction of origin.  Furthermore, it is found to be unsettling how the 
introduction of non-criminal justice responses to counter organized crime seem to raise concerns 
that have been previously raised, either in another jurisdiction or in another context, such as the 
context of criminal justice responses for countering organized crime.  Consequently, suggesting 
that the issue should have been addressed and potentially avoided in one way or another before 
implementation of the response – if the preparation and development of the responses were based 
on best available knowledge in the field. 
These findings are not detrimental to the approach of utilizing non-criminal justice 
responses to organized crime – there are, however, concerns and issues that need to be addressed.  
Unfortunately, the policy documents and legal instruments, promoting non-criminal justice 
responses to organized crime within the European Union, were not found to discuss or even note 
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the issues and concerns raised with existing practices and experience.  This in turn raises 
concerns for the international promotion of the approach not being guided by best available 
knowledge in the field.  Consequently, it must be questioned if political assessment and decision 
making to promote the approach was based on sound knowledge.  
 
Furthermore, the study raises substantive concerns for the existing international 
promotion of non-criminal justice responses to organized crime.  Examination of the promotion 
raises substantive concerns with compatibility of the promotion with fundamental principles of 
law, human rights and good governance.  It is unsettling that the examination was based on well 
known concerns and issues that should have been considered and addressed in such an important 
policy change as is the shift towards non-criminal justice approach to criminal activity, 
traditionally dealt with by way of criminal justice responses.  Subsequently, raising again the 
concern for lack of sound knowledge in guiding the examination and promotion of non-criminal 
justice responses at the international level. 
 
Finally, this study found research based evidence for the lack of reliance on sound 
knowledge in the policymaking and within institutions of the European Union’s Aria of Freedom, 
Security and Justice.  These evidence seem to be reinforce by findings of this study, that best 
available knowledge is not sufficiently guiding the international efforts for promotion of non-
criminal justice responses, selection of best practices and development of new responses.  In fact, 
the development and utilization of non-criminal justice responses seems to be lead by sharing of 
raw information and intelligence, rather than sound knowledge.  Emphasize on intelligence in 
policing and for policymaking seems to have generated a widespread misconception of 
intelligence as a sound knowledge – causing intelligence to be extensively presented as best 
available knowledge. 
Consequently, the promotion of the approach and existing practices seem repeatedly to 
raise known issues, apparently without existing knowledge being utilized to avoid those issues 
and develop legitimate and less contested practices.  This study does not find against the 
international promotion of non-criminal justice responses to organized crime in general – it does, 
however, finding existing efforts to ignore best available knowledge in the field and 
subsequently run into known issues. 
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The main conclusion of this thesis is, therefore, that sound knowledge is lacking about 
non-criminal justice responses to counter organized crime and that existing best available 
knowledge in the field is not relied up on.   
This lack of reliance on best available knowledge seems to be caused by a culture of 
reliance on intelligence amongst policymakers, law enforcement and security personals.  This 
culture leads to misconception of intelligence as sound knowledge and reliance on intelligence 
style analyzed and assessments for decision making.  As intelligence is neither knowledge nor 
evidence, this leads to decision making that runs into known issues and concerns.  While 
evidence based decision making based on best available knowledge should be capable of 
identifying potential issues and concerns, in order to address them in a way that would avoid the 
issues or justify the approach taken. 
Consequently, public discussion is needed about the present shift from traditional 
approach of countering crime with criminal justice responses, towards utilizing non-criminal 
justice responses for countering criminal activities, such as organized crime, and the problematic 
international promotion of the approach.  The lack of reliance on sound knowledge and 
overreliance on less than sound knowledge must be exposed.  Hopefully, such public discussion 
can lead to public and political pressure, capable of leading to policy and practices in the field 
become more compatible with fundamental principles of law, human right, good governance and 
the best available knowledge. 
 
Such knowledge based development of non-criminal justice responses to criminal 
activities such as organized crime would do well to learn from knowledge in the field of 
Transnational Criminal Law and Global Governance, showing the problems with realization of 
universal norms and the potentials of more pluralistic approach.  Pluralist legal thinking might 
then guide the sharing of information about practices and experience of domestic non-criminal 
justice responses, based on sound knowledge, preferably realized by “interdisciplinary 
understanding of functionalist comparisons”678, in the appropriate context.679  Potentially such 
                                                
678 Zumbansen, Peer, ‘Comparative, global and transnational constitutionalism: The emergence of a transnational 
legal-pluralist order’ (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism, 16, at p 51. 
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development would be capable of furthering the development of domestic non-criminal justice 
responses that would fit the perceived problem and the context of its own jurisdiction.  Capable 
of bringing about responses that are effective in countering the perceived problem, while 
compatible with fundamental principles of law, Human Rights and good governance.  After all, 
being tough on crime is not ‘cool’ if you end up loosing in court – found yourself to have violated 
fundamental principles of the society you thought you were serving and protecting. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
679 Ibid; Zumbansen, Peer, ‘Transnational comparisons: theory and practice of comparative law as a critique of 
global governance’ in Jacco Bomhoff and Maurice Adams (eds), Theroy and Practice in Comparative Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2012), p 186. 
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